

Map showing approximate new borders—Railway from Petrozavodsk to Suojärvi built during the fighting—Railway from Kandalaksha to Kemijärvi under construction

WAR AND PEACE IN FINLAND

A DOCUMENTED SURVEY

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WAR AND PEACE IN FINLAND

Introduction

THE events following the conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Finland on March 12 have demonstrated incontrovertibly the wisdom and necessity of the Soviet course in the Baltic. The Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty, securing guarantees which have rendered the Soviet Union safe at a number of vulnerable points, puts an end to the anti-Soviet war base long prepared in Finland. The peace treaty has reinforced Soviet neutrality, pushed back the flames of the European war from the East Baltic and confirmed the main task of Soviet foreign policy, restated by Molotov in his address to the Supreme Soviet on March 29 "to ensure peace between nations and the security of our country."

As soon as the new imperialist war opened, the belligerents, locked behind their Maginot and Siegfried Lines, began maneuvers to shift the theatre of war elsewhere, to spare their own cities and industrial structures, and bring their quarrel to an issue on other soil and, as far as possible, with the blood of other peoples.

Defense of Finland was the pretext through which, as we shall show in the following pages, the Allies had expected to create a northern front in the war against Germany and a base for attacking the USSR. The conflict in Finland was not between the USSR and Finland alone, but between the USSR and a group of imperialist powers which had long planned to use Finland as a base for attacking the Soviet Union. The peace in Finland, which the Allies desperately sought to prevent, blocked these plans. But the search for another battlefield went on, and in less than a month the frantic efforts to drag Scandinavia into the war bore fruit. British violation of Norway's territorial waters was swiftly followed by the retaliatory German invasion of Norway and Denmark. And the new battlefield had been created.

With the pretext of aid to Finland gone, the real war aims of the Western Powers in preparing a northern battle front were laid bare. Before it could catch its breath, the press frankly described this new phase of the war "as the struggle for mastery of the Scandinavian Peninsula with its rich ore deposits" (Raymond Daniell, *New York Times*, April 10) and "a life and death struggle for the mastery of Scandinavia between Germany and the Allies" (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 10). Thus the peace-loving people of Scandinavia who sought to remain neutral, have been sacrificed to the predatory aims of the warring powers of Europe, and the danger that the people in the Balkans and the Near East will also be drawn into the conflict is intensified.

Finland sought peace with the Soviet Union not only because of military reverses, but because of disillusionment over the nature of British promises and belated recognition of what was in store for her through her involvement in the imperialist war that would have followed large scale assistance from Allied troops. Once the Finnish Government made its belated decision, the final negotiations took but five days. The terms of the treaty, signed March 12, reemphasized the fact that preservation of its own security and peace in the Eastern Baltic were and are sole objectives of Soviet policy toward its Baltic neighbors.

After the breakthrough of the supposedly impregnable Mannerheim Line and the swift victories that followed, the Red Army could easily have occupied the whole of Finland. But the Soviet Union had no desire for territorial aggrandizement or domination of the internal or foreign policy of its neighbor. She had not wanted to embark on military operations in the first place, and was only too glad to return to the path of negotiations as soon as the Finnish Government was prepared to act in the interests of its own people and not at the behest of the imperialist powers. Despite its victories, the Soviet Union exacted no reparations and demanded no territorial concessions stripping Finland of natural wealth. Soviet troops had occupied the rich Petsamo region, with its valuable nickel mines and its ice-free port, considered superior to the Soviet ice-free port of Murmansk. The troops were withdrawn and the region was returned to Finland, with all damages resulting from hostilities fully repaired. No demands were made for bases on the Aland Islands which a Baltic power, if it were bent on dominating the policies of its neighbors, would have insisted on.

The territorial cessions asked by the Soviet Union were such as the course of the war had indicated were necessary to Soviet defense. The treaty (published in full in the document section) provided for the cession to the Soviet Union of the whole Karelian Isthmus and the entire shore of Lake Ladoga, and Rybachi and Sredni Peninsulas in the north. Hangö Peninsula and adjoining districts on the Baltic Sea are leased to the USSR for thirty years. A railway is to be constructed from the Soviet town of Kandalaksha to Kemijärvi in North Central Finland, and transit of goods to and from Norway and Sweden is to be facilitated. The treaty incorporates a mutual pledge of non-aggression, and provides for immediate trade negotiations. Resumption of diplomatic relations followed.

Finland emerges from the war more independent and secure than before. As the history of the last twenty-two years shows, Finland's positions on the Gulf of Finland, the Karelian Isthmus and in the north had previously been used against the Soviet Union and had been counted upon in long range anti-Soviet plans. With their loss Finland, in effect, is relieved of liabilities, of future danger points as well as of direct involvement in the present war. Closer economic relations with its geographically logical market, the Soviet Union, offer a new stimulus for the development of Finland's productive forces.

Another positive achievement that has followed the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish peace, is the formation of the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic, joining new territories ceded by Finland with the former autonomous Karelian Republic to constitute a twelfth Union Republic. Thus the Finns remaining in the ceded areas immediately assume, side by side with the related Karelian people, full equality in the Soviet family of nations, in accordance with the Soviet policy in regard to all nationalities.

In its military operations in Finland, the Soviet Union carried out its principles that in armed conflict it does not make war on peoples, but confines itself to operations against the military apparatus of the hostile government. When the conflict opened it was immediately assumed abroad that the Soviet Union would wage a "blitzkrieg" war on the routine model adopted by the imperialist powers when engaging a weaker state. On the very day that Soviet planes went into action the press, without waiting to check what had happened, falsely reported indiscriminate bombing of open towns and civilians. But in the flood of public revisions of previous testimony by the war correspondents that came later, it was universally admitted that there were astonishingly few civilian casualties throughout the whole conflict, and that Red Army airmen had scrupulously limited their operations to military objectives.

Reversing all their early judgments, both correspondents and military experts paid high tribute to the unprecedented Red Army achievements in making mid-winter advances in Arctic regions and in cracking the Mannerheim Line, a feat which had been considered impossible. The Red Army man was seen to be a courageous, disciplined, resourceful soldier, with a devotion to his principles that gave him invincible morale. The Soviet General Staff showed remarkable flexibility in guiding operations under the most difficult conditions faced in a modern war. The Soviet engineering staff showed high capacity in building an 81 mile railway through a combat sector during record breaking cold. Soviet war materials, tanks and airplanes proved to be of excellent quality. The supposedly inefficient Soviet transport system functioned without a hitch.

The practical demonstration in military operations of the quality and organization of Soviet armed forces becomes a factor for world peace. The imperialists will not find it easy to lure other countries into military adventures against the Soviet Union.

Through the military and diplomatic efforts of the Soviet Union the Gulf of Finland is closed to aggression through that door. Leningrad is secure, with the border relocated a safe distance away. The danger of hostile bases in the Arctic is removed. By virtually sealing these borders from aggression the dangers of war are immensely lessened. The Soviet Union preserves its neutrality and can pursue its peace policy with still better prospects of becoming a force for extending the area of peace in the world as it is already serving to limit the areas of war.

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

WHEN World War II opened, the Soviet Union, recognizing the dangers facing all nations in a war that threatened to spread, like World War I, and determined to ensure the security of the approaches to Leningrad, opened negotiations with the neighboring Baltic States, in turn. The proposals involved border revisions, mutual security pacts, and garrisoning of strategic points which these nations might either be unable to defend, or be powerless to prevent being used as bases of attack upon the Soviet Union. The negotiations were speedily brought to harmonious conclusions with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Through these arrangements the westernmost approaches to Leningrad were made more secure. To render this security complete an analogous agreement with Finland was necessary. There the geographical situation as regards the security of the Soviet Union presented three danger points. First, the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus put Leningrad within artillery range, thus menacing the second largest city of the Soviet Union, a city with a population almost equal to that of all Finland, and the center of one of the major Soviet industrial areas.

Secondly, holding the entire northern coast of the Gulf of Finland and strategic islands facing the defense fortresses of Leningrad, Finland was in a position to prevent defensive operations of the Red Fleet and to provide bases and other support for the operations of hostile fleets.

Thirdly, the Rybachi and Sredni Peninsulas in the Arctic provided harbors suitable for submarine bases from which menacing naval operations could be carried on against the new Soviet-developed Arctic Sea route and against Murmansk and the new Arctic cities and harbors established by Soviet pioneering.

These were not merely theoretical dangers. In the interventionist and White Guard campaigns against the Soviet Union these land approaches on the Karelian Isthmus, these sea approaches through the Gulf of Finland and these peninsular submarine bases were used against the struggling Soviet State. Since that period these approaches from Finland have always held a prominent place in anti-Soviet calculations.

The Negotiations with Finland

In the negotiations with Finland, therefore, the Soviet Union sought to nullify these dangers to its security. It proposed at the same time a mutual defense pact similar to the pacts entered into with the other Eastern Baltic States. And it offered substantial territorial and trade compensations. At first the Finnish Premier Cajander issued a public statement

that the Soviet proposals did not compromise the territorial integrity and the independence of the country. But, following a conference of the Kings of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, a public statement by the President of our country and diplomatic activities on the part of the Allies, the Finnish negotiators became intransigent. After dragging on for five weeks, during which period the Finnish Government ordered a general mobilization, established large forces on the frontier, and suppressed newspapers that considered the Soviet proposals a reasonable basis for negotiations, the deadlocked negotiations were suspended and there followed seventeen days of mounting crisis culminating in the opening of hostilities.

The issue that brought negotiations to a deadlock was the lease of Hangö as a naval base. On this point the Soviet Union modified its proposal, reducing the garrison and proposing that the Hangö lease be only for the duration of the war between the Allies and Germany. This proposal was rejected. (*See page 120*)

During this period Finland not only retained its unfriendly intransigence but made an overt declaration of its hostility by a public attack on the Soviet mutual assistance pacts with the other Baltic States. Former Premier Cajander made a speech, not subsequently repudiated, commiserating with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, "three prosperous states which, after being independent nations, have suddenly become more or less dependent on Soviet Russia. Finland feels especially concerned for the fate of her dear sister nation Estonia."

These were suspicious overtures in view of the fact that Finnish extremists had often suggested a union of Finland and Estonia with the Leningrad area as the point of fusion. Such a statement, made at this time, had two possible interpretations. Either it could be taken as the outburst of a diplomatic pyromaniac, or as evidence that Cajander was aware of promises of backing by other nations in a projected conflict with the Soviet Union and was making a bid for another ally and another battle front.

There followed, two days later, a fusillade upon a squad of Red Army men, a provocative border incident by the Finns similar to those that had been carried out by the Finns in the past and to those projected as prelude to war in previous anti-Soviet plans, exposed in the trial of the leaders of the so-called Industrial Party in 1930. To prevent a repetition of such incidents the Soviet Union proposed that the Finnish troops be withdrawn a short distance. The Finnish Government refused unless Soviet troops were withdrawn an equal distance. The Soviet Union pointed out that whereas the proposed withdrawal of the Finnish troops would leave no Finnish city or strategic point exposed, the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the point asked by the Finns would mean abandoning the outer defenses of Leningrad and placing the troops in the city's suburbs. The Soviet Union further pointed out that to insist upon such a military advantage presumed a hostile attitude on the part of the Finnish Government.

When the Soviet Government, exasperated by Finnish provocations,

severed diplomatic relations, the Cajander government went out of office. The new government, with Vainö Tanner as Foreign Minister, distinctly worsened the situation, lessening hopes of a peaceful and complete settlement of the issues between the two governments. Tanner, the Social-Democrat, seemed intent on proving more belligerent than his confreres on the Right. His hostile attitude during the negotiations was in striking contrast to the reasonableness of Paasikivi, who had a leading role in the first stages of the negotiations and who was later chosen for the final negotiations that terminated the war. The composition of the new government indicated that the rulers of Finland had turned out the Cajander government for fear that it would come to a peaceful settlement after all. The change in government was a further provocation since the new Ryti government was a mobilization of known anti-Soviet politicians.

The authoritative British bulletin, *The Week*, wrote:

"It had been supposed not only in London but in Stockholm and Helsinki that there was time, at least until spring, in which to 'prepare the position' for a large scale showdown on the Soviet proposals to Finland. There is no question that in Scandinavia and London alike—and apparently in Washington too—information from agents has been to the effect that the Communists would 'play it slow,' would be alarmed at the possible 'repercussions of world opinion' and would therefore be unable to take violent action to close the Gulf of Finland until spring.

"This 'preparation for position' is confirmed particularly in Sweden: for it was hoped—and with some reason—that by spring it would be possible to have secured a government in Sweden which would be willing to act against the Soviet Union and—more important still—it was believed that by then, American aid to Sweden in military action against the Soviet Union would be secured.

"It is important to note, even twenty-four hours before the Soviet move, the well-informed Conservative circles in London were offering even money on the proposition that Sweden and the United States could be militarily and financially aligned against the Soviet Union's proposals. And these proposals were of a particularly alarming nature, inasmuch as their success would profoundly change the world power position by removing the possibility of a direct threat by the 'Capitalist World' to one of the principal industrial regions of the 'Communist World.' . . .

"There was a moment of acute nervousness when Paasikivi, then the Finnish delegate to Moscow negotiations, was discovered to be willing to reach an agreement on Soviet terms. . . . The appointment of M. Tanner . . . was made with the object of 'stiffening' the Finnish delegation and reversing the position reached by Paasikivi.

"That having been accomplished, it was thought a long period of diplomatic and financial pressure by the Russians would set in and last all winter, the Helsinki government in the meantime receiving increasing support from the United States." (December 6, 1939)

The Soviet Government, facing the demonstrated hostility of the Finnish Government, had no recourse but armed action.

Considering that the Helsinki government was not acting in the interests of the Finnish people, the Soviet Government made a treaty with a Finnish People's Government organized by Finnish working class leaders

at Terioki. This treaty has been superseded by the subsequent treaty made with the Helsinki government, with the approval of the Terioki government, which dissolved itself when the Helsinki government sought peace and stable relations with the Soviet Union.

Clearly, in the present crisis of world affairs, the Soviet Union was justified in seeking a revision of frontiers which would give it security. Peaceful change of frontiers is of course known in international relations and the Soviet Union did all that was possible to bring about this change of frontiers peacefully by negotiations.

The Mannerheim-Ryti-Tanner Government Chooses War

Was Finland justified in rejecting the Soviet proposals?

If the Finnish Government feared that the Soviet Union aimed at more than security, seeking to dominate the Baltic and to tie Finland to a military alliance, there are these facts in disproof: first, that, the Soviet Union included in its proposals no request for the strategic Aland Islands, possession of which would be essential to any country intending to dominate the Baltic. The Soviet Union had even agreed to Finland fortifying these islands provided Finland alone controlled them. Secondly, the Soviet Union withdrew its proposal for a mutual assistance pact, on objection by the Finnish negotiators. Thirdly, that the security of Leningrad, not territorial aggrandizement, was the Soviet objective, was indicated by the original offer to transfer to Finland, Soviet areas twice as large as those asked for on the Karelian Isthmus and elsewhere; and by the highly significant fact that the USSR offered to curtail the term of the proposed lease of Hangö *to the duration of the war between Britain and France and Germany*.

As noted before, at the opening of the negotiations Premier Cajander issued a public statement that the Soviet proposals did not compromise Finland's integrity or independence. Subsequently the Finnish Government reversed its position, explaining the departure of the Finnish negotiators from Moscow on November 13, as follows: "At that moment a deadlock had been reached and they were willing to accede to almost all the Russian proposals." . . . But not to a Soviet naval base at Hangö which they now claimed "would have meant the complete strategic dominance of Finland, and in turn the loss of Finnish independence."

At no time during the negotiations was a session of the Finnish Parliament held to canvass the sentiments of the deputies; and newspapers which suggested that the Soviet terms were reasonable were suppressed.

Why was the Hangö base refused? It could be of vital importance to the Finnish Government only if aggressive activities were to be carried on from her territories. This was how Hangö had been used in the period following the Russian revolution. If Finland contemplated continued good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union a Soviet base in Hangö would be no menace to her, would render Leningrad secure from attack, and, collaterally, lessen the chances of the extension of the war area into

the East Baltic basin and thereby promote the security of Finland herself.

The course of the Finnish Government takes on logic only on the following bases: that the government had made the decision for war on encouragement from other powers; that it protracted negotiations on the assumption that a deadlock would postpone military operations till the spring when other and complementary Allied plans in the Near East (witness the troop movements directed by the French General Weygand and the British General Wavel) could mature. The miscalculation was the Soviet Union's readiness and ability to undertake military operations in winter.

There was an additional reason why the Finnish ruling class sought the road of war. In 1916-1919 the severe economic crisis produced by the war had brought a Socialist majority in the Diet, and then a Socialist government committed to socializing the country. The ruling clique had called in foreign armies to defeat this government and subjected the people to a bloody suppression. Again in 1930, when the Finnish working class, reacting against the miseries of the world depression, began to stir, the fascist Lapua movement invoked terrorist suppression. The Second World War, cutting off Finland's markets, resulted in a new crisis and renewed stirring of the working class. War appeared to be a way out.

In this light the border provocations by Finnish troops appear as one of the routine measures to whip up war sentiment at home and a means of taking the issue out of the diplomatic realm and making war inevitable.

Thus the Finnish Government gave up peace and the good will of the Soviet Union and accepted the risks of war. It is clear that they took these risks on encouragement, presumably from the British Government. An article in the London *Daily Sketch*, by Candidus, nom-de-plume of a prominent Tory journalist, explains why England proffered this encouragement:

"The first lesson for us and France is that we must keep the war going in Finland as long as we possibly can, not only in the Finns' interest, but also in our own.

"The longer the Finnish war lasts and the more deeply Russia is involved, the less Russia can do for Germany, and the more effectual the British blockade will be."

On its part the Soviet Union was faced with the alternative of accepting diplomatic defeat, and consenting to the exposed position of its single Baltic port and second largest city, or resorting to force. Critics of the Soviet Union declare that the Soviet Union should nevertheless have accepted the situation. As D. N. Pritt observes in his book "Must the War Spread?", this is equivalent to saying to the USSR:

"You are in a position where any capitalist country would resort to force without a moment's hesitation; such countries are ruthless and amoral, and in a world where every rule of decency has now disappeared they can derive great advantage from ruthlessness and amorality. But you mustn't act in that way; you have a higher moral code to keep. If you tell me that, on the information

before you, you are convinced that if you do not move now you may be attacked before you can secure your frontier, and that such an attack will be at once more likely to happen and more difficult to repel unless you do move now, I still insist that you must not move. If you tell me that you think your whole future depends on now reinforcing your safety, and that you regard your future and the future of your civilization as worth every sacrifice to preserve, I still insist that you must not do what international law says you may, and what every other state in the world would do without hesitation."

Finland's War Preparations

It is not yet possible to secure complete information on Finnish war preparation in concert with other powers. But it is known that the Finnish airdromes with landing fields capable of accommodating 2000 planes could not be intended for the use merely of its own airforce of 150 planes. Airfields of that size indicated long-term military arrangements, with powers that had airfleets of that size.

It is known also that roads and railways far in excess of traffic expectations were built, along strategic approaches on its borders with the Soviet Union, presupposing long planned military operations. Even the manner in which the Mannerheim Line was built carried certain sinister implications. Unlike the purely defensive Maginot Line, it was a deep fortified zone also providing cover for launching a strong offensive.

It is further known that large supplies of war material were ordered by the already heavily armed Finnish Government some time before hostilities began. On the 1st of December, 1937, two years before the crisis, the British Government, in the House of Commons admitted that the export to Finland of Blenheim bombers was planned. Blenheim bombers were delivered in Finland on November, 1939, during the negotiations. A *United Press* dispatch from Paris revealed that the Allies had sent \$40,000,000 worth of war supplies to Finland shortly before hostilities started.

A release of the U.S. State Department, on November 25, which was completely buried in the newspapers, showed that for the ten months ending with October, 1939, Finland had been licensed for arms purchases of \$1,318,654, exceeding similar Soviet licenses by \$400,000. Moreover, \$849,900 of this total was licensed in October alone whereas the Soviet Union ordered none in the United States during that month.

Add all these airdromes, strategic roads, fortifications and the import of war materials before and while negotiations were going on, to the previous record of the Finnish Government as willing collaborator in anti-Soviet movements and even in initiating aggression upon Soviet territories; add to these the character of the Finnish state, which contrary to the propaganda seeking to give it a democratic face, has a strongly fascist complexion, and the fact that nationalistic extremists have expressed ambitions for a "Greater Finland" stretching all the way to the Urals, and including Estonia with the Leningrad area as the point of fusion; add the openly expressed desire of the Allies to switch the war against the Soviet Union and the sum totaled a situation too critically dangerous for the Soviet Union to accept.

FINLAND AND THE ANTI-SOVIET FRONT

EVENTS since the outbreak of hostilities, the maneuvers of the Anglo-French imperialists and the admissions of their official and unofficial spokesmen, establish beyond doubt that the Finnish incident was but the continuation under new conditions of the offensive which, in one form or another has been plotted or waged against the Soviet Union from the day of its birth twenty-two years ago.

From Hitler's accession to power in 1933 to the announcement of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939, the leading role in this offensive was assigned to Germany. The objective of British and French diplomacy during this period was trenchantly summarized by Stalin in his report to the Eighteenth Party Congress, March 10, 1939:

"Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the obligation to defend Austria's independence, they ceded the Sudeten region, they left Czechoslovakia to her own fate, thereby violating each and every obligation, and then began to lie vociferously in the press about the 'weakness of the Russian Army', about 'demoralization of the Russian air force,' about 'riots' in the Soviet Union, urging the Germans to march further east, promising them easy pickings and prompting them on: 'Just you start war against the Bolsheviks and then everything will proceed nicely.'"

So well satisfied were the Tory rulers of Britain with what they supposed was the fruition of this policy in the infamous Munich agreement, that they took few pains to conceal it from the public. Thus, on October 10, 1938 in a dispatch to the *New York Times*, Augur, the unofficial mouthpiece of the British Foreign Office wrote:

"The truce bought at Munich may last longer than is generally expected, if Britain and France refrain from interfering with Germany's plan to expand her sphere of political and economic influence. . . . That formidable expansion already under way after the seizure of Austria and the crushing of Czechoslovakia finally must bring Europe's great aggressor face to face with Europe's champion passive resister, Russia. . . . Then we may see a gigantic struggle, the object of which will be the fertile Ukraine."

Warning to the Munich Men

In the report from which we have already quoted, Stalin takes note of this and similar expressions from English and American commentators and of their ill-concealed impatience for the outbreak of the fascist offensive:

"It is still more characteristic that some European and American politicians and newspapermen who have lost patience waiting for 'the march on Soviet Ukraine' are themselves beginning to reveal the real background of the policy of non-intervention. They openly state and write in black and white that the Germans have 'disappointed' them cruelly, that instead of marching on further to the East against the Soviet Union, they have turned to the West, if you please, and demand colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were ceded to Germany as the price for undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, and now the Germans refuse to pay the note, telling their creditors to go chase themselves."

He adds a solemn warning to the plotters:

"Far be it from me to sermonize about the policy of non-intervention, to speak of betrayal, of treachery, and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics are politics, as old and hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game which adherents of the policy of non-intervention have started, may end in serious failure for themselves."

The men of Munich took no heed. They continued to play their "big and dangerous political game." They "guaranteed" the territorial integrity of Poland. While going through the motions of negotiating for a military alliance with the Soviet Union, they continued to egg Hitler on to attack in the East. As Stalin predicted, their conspiracy ended "in serious failure" when the Soviet Union, convinced of their bad faith after months of abortive negotiations, entered into a non-aggression pact with Germany. Prevented by Soviet diplomacy from provoking a war in the East, the Munich men were forced to do what their scheme had been designed to avoid—take up arms to defend their imperialist positions against Germany in the West.

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact made a shambles of the edifice so carefully constructed at Munich. It resulted in the indefinite postponement of the offensive against the Soviet Union for which Chamberlain and Daladier had been maneuvering. It removed Germany, for the time being at least, as the principal actor in that offensive. It forced the Munich men to reorganize their conspiracy under new conditions and to find other agents to play the role for which they had cast Hitler. But the objective which they had sought to gain at Munich was by no means abandoned. It was no longer possible to speak of that objective so freely or to prepare for it so openly as in the days immediately succeeding Munich. The British and French people had not been wholly deceived by the mock negotiations for a pact with Moscow. They rightly suspected that it was because their statesmen had not conducted these negotiations in good faith that the Soviet Union had signed with Germany. Any open attack on the Soviet Union in this period, any open avowal of a purpose to organize a military expedition against it would have provoked a demand for disclosure of the record of the negotiations at Moscow. That record is so damning that the British Foreign Office, long expert in manufacturing a paper record to fasten "war guilt" where it pleases, has

been unable to prepare a satisfactory White Paper disclosing the diplomatic exchanges between London and Moscow. After repeatedly postponing the date for the publication of these documents, Chamberlain finally stated on March 6 that after consultation with the French it had been decided not to publish them at all. Pressed on his earlier promise, he told the House of Commons:

"We have reviewed the question in the light of general considerations, and we have changed our mind."

This decision was foreshadowed and explained in a despatch from the London correspondent of the *New York Times* a month earlier:

"The explanation lies rather in the belated realization that the document, as originally prepared, failed to make out as good a case against the Soviet Government as the compilers planned and that it might be more embarrassing to Britain's allies than to anyone else. . . ."

This—now admitted—vulnerability of the Chamberlain government was one of the reasons it was compelled in public to deal so gingerly with the Soviet Union in the months from September to the outbreak of the Finnish hostilities on November 30.

In Place of Hitler

But if, publicly, Chamberlain and Daladier continued to maintain correct relations with the Soviet Union, there was no relaxation of their behind-the-scenes effort to reconstruct the anti-Soviet front shattered in August. For this two things were essential. First, a state willing to substitute for Germany as the spearhead of a military offensive against the Soviet Union; second, a pretext for whipping up public opinion against the Soviet Union to secure support for the new offensive. Before there was any question of hostilities between the Soviet Union and Finland, British and French statesmen were picking the state and manufacturing the occasion. Finland, which as shown elsewhere in this volume, has occupied an important place in every interventionist attempt against the Soviet Union, fulfilled the required conditions, and Chamberlain and Daladier were quick to make use of her. The full record of the maneuvers which preceded the outbreak of Finnish hostilities will not be available until foreign office archives yield up their secrets. It is certain however that France and Britain not only encouraged but incited Finland to resist the reasonable Soviet proposals. As we have seen, diplomatic pressure was reinforced with material aid before the outbreak of hostilities.

These moves were all behind the scenes. It was only on the eve of hostilities that Chamberlain found the moment opportune to lift the curtain slightly. Speaking to Parliament on November 28, he gave the first official hint of the true direction of British policy when he said:

"I say now that none of us knows how long this war will last, none of us knows in what direction it will develop, none of us knows, when it is ended, who will be standing by our side and who will be against us. . . ."

Succeeding events have made it abundantly clear in what direction he wanted the war to develop, what states he wanted by his side, and against what state. The first instrument selected by Chamberlain for developing the war in the chosen direction was the moribund League of Nations. For years, under Anglo-French domination, the League had connived with the aggressors. Its shameful record of procrastination and inaction, its refusal to assume its plain obligations under the Covenant in the face of pleas from China, Spain, Ethiopia and Albania had enfeebled and discredited it. Chamberlain and Daladier had not bothered to use it in the case of Czechoslovakia, whose fate they settled at Munich. It had not been called into action in the case of Poland, and indeed had not even met since the outbreak of hostilities in the west.

The League of Nations Resurrected

Now, resurrected by the very Anglo-French statesmen who had been responsible for its burial, it was used to give an appearance of legitimacy to the anti-Soviet front which they were in the process of organizing. But their purpose was accomplished only by an exhibition of gerrymandering and political chicanery so shameless that it would turn the stomach of a Tammany district leader.

To the request filed by the Mannerheim-Ryti government, the Secretary General of the League responded with unheard of promptness by calling an immediate meeting of the League. It was the plan of Great Britain and France to remain in the background, leaving the initiative in the proceedings to other states. The *London Times* of December 9 explained their position thus:

"It is felt that the move (for the expulsion of the USSR) had best be made by thoroughly disinterested neutrals. The moral judgment involved would be all the more effective if the belligerents confined themselves to supporting disinterested parties."

But this plan was not without difficulties. Under League procedure, the Finnish question had first to be considered by the then existing Council and referred by it to the new Council which was to be reconstituted by filling vacancies caused by the expiration of the term of five non-permanent members. From the new Council the matter had to be referred to the Assembly for final action. No important League decision had ever previously been made without an unanimous vote. Indeed, in apologizing for the failure of the League to act on the appeal of Loyalist Spain, the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed the House of Commons that "at Geneva an abstention means that the nation giving it does not agree with the resolution."

Because there was doubt that a unanimous vote could be secured from the old Council, the matter was referred to a handpicked committee consisting of Britain and France, Canada, India, Egypt, Eire, Poland, Portugal, Siam, Uruguay, Venezuela, Norway and Sweden. Of these only four were in normal diplomatic relations with the USSR. Three beside

Britain, are members of the British Empire. One, Poland, is no state at all, but an irregularly constituted refugee government operating in Paris. Egypt and Portugal are both satellites of Britain, Uruguay and Venezuela are military dictatorships. The latter had announced its irrevocable intention to withdraw from the League in 1938; both are highly susceptible to suggestions from Washington. Siam is a semi-colonial pawn in the British-Japanese imperialist chess match. Norway and Sweden as co-members with Finland of the Scandinavian bloc, were counted on to support British policy. This was the group of "thoroughly disinterested neutrals" which recommended the expulsion of the Soviet Union.

The next move was to fill the five vacancies in the council. Backstairs intrigue elevated the following five to non-permanent membership: the Union of South Africa, Bolivia, Egypt, China (whose assurance that she would abstain from voting was secured in advance) and Finland. With these the Council stood as follows: other non-permanent members, Belgium, Greece, Jugoslavia, Peru, Iran (Persia), and San Domingo; and the three permanent members, Britain, France and the USSR. When the vote was taken the USSR, Peru and Iran were absent. Finland, as a party to the dispute could not vote; Jugoslavia, China and Greece abstained from voting. Thus the expulsion was voted by seven states, just half of the Council. In addition to Britain and France they were the Union of South Africa and Egypt (which mean England), Belgium (which means France) and Bolivia and San Domingo (which mean the United States).

The final act of this international farce remained to be played. The recommendation of the Council had to be accepted by the Assembly. The complete fraud of this performance is well revealed in the dispatch of the Geneva correspondent of the *New York Times*, December 15, 1939:

"During the morning meeting of the Assembly, seventeen speakers went to the tribune to state the attitude of their governments. While *six* were forthright in their demand that the letter of the law should be applied, *eleven* made reservations of one kind or another. The six were, in the order of their speaking, Portugal, India, Ecuador, France, Britain and Poland. The eleven were Mexico, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, China and Bulgaria.

"With this division of opinion, the business of getting a unanimous vote or anything like it looked extremely precarious. But that astute and forceful presiding officer, Carl J. Hambro, the president of the Norwegian Storting, managed it majestically. No country had defended Russia, and no one had declared out and out that it did not approve of the draft report with its condemnation and recommendations to the Council.

"How they voted however, depended on how the alternative was presented. Dr. Hambro did not give them time. As soon as the last of the speakers sat down, he announced: 'The assembly will have taken note of all the declarations that have been made. I do not think, therefore, that it is necessary to take a vote by roll call. If there are no observations to the contrary, the Assembly will vote according to the ordinary method.'

"He barely paused for breath, and added:

"There being no observations to the contrary, I will ask all delegates who are in favor of the report to remain seated.'

"It would have taken a brave man to have risen to his feet at that moment and so proclaim himself in favor of Russia. No one moved."

By these maneuvers the League accomplished the object for which its Anglo-French masters recalled it from the grave, and adjourned. It did so only after removing from its agenda and indefinitely postponing the embarrassing items of Albania's appeal against her extinction at the hands of Italy, and China's latest appeal against Japanese aggression on which it has sought action since 1931.

Fomenting the Holy War Against the USSR

In an editorial on the proceedings of the League under the title, "Resurrection at Geneva", the *New York Herald Tribune* of December 12, comments:

"But after Manchuria and Ethiopia and China, after Spain and Austria and Albania and Czechoslovakia and Poland, this sudden resurrection of the League in defence of the Finns is as startling a development as any in this always surprising war. In the last ditch and at the eleventh hour Geneva—that was to be the capital of the world—comes suddenly back to life. It has the appearance of a miracle. . . . What has arisen from the Geneva mausoleum is not exactly the League; it is a form of international organization, limited in scope and meeting a limited problem, which has its interesting possibilities."

The "possibilities" which interest the *Herald Tribune* are, of course, the possibilities of using the League to organize a Holy War on the Soviet Union. Those possibilities are not new. They were foreseen by the founders of the League and, in fact, were one of the principal reasons for its organization. In his memorandum to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, Lloyd George wrote:

"If we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevism, we must make the League of Nations into something which will be both a safeguard to those nations who are prepared for fair dealing with their neighbors and a *menace* to those who would trespass on the rights of their neighbors, whether they are imperialist Empires or imperialist Bolshevism." (*Italics ours*)

Lloyd George was one of the moving spirits in the attempt, advocated in his memorandum, to exterminate the new Socialist State. He witnessed the failure of that attempt. Today he warns against its renewal. Writing for the *United Feature Syndicate* on February 13, he said:

"There can be no doubt there are powerful classes both in France and in Britain which would be much more interested in a war against Bolshevik Russia than in a war against Nazi Germany. . . . The British public does not forget that there was an attempt made in 1919 to destroy Bolshevism by force of arms. It was a dismal failure despite the fact that the Bolsheviks at that time possessed only an ill-organized and very badly equipped army. . . . The people of this country would not, in my opinion, countenance a repetition of the disastrous experiment of 1919 at a time when war against Nazism alone is absorbing all our strength."

Arms for Finland

In its resolution expelling the Soviet Union, the League included an appeal to its members for assistance to Finland and authorized the Secretary General to consult non-members with the view of obtaining their cooperation. Armed with this resolution, which they had themselves written and jammed through the League, and which gave them an excuse to continue and expand the arming of Finland which, as we have shown, they had already long embarked on, the Allies proceeded to bolster the Mannerheim regime with men and more armaments. On the very day of the League decision, Chamberlain announced in Commons that without waiting for it to act, Britain had already delivered a number of fighter aircraft to Finland. The supply of additional armaments was organized by the Allies through their Supreme War Council, Britain contributing three-fifths and France two-fifths of the cost.

The full extent of their arms shipments was revealed by Chamberlain and Daladier only after the peace treaty had been signed. They include 280 planes, among them the most modern types of large bombers; 590 cannon ranging in caliber from 75 mm to huge 305 mm naval guns; 250,000 hand grenades; 5200 machine guns; 400 marine mines; 10,000 anti-tank mines; 15,700 air bombs; 980,000 artillery shells and 20,000,000 cartridges. Additional quantities of munitions were ready for shipment when the peace was signed. Raymond Daniels by no means exaggerated the case when he reported to the *New York Times* on February 7, that:

"British policy toward Russia in Finland maintains a steady course of 'non-intervention' which is rapidly approaching in scale the German and Italian 'non-intervention' in Spain."

This large scale military assistance is in striking contrast to Anglo-French action in the cases of their ally Poland, and Loyalist Spain. They had guaranteed the integrity of Poland, but haggled for months over the question of a loan, finally giving her a measly 5,000,000 pounds. Following the onset of the German invasion, the Poles pleaded in vain for military aid.

As for Spain, a true democracy, fighting for its life against fascist aggressors, she was strangled by the hypocrisy of "non-intervention" which denied her the right, recognized under international law, to purchase arms for her defense. Attempting to minimize the effects of the Spanish embargo, Chamberlain told Parliament in 1938:

"So far as this country is concerned, the effect of allowing the government of Spain to purchase arms would be very little, because we ourselves obviously want all the armaments that are in our possession for our protection."

That statement was made while Britain was at peace. Yet, ten months later, with England at war, Chamberlain rushed to share her munitions with Mannerheim.

On February 14, Chamberlain advised Parliament that a "general

license" had been given to British subjects to enlist in the Finnish army and a recruiting organization established, under government authority, in London. By this action, Chamberlain nullified an Act of Parliament passed in 1870 forbidding the enlistment or recruiting of men to fight against a country having diplomatic relations with Britain. However, there was no enthusiasm among the British people for this interventionist adventure. Only a few hundred volunteers applied.

The organization of an expeditionary force to fight the Soviet Union presented quite a different problem from 1919 when White Guard forces on Russian soil formed a nucleus which the Allies organized and financed. For the war in Finland they at first mustered remnants of the Polish army in France, and Scandinavian volunteers.

Chamberlain and Daladier recognized that volunteer forces would be far from sufficient and early in February laid their plans for intervention on a much more ambitious scale. The nature of these interventionist preparations was carefully concealed. They dared not yet inform the British and French public that large contingents of the Allied regular army, ostensibly recruited to fight fascism on the Western front were to be launched against the Soviet Union in the far north. It was only when peace became imminent and after the treaty was signed that Daladier and Chamberlain began to boast about these preparations in the hope of persuading the neutrals that they had not let Finland down as they had Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Recent statements by Chamberlain and Daladier now make the details of these preparations clear. As we have already pointed out, before hostilities commenced, Britain and France were confident that the Soviet Union would not undertake a winter campaign against Finland. They counted on having at least until spring to mature their plans and prepare the ground for a full-fledged war in the north. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, seriously underrating the strength and strategy of the Red Army, and relying upon the difficulties of winter warfare and the supposedly impregnable Mannerheim Line, they made their plans on the assumption that Finnish troops, supplied with Allied munitions, could hold out until May without reinforcements. They were so informed by Mannerheim himself who told the British representative in January that his first requirement would be 30,000 trained soldiers in May.

Plans on a much more generous scale than Mannerheim requested were made and approved by the Allied Supreme War Council at its meeting on February 5. They called for outfitting an expeditionary force of 100,000 trained men, heavily armed and equipped, which was to be dispatched to Scandinavia in March, part of them to arrive in Finland before the end of April. These plans were so far carried into execution that, as stated by Daladier to the Chamber of Deputies on March 12, 50,000 French soldiers had been standing by since February 26, ready to embark at channel ports for transit to Finland under protection of a British Naval convoy. Britain presumably had another 50,000 ready.

While these vast plans were maturing, military assistance on a smaller but by no means insignificant scale was forthcoming from other sources. Mussolini and Franco were not behindhand in sending aid to their fellow "Democracy", the Mannerheim government. Italy delivered 50 planes and was reported by the *New York Herald Tribune* staff writer in London to have trained a fully equipped volunteer corps. Franco contributed the Italian war materials left over from the slaughter of Spanish democracy.

Sweden supplied one-fifth of its total airforce, 84,000 rifles, 575 machine guns, 300 artillery guns, 300,000 hand grenades and 50,000,000 cartridges, all of the most modern design.

From the "Unofficial" Spokesmen

The organization of material aid to Mannerheim was accompanied by a propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union pushed to lengths unknown since the interventionist days of 1919. The world press launched a venomous barrage designed to prepare public opinion for the holy war against the Soviet Union. In France and England, Chamberlain and Daladier thought it safe to lift their masks and display their hatred of the Socialist State, although officially, they still found it necessary to proceed with a measure of caution. Thus, on January 24, in response to a question asked in Commons, Chamberlain replied:

"The decision whether or not to break off relations with the Soviet Government is one that would require most careful consideration in all of its aspects. It is not one to be dealt with satisfactorily in a question answer."

Other "unofficial" spokesmen were not so reticent. On February 18, Hore-Belisha, recently resigned British Secretary of War, published an article in which he said:

"Leningrad is within fifty miles of the Mannerheim Line. . . . A blow struck against Leningrad might well leave Germany with a Soviet corpse on her hands."

This open call to war against the Soviet Union via Leningrad had been submitted to the government for approval before publication. Duff Cooper, former First Lord of the Admiralty and recently in this country as one of the official British propaganda agents, told an American audience that "Britain will be at war with Russia very soon." Major General J. F. Fuller, a leading British army authority, writing in the February *Army Ordinance Journal*, pointed out that the central aim of British policy in the present war is to come to terms with Germany against an enemy "who today is Germany but tomorrow obviously may be Russia."

Not only did these "unofficial" circles publicly urge war against the Soviet Union, but the question of tactics was discussed with equal frankness. The British General, Sir Hubert Gough, writing in the magazine *English Speaking World*, proposed British naval action to destroy Soviet ships at Petsamo and then to close the port at Murmansk. "Scrutator," the well-known English diplomatic journalist, contributed an article to the

London Times in which he counseled an attack on the Soviet Union with an Anglo-French army from Palestine and Syria, accompanied by air raids on Baku. The military expert of the Paris *Temps*, unofficial organ of the French Foreign Office, advocated a combination of both plans of attack. A naval blockade of Murmansk was to be followed by the landing of Anglo-French forces at Petsamo, which in cooperation with the Finns would drive the Soviets out of the Arctic; this action to be accompanied by a diversion in the south through a Black Sea naval action directed against Soviet oil fields. These actions, he concluded, could be taken at small cost to the British and French since they would be carried on "in conjunction with the armies of certain friendly powers."

"Protecting" the Neutrals

Ever since the outbreak of World War II, the Anglo-French war-makers have been trying to maneuver these "certain friendly neutral powers" into doing the fighting for them. Their efforts in this direction have been concentrated on Turkey and the Balkan states in the southeast and on the Scandinavian countries in the north. The objective is three-fold: first to make use of their military resources of men and materials for an attack on the Soviet Union; second, by involving them on the side of the Allies, to cut off an important source of raw materials for Germany, and third, to create a new front on neutral soil in the war against Germany.

The Anglo-French method of accomplishing their purpose is familiar to American gangsterdom as the "protection racket." It consists in manufacturing or provoking a threat to the security of the intended victim and then offering to "protect" him from it—at a price. The international gangsters have exerted every sort of pressure, economic and diplomatic, to threaten the neutrals. Nor have they hesitated to use armed force. The price that they ask for "protection" is that their victims launch a military assault against the Soviet Union and allow themselves to be used as a base of operations against Germany.

Winston Churchill, British First Lord of the Admiralty, is a past master at this kind of blackmail. In a world-wide broadcast on January 20, he first made the threat—not only picturing the fate of the neutrals at the hands of Germany, but plainly hinting at what the Allies might do to them:

"They (the neutrals) bow humbly and in fear to German threats of violence, comforting themselves meanwhile with the thought that the Allies will win, *that Britain and France will strictly observe all the rules and conventions and that breaches of these laws are to be expected, only from the German side.* . . . All of them hope that the storm will pass before their turn comes to be devoured. But I fear greatly the storm will not pass. It will rage and it will roar ever more loudly, ever more widely. It will spread to the south, it will spread to the north."

Then the offer of "protection":

"There is no chance of a speedy end except through united action, and if at any time Britain and France, wearying of the struggle, were to make a shame-

ful peace, nothing would remain for the smaller states of Europe but to be divided between the opposite, though similar, barbarisms of Nazidom and Bolshevism."

Finally the consoling thought that the price exacted of the neutrals in exchange for "protection" is small and can easily be paid:

"There (in Finland), exposed for all the world to see, is the military incapacity of the Red Army and the Red Air Force."

The British *United Press* reported that Danish circles characterized Churchill's performance as "a brickbat directly aimed at the Scandinavian nations."

Churchill's speech was accompanied by further efforts to betray Scandinavian neutrality. While diplomatic and economic pressure was applied at Oslo and Stockholm, provocative reports were circulated that the Soviet Union had designs on the Norwegian Atlantic port of Narvik, that the Soviet Union was menacing Sweden along the Swedo-Finnish border. Inspired stories were issued that England was ready to "guarantee" the Scandinavian countries, if attacked, while on the other hand she was pressing them to permit the transit of Allied troops to the Finnish front. Finally, a British destroyer, with an ostentatious display of authority from the British Government itself, violated Norwegian territorial waters in pursuit of the German ship *Altmark* in a clear effort to panic Norway out of her neutrality.

James Reston did not overstate the case when he pointed out in a *New York Times* dispatch from London:

"The Scandinavian countries, after a century of peace, are in danger of being drawn into the war, whether they like it or not. . . . For the immediate future of these countries would seem to depend upon whether Britain and France decide to fight one war at a time or take on Russia as well as Germany."

The arrogant view that Britain is the master of the fate of Norway and Sweden was again voiced by Churchill in a speech to Parliament on February 27 when, referring to the continued neutrality of Scandinavia despite the feverish efforts of the Allies, he impatiently snapped:

"It is not at all odd that His Majesty's Government are getting rather tired of it all."

"Activists"

The Allied effort to involve the Scandinavian countries in war met with the responsive cooperation of certain circles within Norway and Sweden themselves. The great majority of the workers and farmers of Scandinavia were resolutely opposed to any efforts to violate their traditional neutrality, and in this they were joined by important business interests seeking to preserve their trade relations with Germany. Pressure for war action came from the so-called "activists" consisting of the extreme right, supported by Social-Democratic leaders under the domination of the British. The Social-Democratic group in Sweden is headed by the notorious Sandler whose hysterical cries for a Swedish assault on the

Soviet Union finally resulted in his removal as Foreign Minister, but who continued to lead the attack in the Swedish Parliament. He was seconded by the Social-Democrat, Hoeglung, editor of the paper *Sozial Demokraten*, which has been most venomous in its incitements against the Soviet Union. Hoeglung, who demanded Swedish assistance to Mannerheim's "Democracy," had quite a different song to sing in 1922 when he wrote:

"Ever since the 1918 terror which continues to this day, Finland can hardly be classed as one of the civilized countries. Instead of maintaining amicable relations with Soviet Russia upon whom her economic existence and political independence may depend in the future, Finland's leaders, affected by a superiority complex, are entering into a most dangerous alliance with Soviet Russia's mortal enemies in an effort to achieve their ambitious aim to become a great power. This is nothing short of war provocation."

The Soviet Union had occasion to protest against the provocative attempts of these Scandinavian activists. On January 4, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden delivered a statement to the Foreign Minister calling attention to the press campaign, led by the newspaper *Sozial Demokraten*, for immediate armed intervention against the Soviet Union; to recruiting bureaus opened with the consent of the Swedish Government from which 10,000 "volunteers" were sent to Finland up to December 28; to the supply of Swedish arms to Mannerheim and to the permission given by the Swedish Government for the transport of military supplies across her borders to Finland. The note concluded:

"The Government of the USSR deems it timely to point out to the Swedish Government that these actions of the Swedish authorities not only run counter to Swedish neutrality policy but are also likely to lead to undesirable complications in relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden."

A protest of similar tenor was transmitted to the Norwegian Government.* In summarizing the contents of these protests and the replies of the two governments, the USSR pointed out on January 13:

"The governments of Norway and Sweden do not deny all the facts proving their violation of the policy of neutrality. Such a stand of the governments of Sweden and Norway is fraught with danger. It testifies to the fact that the governments of Sweden and Norway are not offering proper resistance to the influence of those powers who are striving to involve Sweden and Norway in a war against the Soviet Union."

In an effort to spur on the war campaign of the Scandinavian Social-Democrats and to make English support to Mannerheim more palatable to British labor, the British Government dispatched Sir Walter Citrine, Chairman of the British Trades Union Congress, and a delegation of other trade union bureaucrats to Scandinavia and Finland. It will be recalled that Citrine accepted the non-intervention policy of the British Government with which it destroyed Loyalist Spain, and sabotaged every appeal for united action of the Second and Third Internationals for its aid. However, he was only too eager to serve Chamberlain by helping to organize

* See *Soviet Russia Today*, February 1940 for exchanges with Norway and Sweden.

military support for Mannerheim and by conspiring with the Social-Democratic leadership of Sweden and Norway on further methods for bringing their countries into a war against the Soviet Union.

The Neutrals Resist

The campaign of the activists and increasing British pressure won some initial successes for the warmakers, notably in Sweden where repressive measures were taken against the Communist Party and all those who had taken a resolute anti-war position. However, this effort to involve the Scandinavian countries in war failed. The King and the Premier of Sweden, with the support of the overwhelming majority of the country, unequivocally declared that Sweden would not participate in military intervention or permit its territory to be used for the passage of troops. A similar declaration was made by Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht on behalf of his country. Answering the provocative lies about Soviet aggressive designs on Norway, he stated:

"I have said publicly, and it is an historical fact that Russia has never made any demands whatsoever on Norway."

These declarations were reaffirmed at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Sweden, Norway and Denmark in Copenhagen on February 25 where the three Scandinavian countries formed a bloc for the defense of their neutrality. Protesting against all efforts to violate their neutrality they declared:

"The foreign ministers ascertained their unanimity in respect of the policy of the neutrality of their countries. They reject all assertions that this is exercised under pressure of one side or the other, and they intend to continue this policy impartially and independently in their relations to all sides."

Although temporarily defeated in their attempt to force the Scandinavian countries into war, the Allies by no means abandoned their efforts in this direction. On the contrary, as the Finnish defenses weakened and gave way before the Red Army, they pursued their program with the vigor of desperation.

From the beginning of February it became increasingly apparent that there had been a serious miscalculation in the time-table which the Allies had worked out with Mannerheim. The typewriter generals continued to grind out their fables of miraculous Finnish victories. But private reports of the remarkable feat of the Red Army in penetrating the ferro-concrete fortifications of the Mannerheim Line provided most disturbing reading to the Allied General Staff. The military situation was even more disturbing to the Finns who were in a position to appraise it at first hand. Recognizing that their game had failed, they approached the Soviet Union through the Swedish Government to ascertain the Soviet peace terms. As Premier Molotov pointed out in his statement to the Supreme Soviet, published in full elsewhere in this volume, the British tried

to block these peace feelers by refusing to cooperate in advancing the negotiations. Chamberlain himself has stated that the British refused to transmit the Soviet terms to Finland. But the belligerents had no difficulty in communicating through other channels, and by March 7, matters had progressed so far that Finnish representatives flew to Moscow for conversations.

As the perspective for Soviet-Finnish peace became clearer, the desperation of the Allies increased. In their feverish attempt to prolong the conflict, to create a new front in the north and to convert the whole of Scandinavia into a battlefield, they dropped all pretense of protecting Finnish "democracy" and revealed their true imperialist aims with brutal frankness.

Opposing the anti-Soviet war plans were thousands of resolutions passed by workers' organizations throughout England. An open letter whose signatories included the Dean of Canterbury, Sir Richard Acland, M.P., George Bernard Shaw, H. N. Brailsford, Professor Haldane, Lord Listowel, Sir Charles Trevelyan (former Minister of Education) and Sidney and Beatrice Webb, warned against the plans for war against the Soviet Union and urged British citizens to use the utmost efforts to prevent the government from taking this ruinous action.

We have since learned from Swedish Foreign Minister Guenther that on March 2 the Allies sent formal requests to Norway and Sweden for permission to send troops across these countries to Finland. These were refused. Indeed, increasing pressure on the Scandinavian countries only served to stiffen their resistance. Harold Callender reported to the *New York Times* from Stockholm on March 7:

"The opinion is widespread in Sweden that the Allies have a desire to drag Scandinavia into the war and establish a northern front against Germany. It is believed here that the British are less interested in saving Finland than in blocking Germany's access to Swedish iron and perhaps threatening Germany and Russia from the Baltic and from the Black Sea region at the same time."

The leading conservative Swedish newspaper, the *Stockholm Tidningen*, made this answer to the Anglo-French imperialists:

"No foreign troops will ever be permitted to cross neutral territory. . . . Grotesquely but logically, we may be obliged to fight to prevent others from helping Finland. Are we already reduced to being pawns in a vast game of chess being played by great powers?"

Reactions to the Soviet-Finnish Peace Negotiations

Coming hard on the heels of the Scandinavian refusal to permit the passage of Allied troops, the news of the opening of Soviet-Finnish conversations in Moscow was a deadly blow to the warmakers in London and Paris. James Reston reported from London:

"An official announcement in Helsinki that Russian terms for ending the Russo-Finnish war had been received by the Finnish Government and reports

that armistice negotiations were under way caused consternation among Allied officials here today." (*New York Times*, March 8)

Their "consternation" led to a redoubling of their efforts to prolong and intensify the war. The *London Times*, which on many previous occasions had foreshadowed the ominous plans of the Chamberlain government stated editorially:

"It is becoming clearer every day that this (Russo-Finnish) war is no side issue. . . . There is no baneful magic in the word 'diversion' if hostile forces are being diverted simultaneously. But there is now no time to waste in debate."

The same paper on March 7 published a letter from Lord Davies indicating how the "diversion" of Allied forces was to be accomplished in the face of the Scandinavian refusal to permit the passage of troops:

"Our strategy is clear. If Sweden, supported by a British guarantee of assistance against German invasion is still unwilling to intervene on the side of Finland, we can invoke the provisions of Article XVI (of the League of Nations Covenant)."

Article XVI provides that members of the League shall "afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the League who are cooperating to protect the Covenant of the League." But League action to compel Sweden and Norway to open their frontiers to an Allied expeditionary force was impossible without a request from Finland. Even with the shadiest kind of maneuvering, the League could scarcely invoke Article XVI in behalf of an unwilling beneficiary.

Accordingly, pressure was applied on Finland. We have since learned that on March 7, the day of Lord Davies' letter to the *Times* and as conversations got under way in Moscow, Daladier sent an urgent letter to Finland. By threats and promises, he tried to exact the required appeal for assistance.

"For some days past we have been waiting an appeal from Finland to come to her help with all our resources. It is difficult to understand why this appeal has been postponed. We know well that pressure is being exerted by Sweden to induce you to make peace; but are you not afraid that Russia, who fears Allied intervention, is tricking you so as to destroy you, later?"

"Airplanes and expeditionary corps are ready to leave; but unless Finland sends her appeal now, the Allies will not be able at the end of the campaign to assume the least responsibility for her definitive territorial status. I request that you let us know urgently your decision."

The Finns, negotiating a peace treaty in Moscow, did not reply, and Anglo-French propaganda for war against the Soviet Union reached fever heat. James Reston reported from London March 11:

"While peace apparently was also the topic of much diplomatic conversation in Moscow, Berlin, Rome and Stockholm over the weekend, London was buzzing with rumors, not of peace but of war—war on a much wider front and perhaps war with Russia."

In Paris, Leon Blum, who as Premier of the Popular Front Govern-

ment had initiated the shameful non-intervention policy which strangled Loyalist Spain, servilely followed Daladier's lead by demanding immediate action:

"If Finland addresses a direct and formal appeal to us, Great Britain and France should respond without limit, without restriction and with the acceptance of all the consequences of their acts."

To fan the flames of war still higher, Chamberlain on March 10 and Daladier on March 11 for the first time revealed that an Allied expeditionary force had been equipped and was standing by for transport to Finland and that the two governments were prepared to assist her with all of their available military resources. Scandinavian sources characterized these statements as "a last attempt to stop peace."

At the same time the Anglo-French press released a barrage against Sweden and Norway for refusing to open their borders to Allied troops. Chamberlain himself indicated the most brazen disregard of their rights as neutral and independent nations. When asked by a Labor member of the House:

"Is the government proposing to send troops to Finland? If so, are they preparing to violate the neutrality of Norway and Sweden in so doing?"

Chamberlain replied:

"I cannot add to the statement I have made."

However, the Scandinavian countries continued to act with calmness and prudence in the face of these provocative efforts to convert their territories into battlefields. The *Svenska Dagbladet* declared in Stockholm:

"The western powers must be made to understand that their intervention will not be tolerated by Norway or Sweden. We do not want to see Scandinavia made into a battlefield for the Allies' northern flank. And we have not so much confidence in the western powers' military strength that Poland's fate does not fill us with fear."

Swedish Foreign Minister Guenther, speaking on March 17 after the peace treaty had been signed, officially explained the Swedish position in the same terms:

". . . the idea of coming to the help of Finland opened up new vistas to the Allied powers that particularly appealed to the French. The deadlock on the Western Front was not popular, and the newspapers in France spoke of the hunt for new battlefields. Moreover, the removal of the war to Scandinavia would have given an opportunity to cut off the iron ore exports to Germany. . . .

"In this respect it suffices to point out that the Swedish Government was fully convinced that the appearance of Allied groups in Sweden must bring with it the transfer of the war to Sweden. The Swedish people would have been dragged into the war."

Confirmation of this conclusion comes from Chamberlain himself. In defending British policy in a speech to the House of Commons on

March 19 he made clear that Allied strategy contemplated making Sweden as well as Finland the scene of a major war. He explained that two factors were considered in fixing the size of the expeditionary force to be despatched to the north: the number of troops immediately required by the Finns, and the number necessary to assist Sweden in an anticipated attack by Germany.

"We were conscious," said Chamberlain, "that those two countries (Norway and Sweden) would have to brave the wrath of Germany. . . . Therefore we felt that we must be ready also to provide a force to come to the assistance of Sweden defending herself if she should be attacked by Germany. . . . Part of that force (the Allied expeditionary force of 100,000) would be required for the assistance of Sweden if she were attacked by Germany, and part would be needed as an expedition to help Finland."

The signing of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty on March 12 temporarily arrested this conspiracy to spread the war to the north. James B. Reston describes the treaty's reception in Great Britain in a *New York Times* despatch of March 13:

"Signing of peace in any corner of Europe usually is an occasion for rejoicing in London, but there is no rejoicing here this morning over the bold headlines that announce the end of the Russo-Finnish war. Official Britain is silent, *obviously disappointed*, and the people are surprised and slightly bewildered."

The same writer explains the "bewilderment" of the British people in a despatch of March 17:

"The general public here is still not quite clear as to the purpose of sending an expeditionary force to Finland. Most persons here still believe the purpose was to help the Finns, *whereas that actually was only an excuse for getting troops there upon Germany's northern flank.*"

Ralph W. Barnes, writing to the *New York Herald Tribune* on March 14, similarly points out that the Anglo-French objective was "to secure a temporary foothold in the Scandinavian peninsula." He adds:

"The excuse for such an operation—Finland's need—has been liquidated and may not recur."

The excuse was gone, but the intent remained. The consternation and confusion sown among the Allies by the Soviet-Finnish peace, found expression in cabinet shufflings in Great Britain and France designed to strengthen the spread-the-war forces despite the rising protest of the people against continuance of the war. Three weeks after the peace was concluded Great Britain flagrantly violated Norway's neutrality by mining her territorial waters, thus precipitating the Germans' occupation of Denmark and Norway.

The conclusion of peace between the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Union, reinforcing Soviet neutrality, and guaranteeing the security of Leningrad, Murmansk and the Murmansk railway, bring us again to Stalin's speech quoted at the opening of this chapter, in which he stated as the cardinal point of Soviet foreign policy:

"We stand for peace and for the strengthening of business-like relations with all countries. This is our position and we will adhere to it as long as these countries maintain identical relations with the Soviet Union, as long as they make no attempt to violate our country's interests."

The United States Takes a Hand

The course pursued in Washington from the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in October must be profoundly disturbing to all who are interested in the preservation of peace for America. As the moves of the Roosevelt Administration are surveyed and analyzed, suspicion grows that it was playing the game of the Allies; that it encouraged the Finns to resist the reasonable Soviet proposals; that it sought to enlist the Scandinavian countries on the side of the Allies, and that with each move it drew the United States itself closer to the orbit of war.

In the very beginning of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, President Roosevelt intervened with notes to the Presidents of the USSR and Finland "hoping for a peaceful solution of the controversy." This was gratuitous indeed from an administration which had already intervened to hamper "a peaceful solution." For on November 14, 1939, two weeks before the Soviet-Finnish crisis reached the stage of hostility, the *N. Y. Times* reported:

"The RFC is seriously considering an application from Finland for trade loans through the Export-Import Bank. In diplomatic quarters it was thought that Finland's hope of getting trade finances here to aid in meeting the effects of Soviet pressure, coupled with the moral backing of the United States, *might have influenced Finland in suspending negotiations with Moscow.* The loans would run into millions of dollars."

President Roosevelt's comment on this report merely put the date of American intervention two months earlier. According to the *N. Y. Times* the following day, Roosevelt

"shook his head incredulously when told today of reports that an administration promise of financial and economic assistance to Finland had resulted in that state's stiffened attitude towards territorial and military demands of the Soviet Union . . . he recalled that Finnish representatives had been negotiating about two months ago for a loan in this country."

A \$10,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan to Finland was forthcoming shortly thereafter.

Washington's response to the League of Nations appeal to non-member states for Finnish assistance was the announcement that forty of the latest and speediest American planes, built for the United States Navy, had been relinquished by the Navy in favor of Finland. At the same time, a "moral embargo" against the sale of arms and raw materials important in armament manufacture, was declared against the Soviet Union for alleged bombing of "unfortified cities" by an air force whose operations, being strictly confined to military objectives, have resulted in the lowest civilian

casualties in the history of military aviation. Moreover, this action came with bad grace from a nation which had for years countenanced supplying the German, Italian and Japanese aggressors with war material for the slaughter of thousands of civilian victims in China, Ethiopia and Spain.

Those Loans

With the opening of the Congressional session in January, the administration put on a high-pressure campaign for further loans to Finland. But in the face of the overwhelming neutrality sentiment of the country, Congress twisted and squirmed for two months before authorizing credits.

Congress shelved the administration-inspired bill which expressly authorized a Finnish loan. Instead a scheme was concocted by which it could authorize the funds and avoid assuming any responsibility for the results, by increasing the capital of the Export-Import bank, without mentioning the names of the proposed beneficiaries. Thus funds were to be made available for a loan to Finland, but the buck passed to the administration for doing so. Even in this form the bill was not popular in Congress.

One reason for Congressional reluctance was the ill-concealed secret that although the proposed bill prohibited the use of any loan for military purposes, it was guns and not food that Finland was to get with the proceeds. RFC chairman Jesse Jones, appearing before the Senate Committee, stated that the Export-Import Bank would have no jurisdiction over Finnish purchases after they left this country. From this it was obvious, as the correspondent of the *New York Times* concluded, that "purchases here might be traded in Great Britain and France for guns and ammunition." In this devious fashion the way was prepared for our connivance with the Allies in their scheme to give military assistance to the tottering Finnish regime. Even the *New York Herald Tribune* characterized the whole shady transaction as "a masterpiece of hush-hushery."

Finally, the bill passed the Senate only after it had been sweetened by making China eligible for a portion of the funds, and the House only after the members had assured themselves against political responsibility for the results by approving the measure without a record vote.

The feverish haste with which Mr. Jones arranged to make the credits immediately available before the President had set his signature to the bill was startling. Even more ominous was the announcement of the first beneficiaries of the loan fund. Not only did Mannerheim get his anticipated \$20,000,000 but Sweden was advanced \$15,000,000 and Norway \$10,000,000. Neither of these states was in need of "relief," the pretext of the grant to Finland. On the contrary, they have always been pictured as happily exempt from the ravages of capitalist crisis. Coming as they did in the wake of the British campaign to involve these countries in war with the Soviet Union, the loans looked suspiciously like an American bribe for the sacrifice of their neutrality.

What Loans Lead To

Pronouncements of President Roosevelt himself during the course of the Finnish conflict were scarcely reassuring. His blessing to the campaign for recruiting volunteers to serve in Finland while his Attorney General (Murphy) was preparing prosecutions on charges of assisting enlistments to Loyalist Spain aroused further misgivings. These were not allayed by the gratuitous and uncalled for attack on the Soviet Union which the President made in his address to the American Youth Congress on February 10, 1940. When we recall the President's silence in the face of the fascist invasion of democratic Spain and Mussolini's conquests of Ethiopia and Albania, the diplomatic delicacy of his dealings with Japan, and the mildness of his occasional reproof of Hitler's long series of aggressive acts, it is clear his unprecedented denunciation of the Soviet Union on that occasion was not inspired by any moral indignation.

Its real motive is indicated by the President's effort to ridicule the resolution adopted by the New York Chapter of the Youth Congress opposing the proposed Finnish loan. It was "axiomatic" the young people were assured, that the American people wanted to help the Finnish Government with gifts or loans. The fear that American financial assistance to Mannerheim would be a step toward the involvement of this country in war was impatiently dismissed as "unadulterated twaddle." "That the Soviet Union would, because of this, declare war on the United States" was, the President assured them, the most absurd thought he had ever heard. An absurd thought indeed, but one not uttered by any section of the youth or any other group that has warned against loans as the first step toward involvement in war. No one at any time suggested that the USSR would declare war on the United States if it were to aid Finland, any more than it declared war on the Allies or the Scandinavian countries for the outright military aid they gave. Those who warned against loans to Finland did so because of the danger of prolonging and spreading the war, of switching it into a war against the Soviet Union and involving the United States so deeply in Allied conspiracies that it would not be able to remain neutral. They remembered, too, that loans to the Tsarist government and the Kerensky regime led inevitably to American armed intervention against the Soviet Government in 1918 and 1919. They knew, in short, that it is "axiomatic" that war loans, open or disguised, lead to war itself.

Finally, the dispatch of Assistant Secretary of State Welles to Europe on a mysterious mission looked like a further attempt to play the Allies' war game. Welles interviewed those well-known defenders of democracy, Mussolini and Hitler. He paid his respects to Chamberlain and Daladier. But Moscow was notable by its absence from his itinerary. Remembering the exclusion of the Soviet Union from Munich and taking note of recent Presidential declarations, we may well wonder whether the British were over-eager when they greeted the Welles mission, in the words of the *New York World-Telegram* headlines "As Move to Isolate

Reds." Or whether the *United States News*, edited by the columnist David Lawrence, was wholly wrong in the following estimate of Washington opinion:

"It is not impossible, say the realists at the nation's capital, that Prime Minister Chamberlain, *with the hearty approval of President Roosevelt*, is prepared to start action on a world union against the Soviet Union that will make the anti-Communist alliance of Germany-Italy-Japan look like small potatoes. Its purpose is to destroy the Soviet Union if possible . . . by a world war against Russia. The League of Nations which proved ineffective against the conquests of Germany, Italy and Japan, may become a league for war against Russia.

"Compared to the proposed league of armed power in which the United States and the Latin American countries would be members, along with possibly Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and Turkey, the recent German-sponsored anti-Communist pact would be a mere bush leaguer." (*Italics ours*)

Fortunately for the cause of American peace and neutrality, the Soviet-Finnish treaty was signed even as Mr. Welles was in the course of conversations with British statesmen in London. But the parallel between American policy during the course of the conflict and the moves of President Wilson prior to our entry into World War I is too close for comfort.

The American press did its part to prevent peace and to propel Scandinavia into war, by incitations in editorials, columns and alarmist headlines. Typical was Dorothy Thompson's frantic warning: "The army of General Weygand in the Near East will be deprived of any excuse for intervention the moment that Finland and Russia conclude peace." (*New York Herald Tribune*, March 8.)

Some Lessons from the Past

The recent publication of the Lansing documents reveals how the United States was maneuvered into the World War.

We began with "strict neutrality." We put a toe in the torrent by permitting "cash sales." Our whole foot went in when credit restrictions were removed. William Jennings Bryan, then Secretary of State, resigned in protest. After that came the plunge that landed us in the sea of blood.

Woodrow Wilson, elected "to keep us out of war," was already committed to war before the hypocritical election campaign, by this course of loans and war investments.

The path to war was clear—loans for war, war profits, then war to try to make the loans good, the bodies of soldiers as bill collectors' letters. Lansing wrote privately to Wilson:

"We are faced with a critical economic situation that can only be relieved apparently by the investment of American capital in foreign loans."

One of the aftermaths of the "War for Democracy" that was the aftermath of these loans was the invasion of Russia, in which American soldiers were sent to prevent democratic self-determination in Russia.

The results are well known. In Archangel the democratic American

soldiers were dismayed at finding themselves given this undemocratic job. The Congressional Record for that period contains numerous resolutions, and readings of petitions from American citizens and letters from American soldiers at the front, demanding the end of these expeditions. The late General Graves, in command of American troops in Siberia, condemned them. Ralph Albertson, in his book, "Fighting Without a War," describing the operations of Archangel, reveals how, fed on "Bolshevists' atrocities" that the soldiers themselves later found to be lies, disgusted by example after example of high handed violation of the will of the Russian people, and irritated by the arrogance of the English officers who ran the show, the troops became discontented and mutinous. In a recently published book, "Perish by the Sword," R. Ernest Dupuy, Public Relations officer of the United States Military Academy at West Point, concludes in his foreword, "the North Russian tragedy of the tundras should serve as a warning against ever again squandering American soldiers under alien command."

The American People Want Peace

The cause of world peace is not served by unfriendly pronouncements against the Soviet Union or by the continuance of the "moral embargo," first invoked upon the pretext that the Soviet air force had engaged in civilian bombings. That pretext has been proved false and in any case can no longer have even a pretence of validity, now that the Finnish conflict has been concluded. Gestures like these can serve no purpose except to encourage further interventionist attempts against the Soviet State.

The American people want no part in reconstructing the Munich front against the Soviet Union. They know from the aftermath of Munich that conspirators who incite others to fight a peace-loving nation end by being drawn into war themselves. They have many interests in common with the people of the USSR. They firmly believe that those interests, and the cause of world peace as well, can best be served by the preservation and strengthening of cordial relations and sympathetic understanding with the Soviet Union.

BREAD AND BULLETS

WHEN the imperialists in World War I reduced half of Europe to starvation, armies could be recruited with bread, and food became a weapon. The grant or refusal of food supplies by the various relief commissions were important factors in the political course of Central Europe. Manipulation of food grants helped to crush the revolution in Hungary and was used in an attempt to crush the revolution in Russia.

In the Lansing Papers, Vol. II, published by the State Department, a letter from Secretary Lansing to President Wilson, dated June 13, 1918, defined one of the objectives of the Hoover Relief Commission:

"... I feel sure that Mr. Hoover's appointment to head such a Commission would be widely acclaimed as another evidence of the determination of the United States to assist the Russian people towards the establishment of an orderly Government independent of Germany.

"The creation of this Commission would, for the time being, dispose of the proposal of armed intervention. The British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments could be told that armed intervention would have to depend on Mr. Hoover's recommendations after he had proceeded further with his work. Armed intervention to protect the humanitarian work done by the Commission would be much preferable to armed intervention before this work had been begun."

It may not be amiss here to point out that apart from the usual influences that would lead a man in Mr. Hoover's position to use such opportune powers put into his hands against the Soviet Union there was a more direct interest. Among the far-flung mining enterprises he had been active in were concessions in Russian Central Asia held by a syndicate headed by the British financier, Urquhart. The establishment of Soviet rule had meant the loss of these properties.

On April 21, 1919, Hoover reported that the Soviets could get food on the following terms: "The Bolsheviki are to keep themselves within a certain circumscribed area ceasing all military action"—in other words, if they surrendered most of Russia to the White Guards. No such strings were attached to relief for White Guards.

On August 19, 1921, Hoover wrote to Oswald Garrison Villard: "The whole of American policy during the liquidation of the armistice was to contribute everything it could to prevent Europe from going Bolshevik and being overrun by their armies."

Hoover's chairmanship, the character of its other leading sponsors and their pronouncements soon made the anti-Soviet emphasis of Hoover's Finnish Relief committee clear. It was given public acknowledgment on February 9, when the committee announced to those who wanted their

donations to buy bullets against the Soviet Union that their contributions would be earmarked for that purpose.

The Hoover committee had led to the formation of other committees more open in their *Bullets instead of Bread* appeal. There was General O'Ryan's Fighting Funds for Finland, Inc., and another calling itself Wings for Finland.

These factors confirmed the suspicions of those who, knowing what kind of democracy Mannerheim represented, and what uses Hoover has made of relief operations, were wary of a Hoover relief fund in support of the Mannerheim regime.

"For the Rich . . ."

Thirteen bankers were on the Hoover Committee; and many others served on local committees. The Morgan interests and a Rockefeller bank were represented; among the banker committee men was Horace B. Merwin, indicted in the \$21,000,000 McKesson and Robbins swindle. With the bankers were associated big industrialists, and its supporters enlisted such public figures as Father Coughlin, G. L. K. Smith, the self-styled Fuehrer, and Russian White Guards, among them Prince Mikhail Goundoroff and Prince Georges Scherbatoff.

Abroad the local Hoovers mobilized the local "best people" for the same cause. The English Hoover was Lord Plymouth, head of the scandalous non-intervention committee that helped Mussolini and Hitler destroy democratic Spain. The Swedish Hoover was a Mr. Malm, President of the Swedish Trading Bank and chairman of four corporations. And just as Hoover had his labor betrayer, Matthew Woll, to count on, so Lord Plymouth had laborite Sir Walter Citrine, and Malm, the notorious Rickard Sandler.

To complete the picture we had as a supporter of Finnish "Democracy" the Beast of Berlin—pardon, the famous woodchopper of Doorn—that former villain of the piece in the great war for Democracy, Kaiser Wilhelm. It may be recalled that a relative of the Kaiser had been groomed, with Mannerheim's blessing, for the throne of a Finnish kingdom, subservient to the Hohenzollerns. The end of the world war had ended these plans.

Working class movements and causes have often been attacked as fomenting class antagonism. But some of the backers of the Hoover drive had no hesitation in raising class lines.

The *N. Y. World-Telegram* recommended it to the rich. "For the rich this is something in the nature of a bargain. They can get more than a dollar for every dollar subscribed," adding, "by a ruling of the United States Treasury, donations to such causes as Finnish Relief, Inc., are deductible for income tax up to 15 per cent of total net income."

Still more explicit was the announcement of one of Mr. Hoover's collaborators in the drive, Mr. Thomas J. Watson, President of International Business Machine Corporation. In the *New York Times* (January 1),

Mr. Watson called for "a great effort in doing our part in a cause that is vital to all industry—the defeat of communism."

Examining Mr. Watson's credentials we find that he was well certified for this good fight. He received the second largest salary listed in the United States, in 1938, the sum of \$450,000. We can understand his opposition to a country where collecting such a salary would be a crime. But Mr. Watson had other credentials. Mr. Watson is Hitler's Eagle and Mannerheim's White Rose. The first American to be so decorated, Mr. Watson received Hitler's Order of the German Eagle in 1937, a full year before Ford and Lindbergh got theirs. The title of his Finnish decoration is "Commander of the First Class of the Order of the White Rose." When Mr. Watson wishes to attend functions in style he can attend, resplendent in four such decorations. The two others are from Mussolini and Horthy.

Having Fun in a Good Cause

High society energetically danced, drank and gambled for the cause. One noted a Blue and White Ball (blue blood and White Guard?) in Palm Beach, a "Big Game Party" in the Hotel Ambassador, New York, and similar socialite affairs all over the country. For Fighting Funds for Finland, Inc., New York debutantes toured the night clubs shaking down the revellers. A specially edifying event was this announced in the *N. Y. Herald Tribune's* Bridge column:

"A polite and pleasant pandemonium is expected to reign in the plush quarters of the club tonight; and while it does not usually call out its members for 'causes' Mrs. T. Charles Farrelly, vice-president, expressed the warm feeling the members had for the fighting Finns, adding, 'and we'd do anything for Mr. Hoover.'"

But the fun was missing in collections made in many shops and offices. There the atmosphere of the Liberty Loan Drive of the First World War was reproduced in miniature, the "minute speech" technique, bulletins, committees, etc.

In a number of cases workers showed their attitude toward this "cause" in unmistakable fashion. Collection cans set up in the Chrysler auto plants, were taken down in a few days after the management saw what had gone into the cans. The contents were mostly metal and paper scraps, skeptical messages and demands of relief for the hungry at home. Slogans frequently appearing in the plants were "Feed the Yanks first—not Mannerheim."

In general, when the relief drive sought support outside the social register and the upper brackets going was not so easy.

A tempest was stirred over the attempt to turn New York's theaters into collection boxes for the Hoover fund.

TAC (Theater Arts Committee) issued the following statement:

"The Theater Arts Committee agrees with the stand of producers and actors who urge that efforts in the entertainment field today be directed toward the needs of the American unemployed rather than benefits for Finland. . . .

"There is every indication that his present activities in relation to Finnish relief are intended to pave the way for our entrance into the Second World War."

Solicited for a statement supporting the drive activities, Theodore Dreiser refused with the statement that he was not "a sucker for British propaganda." John Steinbeck is reported to have written to Hoover, in reply to a similar appeal, that he had been at the same address for a number of years and couldn't understand why Hoover's appeal letters for Ethiopia and Spain had never reached him.

"Loans"

Since the Hoover fund drive served to some extent to lay the propaganda groundwork for the government loans to Finland, the opposition to the loans was another indication that large sections of the people felt all the pro-Finnish activities to be part of a drive toward war.

Not wanting war and knowing as well as the warmongers who want it, that the road to war is paved with loans, they showed their disapproval, protesting against war loans, whatever pseudonym they went under. The Connecticut C.I.O. and A. F. of L. delegates to the Conference for Social and Labor Legislation, the New Jersey Labor's Non-Partisan League, and student groups and the Youth Congress protested. Representative citizen groups in Tulsa, Oklahoma and Cincinnati, Ohio, including ministers, writers, professors and trade union officials, protested.

In its courageous response to the attempted browbeating by the President which stirred the entire country, the American Youth Congress, at its Citizenship Institute in Washington, made clear the stand of progressive youth on the war dangers of Finnish loans and unneutral activities for Finland. John L. Lewis' speech at the same congress made clear the stand taken by progressive labor.

The New York Council of the American Youth Congress, with only five votes in the negative in an assemblage of a thousand, passed a resolution, scoring the war drive centering in the propaganda on Finland.

Where the Finns in America Stood

Finnish Americans, many of whom had relatives among Mannerheim's victims in the butcheries of 1918, responded very differently from Mr. Hoover's expectations. From all over the country, from steel mills and mines in Michigan, from the farm districts in Wisconsin and Minnesota, from lumber camps in Oregon, from Maryland, Montana and New York, Finnish American organizations sent resolutions denouncing the Mannerheim-Ryti-Tanner regime. Two important Finnish dailies, *Eteenpäin* (New York) and *Työmies* (Wisconsin) took a similar editorial stand with a popularity attested by rises in circulation.

THE PRESS GOES TO WAR

STATEMENTS have been made by experienced newspaper men that never in the history of journalism, with all its "yellow" fevers, and paralytic strokes of censorship, has there been such complete, though unofficial, control of news to present a single viewpoint, or falsification so deliberate and extensive, as in the coverage of the hostilities in Finland.

All the standard items in the anti-Soviet arsenal have been put into service, together with new devices handmade for the occasion. Tampering with documents has been resorted to, even the "fit-to-print" *New York Times* lifting Mannerheim's name out of a document it quoted, in order to keep their readers from identifying their new Knight of Finnish democracy with the butcher of Finnish democracy in 1918.

Taking advantage of the old adage that "seeing is believing" the press has resorted to faked photographs in order to extort belief. A photograph of airplanes silhouetted against the sky, with nothing to identify them, was superimposed over a photograph of a dilapidated house, then rephotographed as one and the result labelled, "Soviet Planes Rain Death on Helsinki." Photographs of Soviet Red Army men on skis, distributed by Sovfoto over a period of years, were dug out of the files and recaptioned as photographs of Finnish soldiers in winter equipment. Weeping Italian slum victims of a New York fire-trap conflagration reappeared in other cities as a weeping Finnish mother and daughter watching their bombed home burning down. And these are a few of only the immediately identifiable fakes.

Slander Grows a Family

On December 1, news headlines read: HELSINKI BOMBED—HUNDREDS KILLED. Almost no circulation was given to the report of the American Minister to Finland, noting that the air raids were directed at military objects, and that casualties were few.

When, several days later, an official Helsinki count of air-raid casualties in all Finland was published, it noted 89 deaths. George Seldes pointed out that the three days' bombing of Barcelona by Mussolini's planes had killed 3,000 with total casualties of 28,000. To have pointed out that casualties were light because Soviet fire was directed not at civilians, not at open towns, but at military objectives, would not have served the correspondents' purpose. They blamed it on the phenomenally poor marksmanship of Soviet airmen. Thus slander begot slander.

A statement from a captured Soviet aviation gunner, who had bailed out of a stricken plane, that Russian airmen were under strict orders "not to fire on civilians and to confine their bombing to military objectives" was given virtually no circulation.

Holding the Munchausen Line

Snug in their Munchausen Line, the correspondents trained the guns of their imaginations on the quality of the Red Army. According to them the Soviet troops were ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-armed, ill-trained; went into action in dark clothes that silhouetted them against the snow and made them perfect targets for the Finnish riflemen. They had no skis, they wallowed through the snow drifts in pitiable confusion; they fell for every trick of the resourceful Finns. Stupid Red Army officers kept sending lookouts up into bare trees to be picked off by Finnish snipers who tired of the sport. On their part the Finns were all champions. A Finnish soldier who couldn't account for 90 Russians per 100 bullets was rated a poor shot.

Later, when acknowledgment had to be made of the good qualities of Soviet Red Army men, they were always "picked" divisions, sent over from the Polish campaign or air-mailed from the Far East; or they were "Ogpu" troops hastily dispatched from the Kremlin.

The Red soldiers stayed "half-starved" in the news columns, until it was necessary to turn about and gloat over the booty in captured field kitchens; "half-clothed" until it came to gloating over the booty in captured Red supply bases. In describing the booty the correspondents began to note that Soviet equipment was not only good, but carefully handled. "Long artillery shells were packed in felt-lined cases like delicate instruments." Further, "the Finns frequently find new devices that the Russians are adapting to Arctic conditions, such as a machine gun on skis, a trench mortar on springs, and a stretcher on a small sled. Some of this equipment was new to the Finns and all of it well kept." And there was an uninterrupted supply of it.

Only toward the end were the indecent slanders against the men of the Red Army retracted and then only indirectly. At first Soviet troops were not only presented as clumsy oafs, huddling together like sheep, but as a cowardly lot who had to be shamed into action, by the device of sending contingents of women before them. Later stories paid tribute to their courage and morale, noting that "Russian soldiers don't surrender," that even when they were defeated, according to the correspondent, "they fought bravely and well." This new tone became noticeable after appeals by the Finnish censors who realized that misrepresentations of the facts were not helping their cause. In one set of instructions to correspondents the Finnish censors said:

"Any undervaluation of the enemy, of his fighting capacity, his supply of war materials, and of the possibilities open to him in general, should be avoided. Disparagement of the enemy is not founded on reality."

The daily Finnish "victories" were fabricated, it has become clear, to encourage the reluctant into a combination against the Soviet Union, to recast the never-abandoned world drive against the Soviet Union into a holy crusade with "brave little Finland" at the head. For this propaganda "victories" were essential.

Their wild impossibility from a military point of view has been often dealt with. It is enough to point out that after several "recaptures" of Petsamo by the Finns the line was acknowledged to be far south of Petsamo; that after "encirclements," "pincer operations" and finally "re-capture" of Salla that town was acknowledged to be miles behind the front lines; that the total strength of the 44th division which "lost" 14,000 men in the news columns, consisted of 10,000 men.

From Helsinki, in a dispatch published in the *Times* on January 17, correspondent Eskelund gave a veiled intimation of the unreliability of his sources: "A certain war psychosis prevails in Helsinki just as in other war capitals and rumors are buzzing. 'Have you heard this? Have you heard that?' people whisper to one another. The most fantastic stories are hatched daily and we bewildered journalists must try to distinguish them from the truth."

The only comment one can make is that the attempt was conspicuously half-hearted.

Mr. Kerr, of the *New York Herald Tribune*, wrote on March 23, "Another lesson for the civilian is how to interpret newspaper correspondence in a modern war. A reader in America simply has to read between the lines." The warning came a little late from Mr. Kerr. And he might have added that the American reader has to read between the lines at all times, when it comes to reporting about the Soviet Union.

It is well to remember that in 1917 to 1921 a similar press was given the young Red Army. The White Guards defeated them constantly. Leningrad fell more than once. Amazing casualty figures were run up on the linotypes. But we know what happened to those ever victorious generals, Kornilov, Yudenich, Kolchak and Wrangel.

In the final showdown, as we shall see, the correspondents had to reverse themselves, had to pay tribute to the "striking power and the excellence of its spirit" of the Red Army; they had to admit that "the Russian equipment was good, most of it was Russian-made, and it showed that the Russians had inventiveness for new weapons," that they had "good engineers"—in short, since they have admitted that they were in possession of the facts long before, that they deliberately withheld the truth from their public.

The Comedy Touch

Comedy, sometimes of a grisly sort, accompanied these operations by the correspondents on their Munchausen Line. Among the frozen "statues" found by correspondent Aldridge were dead soldiers with grenades pointing from their stiffened hands. Hand grenades however, must be touched

off before they are thrown, and the explosion would have blown off the dead soldier's arm long before Mr. Aldridge arrived; or if he arrived in time would have blown Mr. Aldridge right through his own story.

But the most precious piece of unconscious humor was the one solemnly and devoutly propagated by Mr. W. L. White in the *New York Evening Post* and by several other correspondents reporting an examination of Russian prisoners. Asked what he was, man after man of these prisoners replied "Krestianin."

Christians! Christians from the Godless Soviet Union! The correspondents had a field day. In their stories the prisoners proudly exhibited Bibles. However, to have Bibles in their kit when every second man in a Soviet squad is supposed to be an OGPU man seemed a little too high. So the Finns were rung in as Santa Clauses. Apparently they had had time on their hands and had used it printing a special Russian Prisoners' edition of the Bible! Mr. White could of course have gotten his story checked up closer to the point of origin. But the check-up came all the way back from home, and not by the editors of his paper but by one of its more conscientious readers, who pointed out that the Russian word *Krestianin* means farmer.

And a Touch of Sadism

While the yellow press and the, shall we say, ivory tinted press such as the *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*, were rocking with editorial indignation over faked atrocities, these same gentlefolk were indulging in a sadistic orgy unexampled in recent history.

The Soviet dead were piled mountain high; Soviet tank crews were broiled alive inside their flaming tanks; Soviet infantry were mangled on mined roads; and plugged in holes through Lake Ladoga to drown in its icy waters; their wounded were left to freeze in their own blood in the snowbanks; they became icy statues, frozen in every possible convulsion of agony; and the phrasing of the descriptions were like a slavering at the mouth.

As an example we may quote from a little idyll of sadism penned by Harold Denny and published as its lead article by the *New York Times Sunday Magazine* of February 18:

"For all the life-and-death struggle in which they are engaged, the Finnish soldiers love to laugh and are actually getting some fun out of this war. . . .

"In their Petsamo advance, the first Russian soldiers arriving took refuge from the cold (in the bathhouse). In one corner was a well. A Russian soldier seized the rope and began hauling up a bucket of water. It was a booby trap. The well exploded, killing several Russian soldiers. But it was bitterly cold and, after the excitement from this disaster had died down, a Russian pulled out the damper of the stove. . . . That set off another explosion which killed more Russians. The remainder rushed out and threw themselves into a near-by depression. That also was mined and all but two or three were killed. The survivors rushed blindly toward the bordering forest and as they reached it struck Finn wire which set off still another mine and killed them. The Finns . . . watched the fruition of

their bloody practical joke from a wooded hill, then skied back to their fellows to tell them the story, which long was a big laugh in Arctic circles."

This, in Mr. Denny's view, is getting "some fun out of this war."

Let us compare with this the Soviet communiques and the articles in the Soviet press. If there are sadists anywhere in the Soviet Union the Soviet press does not cater to them. Nor are the newspapers edited as if it is necessary to feed the people a daily bowl of victories to keep up their morale. There was no gloating over enemy dead, no attempt to fan hatred against the Finnish people. The enemy was the White Guard Army, with the fascist Schutzcorps as its core, fighting at the behest of the world wide anti-Soviet ring. Finally, in the Soviet press, the achievements of Socialist construction, of cultural activity, are more important activities than war. The greater part of the newspapers are given over to them. Elsewhere newspaper readers may turn from a surfeit of sadism in the war news, to murders, lynchings, or the publicity marriages and divorces of celebrities. In the Soviet Union the reader can turn from the terse communiques or informative articles on the war to reports of new irrigation dams, new apartment houses, new schools, new achievements of their Stakhanovites.

Retreat on the Munchausen Line

The breakthrough on the Mannerheim Line brought a simultaneous retreat on the correspondents' own Munchausen Line, which became a rout toward the safe trenches of truth, after the signing of the peace treaty.

Even before that there had been rifts and contradictions. The Moscow correspondent of the *London News Chronicle* resigned in protest, when fantastic yarns, relayed along the rumor route, Helsinki-Oslo-Copenhagen-London, were given a Moscow dateline and attributed to him. A Swedish correspondent in Finland, on getting copies of the home paper, wrote a dispatch warning against the lies and in particular protesting the misrepresentation of a victorious advance of the Red Army as a defeat, when he had sent in a correct report. In the very midst of the newspaper parade of Finnish victories, when the typewriter generals were jeering the Red Army, "purging" its commanders, annihilating its divisions, one per dispatch, and carrying the hostilities deep into Soviet territory, the *Army and Navy Journal* here, professionally analyzing the operations, concluded that the campaign showed excellent generalship on the part of the Red Army staff and excellent soldierly qualities on the part of the Red Army men.

Then Webb Miller, who allegedly had been at the front from the very outset of hostilities and had been a leading factor in spreading the myths of Finnish invincibility and Soviet weaknesses, repudiated his own handiwork in a dispatch sent from outside Finland. He was disturbed, he said, by the underestimation in other countries of the power and efficiency of the Red Army. A dangerous illusion, he warned.

Leland Stowe, correspondent of the *New York Post*, burst out with:

"Most of Finland's present generals were trained in the old German imperial army. . . . Field Marshall Baron Mannerheim himself rose to outstanding success in the Tsar's army and is reported by background and disposition to be an autocrat of the old school. Thus most of Finland's remarkably capable army officers have had very little contact with democratic conditions. . . . It is far more difficult to meet any of the key Finnish generals than it would be to get a half hour's interview with the commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies in France or Field Marshal Goering."

Elsewhere, he complained that correspondents were not allowed to get "within hearing distance of gunfire."

Fletcher Pratt, the *New York Evening Post's* own special military expert, famous for his wonderful campaigns over parlor rugs, counseled the Finnish censors thus: "Instead of sympathy this kind of news (*overdoses of atrocity stories*) produce boredom, the most dangerous of all reactions for the Finns who need to keep foreign sympathy much alive and active." (Wrong again, Mr. Pratt! It was not sympathy that gave way, Mr. Pratt. People resented lies.)

The *New York Herald Tribune's* Mr. Kerr confessed:

"Old time newspaper correspondents say the war in Finland is the first war in many years without *war correspondents*. It probably is. . . . Even if the American correspondents were skilled with skis, which they are not, or spoke the Finnish language which they cannot, the Army would not allow them to visit the front lines unless it were a relatively quiet day. . . . That is why no correspondent, so far as I know, has ever seen the troops in action."

Mr. Paul Tierney in the *Post* complained "while the generals keep the facts bottled up rumors fly with none to check them."

Now It Can Be Told

After the signing of the Peace Treaty between the USSR and Finland the correspondents stepped up on the witness stand in a "now it can be told" mood.

Mr. James Aldridge, of the *North American Newspaper Alliance*, in dispatches printed in the *New York Times* on March 14, 16, and 26, wrote of the cracking of the Mannerheim Line that it "was the most significant military feat since the World War," noting along the way that the Mannerheim Line was "equal and in some respects stronger than the Maginot Line or the West Wall." Of Soviet equipment he wrote:

"Time and again the Finnish commanders told me jokingly but really seriously that the best equipment they had was that captured from the Russians. New weapons such as anti-tank rifles and machine pistols were similar to their own super rapid-firing automatic rifles and machine guns. The new type of revolver did not jam and was better than automatic pistols. . . . Most of it (the Russian equipment) was Russian made and it showed that the Russians had inventiveness for new weapons."

The significance of this can be understood when it is borne in mind

that Finnish equipment came from Swedish arms plants rated among the very best in the world. Of the Red Army engineers Aldridge wrote:

"They were capable enough for they built a whole new road from the Russian border to Lake Kianta, a distance of twenty miles, in less than a month."

Mr. Aldridge forgot to add that the building was done in difficult country, under war conditions, and in the bitterest winter in seventy years. Aldridge also noted that:

"The Red Army soldiers were fighting against practically double their strength. In battle the Finns could muster more men than could the Red Army. This sounds paradoxical but it is true, because the Finn's extreme mobility permitted them to concentrate more men on the point of battle than could the Red Army. This was one of the most important points in the Finnish War."

Still insisting that the Finns were better soldiers, since he seems to require that comfort, Aldridge admits that the Red Army "by the time the war ended had reached a fighting form that surprised the Finns and finally resulted in the buckling up of the Finnish defense."

Of Soviet bombers he wrote:

"They compared favorably with British bombers of similar manufacture. . . . In general the bombing jobs of these planes was effective. Because of the wildness of the country and the smallness of the supply and road centers their navigation had to be good even in daytime. . . . Many new types of bombs, parachutes, etc., came out of the Finnish war. The most famous of all was what the Finns called Molotov's bread basket, which was a cylindrical container carrying a hundred or more incendiary bombs. These scattered as the cylinder fell to earth over a larger area than they could have covered if dropped straight from the bomber. The Russian fighters and patrol planes . . . made of fabric and plywood . . . were light and were extremely easy to maneuver; they outclassed anything sent into the air against them. . . . Most of the fighters and bombers had a noticeably good range of sight for the pilot and few blind spots for gunners which are the severest problems of aircraft manufacture today."

Of the Soviet airmen Aldridge wrote:

"Their ability to fly is unquestionable; and their training is of a high standard particularly in the science of flight and in the use of science in bombing and other tasks. . . . The observers and gunners had to be able to fly planes, so that every man in the air was a pilot. . . . The rank of all men in the air force is the same and interchangeable, although the real skipper of the plane was the man piloting it. . . . The crews . . . were well clothed. They wore 'fur lined suits with electrically heated gloves and boots.'"

What Mr. Aldridge saw was far from representative of Soviet air power. He noted:

"Of the things not used by the Red Air Force their four-engined bombers were the most prominent. Not one was ever seen over Finland. Also there were none of their latest fighters."

Reading this, one wonders what cause Lindbergh thought he served by his stupid slanders of the Soviet Air Force—slanders which may have

played their part in leading Finland's rulers into this adventure. Fomenters of an anti-Soviet war can derive little comfort from the fact that with only a part of its strength Soviet air power gave such a demonstration.

It might be recalled here what a merry time of it the press had over the alleged failure of Soviet fliers to make direct hits. It was implied that had the raiders been English, French or German pilots, direct hits would have been a matter of course. Since then heavy aerial bombardments by both sides have been carried out, and strange to say the percentage of direct hits were small, some shells were duds and civilian casualties occurred. For example, the bombardment of Sylt by the British Air Force, played up as a great feat, has been disclosed to have done little damage; a number of the shells turned out to be duds, and others buried themselves harmlessly in sand dunes.

Along similar lines as Aldridge, Leland Stowe wrote in the *Chicago Daily News* on March 20:

"Russia's army may not rival the German or French military machines but it is a much better army than foreign experts have ever suspected. . . . It has demonstrated its striking power and the excellence of its spirit and much of its equipment. Moreover the Soviet high command has shown great capacity to learn by experience and revise its tactics. Its final achievement in maintaining a large scale offensive in Karelia for six weeks was remarkable and the effort was sustained after foreign experts had said its continuance was impossible. Equally remarkable is the effectiveness with which the Russians . . . succeeded in supplying more than 400,000 men in Karelia and 250,000 men on the more northerly front with food and munitions with only one railroad for each. This mystery may not be penetrated for a long time but the impressiveness and importance of the Soviet accomplishments remain. For if the Red Army could organize wholesale transportation on such a vast scale in the Far Northern snows in February it should be able to do as well or better anywhere along its central or southern frontiers."

Mr. Leland Stowe, acknowledging that foreign correspondents are being criticized for "failing to record the accomplishments of the Red Army," concludes: "Today, it is only fair to put the record straight."

The *New York Herald Tribune's* correspondent Walter Kerr made similar admission regarding the performance of the Red Army, but of particular importance were his "now-it-can-be-told" dispatches of March 21 and 23 acknowledging that the Soviet air operations were not directed against civilians:

"The long-feared unrestricted war in the air, directed primarily against the civilian population, had not started." *Molotov's assurances that it never would, is not mentioned.* "It is true," Mr. Kerr now admits, "that the Red Air force never tried to exterminate the civilian population of Finland. . . . Under a liberal interpretation most of the places could have been called military objectives in the sense that there usually was a railway running through them, a few troops quartered in the town, or a factory in the neighborhood contributing to national defense. . . . Helsinki was spared after the first few days."

Reading this statement one wonders what Mr. Kerr would regard as a strict military objective if railroads, all used for troops and munitions

transport, towns containing military barracks or factories producing military materials, are to be classed as such only by a "liberal interpretation." It is not surprising that one of the dispatches should end leaving the reader with the suspicion implanted in his mind that the peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland had the character of the Munich Pact, and would be soon violated by the Soviet Union as the Munich Pact was. Anti-Soviet journalism began weaving its new falsifications while it was compelled to publicly unravel the old.

The Slanders Go On

The Finnish Government finally made peace, but not the press.

On its own front the press carried on with all the old tactics. The news of the capture of Viborg *before* the armistice was headlined, to use the *N. Y. World-Telegram's* trick, as an example, "Reds Capture Viborg After Signing Peace," implying a Soviet treaty breach. Only in the body of the text, and only if he went to the trouble of untangling the facts from the implications, would the reader understand that military actions went on, including the capture of Viborg, only until the hour of the armistice agreed on by the treaty negotiators.

This, however, is only one small example of the continuing anti-Soviet press drive. In the coverage of the peace negotiations, the manner in which the peace treaty was presented, and in the editorial and columnist interpretations the press wallowed at its lowest level, the level to which it apparently automatically descends whenever the Soviet Union is the theme.

During the peace negotiations the implication was given that it was the Soviet Union, frightened by its losses, discontent at home and breakdowns of transport and supply, that was suing for peace; and the reader was virtually left to conclude that the chivalrous Finnish Government was cooperating to permit the Soviet Government to extricate itself from an impasse.

Later, of course, the truth came out. Mr. Kerr in a dispatch published in the *New York Herald Tribune* on March 20, showed that the often apostrophized Finnish unity had broken down; that army leaders such as Lieutenant General Osterman, Lieutenant General Oesth and even Major General Wallenius had been relieved of their posts:

"General Osterman was removed from the isthmus because of a disagreement with Field Marshal Baron Carl Gustav Mannerheim as to the tactics that should have been applied to halt the Russian offensive. In his opinion the fortified line or what was left of it after Summa had fallen could not be held. He recommended a limited withdrawal and the organization outside the isthmus of a highly efficient type of guerrilla warfare. . . . Mannerheim said 'No.' The Mannerheim Line, his line, could be manned he argued, or at least it should be manned as long as there were troops available. The Red Army could not keep up the offensive. Their system of supply and communications would crack. Anyway Osterman went out. . . . Wallenius . . . went out for another reason. His command was taken away when Major General Ernst Linder, leader of the Swedish volunteers,

insisted that he should have supreme command of his own men. . . . He was to guard the coast west of Viborg. . . . But the Russians got across and the next day the general was sitting in the Hotel Kemp in Helsinki. . . ."

In a dispatch two days later, Mr. Kerr continued the story.

"The story of Finnish casualties in the field . . . was the second tip-off to Finns that something was wrong. The first had been, to those few who learned of it, the last minute shakeup in the Finnish command. . . . Field Marshal Baron Carl Gustav von Mannerheim said in his last order of the day that 'more than 15,000 Finnish soldiers were killed in action.' . . . I am told that between 30,000 and 40,000 men died. . . . I am told that between 40,000 and 50,000 men were wounded and 15,000 of them were wounded so seriously that they could not be sent back into the lines. The last figure was given to a former military attache by General Headquarters on March 1. This is a casualty list of from 70,000 to 90,000 . . . a heavy toll for a people of less than 4,000,000. . . . The figures of course were carefully hidden during the war. . . . But correspondents knew that the Finns were suffering heavily. . . ."

When the Finnish negotiators came to Moscow the newspapers carried stories—subsequently denied—that the maps appended to the treaty by the Soviet Union did not correspond to the terms agreed upon. This was followed by stories that the evacuees from the ceded territories were being terrorized, another lie. Every attempt was made to surround the negotiations, as they had surrounded the conduct of the war, with an atmosphere of brutality, in the never-ceasing attempt to discredit the Soviet Union.

Rarely, if ever, has a victorious nation with so many advantages in its hands made peace on terms so generous, calling only for such territorial cessions as were demanded by the needs of Soviet defense and returning areas of great natural wealth.

The press interpretation of the peace as another Munich is of a piece with its earlier presentation of Soviet military operations as a Blitzkrieg. In time the press had to reverse itself and admit that Soviet military operations were conducted with the utmost care to minimize civilian casualties. Perhaps the time will come when the press in order "to put the record straight", will admit the falseness of its current misrepresentations of the Soviet-Finnish peace.

Even then the reader will be well advised still to read all its Soviet news with wary reservations. Let him recall the widely circulated reports of Soviet mobilization along the Afghanistan borders, reports which were promptly given the lie not only by the Soviet Union but by Afghanistan. Readers will remember reports of Soviet demands on the Norwegian port of Narvik, denied by the Norwegian premier, and reports of Soviet mobilization along the Turkish borders, reports also given the lie by both the Soviet and Turkish governments.

A MILITARY ANALYSIS OF THE WAR IN FINLAND

By Captain Sergei N. Kournakoff

THE nearest point on the old Finnish-Soviet border was only some sixteen miles distant from Leningrad; a modern heavy field gun could bombard the city from Finnish soil.

The Soviet naval position in the Gulf of Finland was badly compromised. The fortress of Kronstadt, guarding the sea approaches to Leningrad, was part of a system of forts. When Finland received its independence from the hands of the Soviet Government, the forts on the northern shore were turned over to the Finns. Thus Kronstadt's right flank was left hanging "in thin air," and exposed to bombardment. Further, the chain of islands strung through the Gulf also were in obliging (to Great Britain) Finnish hands. From these islands one could not only see through but also shoot through the Baltic Fleet.

Finally, the outer naval position was wide open, its southern "anchor," Dagö Island, in Estonian hands and its northern buttress, Hangö, held by the Finns.

The "Hoffmann Plan" of the German General Staff for a Baltic march on Leningrad, cherished ever since 1918, and the British designs on the same objective, were always in the offing.

Elsewhere along the Finnish-Soviet frontier things were no better. The Murmansk railroad, later reinforced by the Stalin Canal to the White Sea, the USSR's line to the open sea (both the Baltic and the Black Sea being nothing more than bathtubs very easily plugged) ran parallel to a potentially hostile border for a length of over 700 miles.

Sixty miles from the Soviet naval base of Murmansk lay the well protected fjord-port of Petsamo, which Soviet Russia had given to Finland together with its independence (Petsamo or Pechenga had never belonged to Finland; it is a purely Russian district, colonized by Novgorod traders centuries ago). Petsamo, in the hands of a great naval power, would endanger the entire Soviet Arctic.

Such was the strategic situation on the northern third of Soviet Russia's 2,000-mile western border.

Fortifications

Immediately after a manner of peace was established in 1922, the Finns began to fortify their border, the British General Sir Walter Kirke

directing the work with sundry assistance from Sweden, and—strangely enough—from Germany.

The fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus were ready only in 1939, up to which time they were being continuously strengthened. There is no doubt that this fortified zone, christened after Baron Mannerheim, included a number of improvements over both the Maginot Line and the German Westwall. Roughly speaking, these fortifications consisted of an advanced zone three to eight miles deep along the Soviet border, containing pillboxes and blockhouses equipped with machine guns, anti-tank guns and field artillery, and guarded by tank traps, barbed wire and land mines.

A second zone—the main one—ran in a wide arc from its western "anchor," Koivisto fortress, across Lake Muolaa, across the Vuoksi waterway, along the latter and along Lake Suvanto and the short Taipale River to its eastern "anchor"—the fortress of Taipale and Lake Ladoga.

This zone was narrower along the eastern or river sector (about 2 miles) and much wider (about 6 or 7 miles) in the center and on the gulf sector. It consisted mainly of ferro-concrete fortifications armed with heavier artillery, each fort capable of independent defensive action. The larger forts measured some 30 by 50 feet with walls five feet thick, often protected with armor plate, and imbedded in the ground to depths reaching 25 feet. All were protected by traps, mines, wire and trenches.

The important railroad junction of Viborg (Viipuri), with its five railroad lines, was protected by a special fortified zone some 25 miles in circumference. Further west were two more separate fortified zones—Helsinki and Abo (Turku).

In the east, the Mannerheim-Kirke Line had another section running from Sortavala on Lake Ladoga northeast to Suojärvi and covering the Isthmus fortified zone as well as the "rockade"—line Sortavala-Joen-su-Nurmes-Uleaborg.

This entire system of fortifications was built on the "Siegfried" rather than the "Maginot" principle, i.e., as a deep belt of independent forts, designed to cushion the thrusts of the invader, and on the other hand, to give its garrisoning troops wide and deep maneuvering space. It was a typical defensive-offensive system as contrasted with the purely defensive French system. It was intended not for defense only, but to serve also as a "retrenched camp" for the concentration of an offensive force.

The Country

The area of Finland is about 150,000 square miles, only a few hundred square miles less than Poland. About 60,000 lakes cover 11.5 per cent of that area. These, as well as numerous rivers, marshes and low but very rocky ranges covered with dense forests make Finland, especially in the central and southern parts, a country of endless *defilés*, or bottlenecks, easy to defend, but offering serious obstacles to an attacking force. The entire length of the eastern border is protected by a hilly, wooded and rocky and roadless wilderness.

The majority of the 3,800,000 inhabitants live in the southern half of the country; the north is sparsely populated. The climate is rigorous, the mean snowfall considerably exceeding the maximum depth through which troops can move. This winter a 70-year record was broken with the temperature on the central front tumbling to 60 and 70 below.

The Armed Forces

With a population of 3,800,000 and a "mobilization potential" of about 15 per cent, the Finns mustered about 600,000 men. This included the regular peacetime army of about 30,000 highly trained men, really forming cadres for a future, fully mobilized force, and about 200,000 men of the Schutzcorps organized by Mannerheim in 1920, immediately after the Finnish Civil War, and closely resembling the Nazi SA troops. The composition of the Schutzcorps is of a distinct class character, its units being mostly recruited among the well-to-do landed families. The corps has its women's auxiliary—the "Lotta Svaard," numbering about 80,000 girls performing military duties in the rear.

Armaments

The Finnish army was quite lavishly equipped, its artillery, especially the anti-aircraft and anti-tank branches, being of Swedish Bofors make. The lavishness of the Finnish equipment can be judged by the fact that the Bofors Armament Works established a branch factory in central Finland, quite a compliment to an army of 30,000.

The Finnish air force counted about 150 planes in 1938, with airdromes built to accommodate about 2,000 machines, indicating that Finland expected some "guest-fleet" or other. These expectations have not been fully realized, but it is safe to assume that the Finnish air force was quadrupled since December 1st.

Chamberlain, in his March 19th speech, admitted having sent 101 planes; the French press admitted that 179 planes had been sent; the Swedish press stated that Swedish planes to the extent of a fifth of Sweden's total air force had been contributed. Italy's and Franco Spain's contributions of planes were also substantial. Similar heavy contributions in armament and munitions from these and other sources have been admitted.

A unique feature of Finland's military establishment was the existence of special military detachments complete with tanks, river gunboats, armored cars and even planes, equipped and maintained by the larger industrial concerns, lumber-mills, pulp-works, textile mills, etc. These outfits would turn the Iron and Coal Police green with envy, and their existence accounted, at least in part, for the political quiet prevailing in the Finnish rear.

War Industries

Finland's war industries were quite considerable. During the period 1920-30, two armament factories, two munition works, an airplane plant

and a powder factory were built. During the last few years a government shipbuilding works was established, while private shipyards had been enlarged. In addition to the Bofors armament works, already mentioned, a munitions factory was completed in 1937. There is a chlorine plant in Bjorneborg, and a nitrogen plant near Uleaborg.

A large air base is located in Immala, another one near Kemi, in the north. The main airdromes are to be found in Turku, Helsinki, Tampere and Marienhamn (Aland Islands).

Great electric power plants in Imatra and along the length of the Vuoksi supplied the metallurgical and chemical plants of that area.

Transportation

The building of new railroads during the last two decades was closely linked with the plans of the Finnish General Staff. On the Karelian Isthmus four lines ran to the Soviet border. In Central Finland five trunk lines ran from the Gulf of Bothnia to the eastern border.

The Far North was linked to the rest of the country by a single highway (from Petsamo to Kemi, near the Swedish border), which joins the railroad line at Rovaniemi. The network of railroads in central and southern Finland, gave the Finnish army the great advantage of operating along good inner lines of communication.

In contrast, the Soviet Union had only the Murmansk railroad, running 700 miles along the Finnish border, for the supply of the entire eastern front. For the Isthmus front, there was the Leningrad bottleneck with only one bridge across the river Neva.

The Campaign of the Red Army

The campaign of the Red Army went through four distinct phases.

The first called for the immediate neutralization of danger points: occupation of Petsamo, pushing the border 35-40 miles away from Leningrad, and occupation of the Gulf islands. This was done in the opening week. There followed an advance from Petsamo of about 80 miles. From the eastern frontier three columns pushed west, one toward Rovaniemi, another toward Uleaborg, a third toward the same goal by way of Nurmes. North of Lake Ladoga Red Army units penetrated some 50 miles westward. Accomplished in the first three weeks under circumstances never encountered before, this first modern mechanized campaign in the Arctic was a great achievement.

In the second phase, the record breaking winter made operations virtually impossible. But the advances were consolidated except for the central column which apparently met with a local reverse (losing one battalion) and withdrew from its advanced position but dug in, still on Finnish soil. Communication lines in the wilderness were strengthened. Pressure on the Mannerheim Line was kept up (no attempt at a breakthrough) as a holding operation to keep Finnish troops from being shifted north.

About January 13, with the clearing of the weather the third, or air phase began, a systematic but highly discriminate bombardment of the entire Finnish military establishment—war industries, railroads, ports, fortresses, and airdromes. This phase, lasting nearly a month, could have been shortened by about two weeks, if the Soviet airmen had bombed indiscriminately. By taking care to bomb only military objectives, they lost two weeks time but saved tens of thousands of lives of the civilian population. This is indicated by the negligible number of civilian casualties charged by Finnish reports themselves.

Fourth phase: On February 11 the Red Army moved against the main zone of the Mannerheim Line after a shattering artillery preparation. Such was the power of the Soviet fire that ferro-concrete blockhouses were uprooted bodily and thrown out of alignment, their guns losing their ability to fire. This artillery preparation was the "aimless wasting of shells" upon which the "typewriter generals" directed their scorn.

Generally speaking, the front can be divided into four sectors. On the eastern side of the Isthmus was the river sector along the Taipale, Lake Suvanto and the Vuoksi, some 35 miles long as the crow flies. Here the Red Army simply kept up moderate pressure, to "rivet" the Finnish reserves and prevent their dispatch to other sectors. The right central sector, between the Vuoksi and Lake Muolaa, was ten miles of heavily wooded and hilly country. A heavy blow fell here, with the Red Army driving through the fortifications, across the Valkjärvi-Viborg railroad and northwest along the Vuoksi, passing to the east of Viborg. By March 1 the Red Army already occupied the station Attali on the Viborg-Sortavala railroad.

On the left central sector, between Lake Muolaa and Summa, the Red Army drove straight at Viborg, cracking the Mannerheim Line, storming the Viborg fortified area proper, and occupying Viborg station on March 2.

In the western sector, between Summa and the Gulf of Finland, the Red Army first passed the Fortress of Koivisto, then surrounded it, and finally captured it. It then drove across the frozen bay, capturing fortified islands in rapid succession, outflanking Viborg from the southwest and establishing a firm foothold on the western shore of the bay, March 4.

There was no necessity to rush the city of Viborg in view of the pincer-character of the operation.

On March 7 there began a series of demonstrations on other sectors, viz: in the far north the Red Army drove southward to capture the town of Nautsi, and on Lake Ladoga a series of islands flanking that sector were captured. This of course was done to prevent the Finns from concentrating all their reserves on the Isthmus. On March 10 lively infantry action started north of Lake Ladoga (the Loimola region).

On March 11 the ring around Viborg was closed by the Red Army.

On March 12 the Soviet Army communique simply said: "Nothing of importance happened at the front." . . . Finnish resistance had collapsed.

The Peace Treaty

On March 13 hostilities ceased after the signature of the peace treaty in Moscow. (Two hours before the deadline Viborg fell.)

The treaty is a typical instrument of peace, not of conquest. This is apparent from its military features, which are the following: In the Far North the Soviet Union—being, by the way, in a position to demand almost anything—did not ask for the rich nickel mines, but demanded only two barren pieces of the Rybachi and Sredni peninsulas which command the entrance to the Fjord of Petsamo. Thus that sheltered harbor—an ideal naval base—is snugly locked against any hostile naval force.

On the eastern border, near the Arctic Circle, the Soviet Union gets a strip of mountainous country. Riches? None. Just a divide commanding the watershed of the Kemi River which runs toward the Swedish border, enabling the Red Army to keep an eye on any suspicious moves from that quarter and quickly to take appropriate action. Here the border is pushed away from the Murmansk railroad which is to be linked with the line Kemi-Rovaniemi-Kemijärvi.

In the southern Karelian sector the border has been pushed away from Leningrad about 85 miles and the entire Mannerheim Line (or what is left of it) is taken over by the Soviet Union, including the important railroad, Suojärvi-Sortavala-Antrea-Viborg, with all its branch lines, leaving (as far as we know) the line Lappeenranta-Imatra-Elsinvaara to the Finns. Thus the Karelian menace to Leningrad has instead become a protective outpost. Its loss to Finland renders her virtually useless as a doorway to aggression against the Soviet Union.

The town of Viborg with its elaborate railroad junction and port is also taken over, together with all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, thus insuring the inner naval position protecting Kronstadt. The outer naval position is secured by the lease of the Hangö Peninsula which, together with the island base leased from Estonia, closes the great naval door to any hostile fleet.

Thus we see that it was not exploitable wealth that has been wrested from a defeated foe—but outposts securing the peaceful work of both the Soviet and Finnish people who would certainly gain nothing from the game of chestnut-pulling for the benefit of Messrs. Chamberlain-Montague Norman-Ryti, Ltd.

General Deductions

The developments of the Soviet-Finnish campaign seem to bear out the following military observations:

1. It being an axiom of military science that an attacking force must normally outnumber its enemy by from 2:1 to 5:1, the steady advance of the Red Army which has pitted in the field some 600,000 men against an equal number of Finnish troops, is a surprising military achievement.

2. The aerial assault on military objectives as carried out by the Soviet air force does credit to its personnel, methods and *matériel*. All the

early canards about bombing of civilians have been conclusively repudiated by their authors.

3. The single railroad line feeding the 700-mile front has functioned with precision; the Leningrad junction with its single bridge has kept up with the colossal demands made upon it by the Karelian offensive—proving that Soviet railroads function with great efficiency.

4. The original plan of the Soviet General Staff to cut Finland in two at the waist, was thwarted by an unexpected turn in the weather. Great credit belongs to the Red Army General Staff for the flexibility of its planning.

5. While both the Allied and the German Armies have been immobilized by the Siegfried and Maginot Lines—the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line, the first such breakthrough in military history, making all further arguments about the efficiency, morale and leadership of the Red Army superfluous.

6. While the press and the radio up to the last days of the war were insisting that disaster was befalling the Red Army “northeast of Lake Ladoga” practically every day, we now learn that the front there was sufficiently stable to permit the construction of an 80-mile railroad line running from Petrozavodsk to Suojärvi, the completion of which was announced to the Congress of the Supreme Soviet by Andrei Zhdanov.

No mean achievement for the engineers of the Red Army!

On April 12 occurred the formal transfer to Finland of towns in the Petsamo district that had been occupied by Red Army troops. Damages had been repaired by the Red Army before the transfer was made. The official announcement read:

“In accordance with the protocol appended to the peace treaty between the USSR and Finland, special representatives of the Red Army Command handed over to special representatives of the Finnish Command, Petsamo and the port of Liinahamari with municipal buildings, equipment and local industrial enterprises.

“On April 9 both parties signed a protocol noting that the Red Army Command had restored in Petsamo the telephone and telegraph station, two power stations, electric wires, water works, central heating in a number of buildings and in Liinahamari—moorages, and that all enterprises were handed over to representatives of the Finnish Army in working condition.”

FINLAND AS A DEMOCRACY

ELSEWHERE in these pages, there is a section analyzing the press treatment of the war. This rested on a basic assumption that Finland was a democracy defending itself from assaults upon its independence and democratic institutions. So far as news readers and radio listeners knew, the Finnish Government was not only a democracy, but a democracy of a highly superior order.

In order to bring the record into true perspective, it is helpful to examine the social and political structure of Finland in its historical settings.

Ethnologically the Finns belong to the Finno-Ugrian group of peoples and are related to the Karelians, Mordvinians, Kalmucks, Magyars, Estonians, and other peoples from the European and Asiatic Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. Their language is included in the Uralo-Altaic group. They and the related Karelian tribes were very early subjected to two pressures from opposite directions, from Sweden, which converted the tribes whom they conquered successively into Roman Catholics and Lutherans; and from Russian colonists from Novgorod who converted the tribes whom they conquered into Greek Catholics.

The Swedo-Finnish Aristocracy

The Western Finns, in what is now Finland, remained under Swedish domination from 1154 until 1809, when it fell under the Tsars. The Swedish army of occupation inter-married with the Finns, developing a Swedish-speaking Swedo-Finn aristocracy which for a long time held itself aloof from the Finnish masses as a race-distinct, as well as economically privileged, class. This situation was not meekly acceded to. There were Finnish peasant uprisings against their oppressors of which the most extensive was the so-called Club War of 1596. In the latter half of the 19th Century, a national Finnish revival, resembling the Gaelic Revival in Ireland, swept the Finnish people and flowered in an important Finnish literary school. It received unexpected aid from the Tsarist government which encouraged it as an offset to possible Swedo-Finn moves for reunion with Sweden. Under Nicholas First, however, at the turn of the century, there was an attempt to Russify the Finnish people.

Curiously enough, the Swedo-Finn aristocracy intrigued to transfer Finland from Swedish to Tsarist hegemony. Sweden had become too libertarian for their tastes. The pattern of the Tsarist provinces on the Southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, where a Baltic-German aristocracy had a free hand over the Estonian and Latvian peasantry, appealed to them. The historian J. Hampden Jackson writes:

"When the Russian troops entered Turku, the capital, they were met with a civic reception. Sweden's cause in Finland has been betrayed by the Swedo-Finnish gentry."

Their power reduced by the Finnish National Revival, the Swedo-Finns formed a separate political party to protect their interests. This party was conservative, in conformity with its social and economic status. In the 1905 revolution it aligned itself with the Tsar. It was the growing Social-Democratic Party which, at that time, fought for independence, for a democratically elected diet and for social reforms. A paralyzing general strike in which even the police joined, succeeded in winning autonomy, democratic rights and social reforms. In the first democratic Diet of Finland the Social-Democrats won 80 out of 200 seats. Most of these gains were lost in the post-1905 reaction, but in another democratic upsurge in 1916 the Social-Democrats won 103 seats out of 200, the first country in the world to return a Socialist majority.

When the Tsarist government was overthrown neither the Lvov nor the Kerensky government gave Finland its independence. The Bolsheviks attacked these governments for withholding independence from Finland, and when they came into power they formally recognized Finland's independence, even though the internal situation in Finland was then in turmoil.

The Finnish Civil War

The bourgeoisie of Finland had been indifferent to Finnish independence until the Bolshevik revolution. When that occurred they were frantic for an independence which might save them from Socialism. Finland's independence had already been acknowledged by the Soviet Union. The bourgeoisie began a Civil War to wrest the government from the hands of the Social-Democratic majority. Baron Mannerheim organized a White Army which was beaten. English arms, Swedish financial aid, arms and "volunteers," and finally and most important, a German invading army under General von der Goltz, brought victory to Mannerheim's White Guards.

The Encyclopedia Britannica account notes that Mannerheim's prisoners totaled 73,915, of whom 4,600 were women. It also notes that "some 15,000 men, women and children were slaughtered." According to contemporary sources the "some 15,000" victims in the Britannica account were some 30,000; but even the 15,000, in proportion to the Finnish population, constituted a fearful holocaust. Mannerheim's title of "butcher" was well earned.

Immediately the victors disfranchised all elements who had been opposed to them, which meant a clear majority of the people, and then held new elections. The Diet brought in by this "election" was the ancestor of the present Finnish Government. Its first act was to declare Finland a German protectorate and invite a brother-in-law of the Kaiser, Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse, to become King of Finland. This was the "in-

dependence" the bourgeoisie had fought for in what the official Finnish histories describe as their "war for independence." The Finnish Civil Guard, the first fascist type of army in Europe, was retained as a permanent check against a democratic upsurge. Finland thus became the first Fascist State, the Schutzkorps preventing its complete return to democratic institutions.

The Allied victory in the World War prevented the project for a Finnish Kingdom. But the Finnish bourgeoisie, though denied a royal court, was not further punished for its pro-German affiliations. Indeed, a British apologist made this explanation of Mannerheim's course: "In asking for a German monarch the Whites were putting Finland under the protection of the Power which was predominant in the Baltic and this, after all, was Finland's traditional position." The Allies had uses of their own for the Mannerheim Regime. Finland was to be made an anti-Soviet base, and the Finnish army was to collaborate with White Guard Russian generals, though some of these refused to guarantee Finland's independence, and with the Allies' own interventionist forces.

Anti-Soviet Orientations

Details of Finnish operations against the Soviet Union are given in other sections of this book. It is sufficient to emphasize here that from its very inception the Finnish Government, established as a result of the Mannerheim putsch, took a fascist form, kept a Fascist Civil Guard in continuous power, and in its foreign relations, had an anti-Soviet orientation that swelled and ebbed, from overt aggression to intrigues and preparations for aggression, according to the international situation.

This anti-Soviet orientation took concrete form in strategic railroads and highways towards its frontiers with the Soviet Union, and airdrome development of a capacity indicating anticipated joint anti-Soviet military action with other powers.

Of the Civil Guard, a shirt army larger proportionately than Hitler's Storm Troopers or Mussolini's Blackshirts, J. Hampden Jackson writes in his history of Finland:

"This body was a survival of the White Guard of 1918 which had been given legal recognition and a State subsidy under the Republic, on the understanding that it would act as a territorial militia to guard the country against foreign invasion and communist conspiracy."

In 1939, whereas the regular army numbered no more than 30,000 men, the Civil Guard, recruited on a class basis, mainly from the well-to-do farmers, numbered 200,000 men, in a population of less than 4,000,000.

Finland's Constitution

While the existence of the Schutzkorps itself has served to nullify the democratic pretensions of the Finnish Government, an examination of the Finnish Constitution reveals how limited is even the formal democracy

of Finland. The basis of the Finnish state is the Constitution of July 17, 1919, which aimed to transform Finland into a standard bourgeois parliamentary republic. This Constitution secures to the upper bourgeoisie unchallenged control of the executive power. It left intact the old Grand Ducal electoral law of 1906, which set the voting age at 24 years, thus barring hundreds of thousands of Finnish citizens from participation in the Diet elections. As a further check against possibilities of popular control, the President was invested with unusual powers. He is completely independent of the Diet, has veto power over Diet decisions. He also has the right to promulgate legislation without the sanction of the Diet and the right to dissolve the Diet. The President's term is six years; the Diet is elected every three years.

The usual catalogue of "democratic rights and liberties" appears in the 1919 Constitution; but it also contains a special clause, Article 16, which nullifies this "Bill of Rights" by providing: that "the above-mentioned clauses dealing with the general rights of Finnish citizens shall not hinder the establishment by law of restrictions necessary in time of war or rebellion, or *under any other circumstances*, or with regard to persons in the military or naval service." (Italics ours) This article has been invoked at the first sign of democratic trends among the people.

The Special Laws of 1930

The series of repressive laws of 1930 legalized the suppression of the working class, leaving no remnant of those rights and liberties so meagerly "guaranteed" by the 1919 Constitution.

These acts include the Defense of the Republic Act, adopted on November 18, 1930, which gave the government the right, in the event of "violation of public order," to issue decrees suspending freedom of press, assembly, domicile, etc. The amendments to Article 7 of the fundamental law, enacted by the Diet on November 18, 1930, provided that persons affiliated to organizations whose activities are directed at bringing about a change in the political and social system of Finland, or supporting or encouraging such activities, directly or indirectly, cannot be elected to the Diet. Consequently, the revolutionary working class was deprived of any opportunity to avail itself even of the minimum representation it had in the "democratic" Finnish Diet.

The amendments to Section 24 of Article 16 of the Press Law, introduced by the Act of July 31, 1930, grant the courts the right to close down any newspaper or other publication for a term of up to one year. The same act grants to the Minister of Justice the right to confiscate any printed matter, subject to the subsequent sanction of the courts.

Further restrictions appeared every year. The law of February 6, 1931, under the pretext of "protecting the freedom of labor," prohibited trade unions from adopting decisions which made participation in strikes obligatory for non-trade-unionists.

The year 1939 brought with it a new wave of terrorist laws. The

Finnish bourgeoisie used the "defense movement" as a pretext to enact scores of reactionary emergency laws. With martial law as another pretext, it intensified the terror against worker and peasant organizations.

From 1930 on, though the Diet continued, the Schutzcorps, as the real executive of the Finnish ruling class, and other extra-Parliamentary forces, took more direct control; the choice of Presidents and ministries was largely decided by these fascist groups. Even this control was considered insufficient by the extremist reactionaries, and in 1932 there was an unsuccessful armed revolt of the Lapuans, who had been carrying on unbridled terror. There was a trial of their leaders—who were all soon pardoned. Their defeat did not lead to a restoration of democracy. Even after the General Elections of 1936, when the Social-Democrats gained over a third of the seats, reaction remained unshaken. The Schutzcorps retained its control and fascists still occupied all important positions in the civil service and the army. In the courts, which they controlled, they declared unconstitutional all laws passed by the Diet for the suppression of the fascist movement. The anti-fascist majority did manage to prevent the re-election of President Svinhufud. The election of Kallio, right wing agrarian leader who still holds office, meant little improvement. It was Kallio who as Premier had helped to suppress the Socialist Working Class Party in 1923.

In the General Election of July, 1939, the Social-Democrats increased their representation to 85 and the ultra-Fascist Party lost seven of its fourteen seats. A Coalition Government of Social-Democrats, agrarians and progressives was formed. But again the hopes with which progressives hailed this change was dashed, since Finland was not ruled by its single chamber Parliament. Mannerheim, the conservative and fascist parties, retained control and no legislation could be carried in opposition to their wishes. A great point has been made of Mannerheim's "retirement" in recent years. Actually, he has held the position ascribed to him by the *London Daily Mail* correspondent in Helsinki of "the uncrowned King of Finland."

The Social-Democrats

In all this period, though Communists had been outlawed from the very beginning, the existence of a Social-Democratic Party was permitted. This party, however, bears little resemblance to the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party which had been the majority party when Mannerheim with aid of the Germans crushed its government. Its most militant elements had been slaughtered and it now existed on tolerance from the Civil Guard. In 1927 Social-Democrats formed a short-lived government which, while it denounced the Schutzcorps, failed to curtail its state subsidy.

When, in 1922, the militants in the Social-Democratic Party split off and formed the Finnish Labor Party, winning 27 seats in the Diet, the Civil Guard acted. The Finnish Labor Party was suppressed and its 27

deputies thrown into prison. Again, in 1930 the militants organized a party and won 23 seats in the Diet; and again, this time at the behest of a new fascist movement called the Lapua movement, the Svinhufud government suppressed the new party and jailed its deputies, carrying out at the same time repressive actions against the labor unions and against workers' newspapers; all left-wing parties but the Social-Democrats were outlawed.

The Social-Democratic Party served in Finland a role similar to that served by the Social-Democratic Party in Horthy's Hungary, an organism to give an appearance of popular acquiescence to an oppressive regime. The Social-Democratic leader, Vainö Tanner, during the worst outrages of the Lapua fascists, placed the responsibility upon its victims and defended the government in the following declaration:

"The Social-Democrats consider that the government had no way out, for who could expect it to dispatch troops to protect Communist printing plants?"

In another statement he said: "The Social-Democrats pursue the same aims as the Lapua movement." The fact that during the Soviet-Finnish hostilities the bars between the Social-Democrats and the Schutz-corps were let down, Social-Democrats being permitted to enroll, speaks for itself.

Finland's Leaders

The undemocratic character of the Finnish Government reflects itself in its leading personalities. From such a set-up it can be expected that the government leaders would scarcely have a democratic tinge, as a study of some of the personalities recently prominent in the news shows to be the case.

Its military head, General Carl Gustav von Mannerheim, aroused such world-wide horror by his butcheries that Hoover, in recommending recognition of Finland, to the American Government, urged that recognition be accorded in spite of the "sinister shadow" he cast over the new Finnish Republic. Mannerheim was one of the two military officers escorting the Tsar Nicholas II at his coronation. He negotiated for a German protectorate with a German prince on the Finnish throne, and collaborated in the Yudenich raid on Leningrad, though Yudenich had refused to give guarantees of Finnish independence in the event of a White restoration regime in Russia. Mannerheim's support was given to the Lapua and other fascist elements in the country.

Risto Ryti, war-time premier of Finland, was a deputy in the Finnish Diet installed by the White Terror. Head of the Bank of Finland, since 1923, *United Press* dispatches referred to him as an "international banker connected with leading banking circles in London and Wall Street and a friend of Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England." He holds a British honorary title, Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order. The *N. Y. Evening Post* on December 1, 1939, commented:

"The British Crown confers such honors only on foreign royalty or on prominent individuals who have earned the gratitude of the British Government for being unusually cooperative. Ryti rated his title because as Governor of the Bank of Finland he worked hand in hand with the Bank of England. He kept Finnish currency closely tied to the pound sterling."

Former Prime Minister Eljas Erkko, wealthy owner of the big Finnish newspaper, the *Helsinki Sanomat*, was an officer in the Civil Guard in 1918, and is a leader of the right wing of the political party to which he belongs.

Vainö Tanner, Ryti's Foreign Minister, though a Social-Democrat, condoned the fascist Lapua excesses, as noted above. Tanner was Chairman of the Advisory Council of the National Bank of Finland, and thus a banker associate of Ryti's.

General Kurt Wallenius, one of Mannerheim's chief military aides, was a White Guard officer in the Civil War; he was active in the fascist Lapua agitation of 1920, and was implicated together with a group of staff officers in the kidnapping of Stahlberg, candidate of the moderates. Sentenced to a prison term, he was almost immediately released and restored to his former offices.

It remains to be added that during the October-November negotiations with the Soviet Union, last year, Finnish newspapers favorable to a settlement, which declared that the Soviet terms formed a negotiable basis for a settlement, were suppressed under the Defense of the Nation act, which stifled what was left of free expression of public opinion before hostilities commenced.

Economic and Social Conditions

By the practical gauges upon which democracy can be measured, the Finnish people still have far to go. As has been pointed out, since the Mannerheim butcheries militant working class parties have been smashed as soon as they have appeared. Trade union halls and working class papers have been wrecked. In 1919 trade unions had a membership of 161,000; in 1939 this number had sunk to 90,000. In other words, twenty years of Finnish "democracy" had cost the trade unions almost half their strength. The historian, J. Hampden Jackson, writes:

"There is no really powerful trade union organization to look after the interests of the workers. . . . Today the printing and some smaller trades have collective agreements with their workers but the timber and other big industries have none."

A U. S. Department of Commerce Bulletin of November 30, 1939, noted:

"Trade unions, although they have played some part in wage disputes in Finland, have little influence in comparison with the trade unions in Scandinavian countries and the organized labor movement is not highly developed."

Finland is frequently bracketed with Sweden and Norway as a part-

ner in a Norse paradise of industrial peace and workers' plenty. The Finnish wage level, however, is about half that of its neighbors. When Swedish industrialists attempt to lower wages their stock argument is that they are hard pressed by the low wages of competing Finnish industries. Furthermore, workers are without old age, disability or unemployment insurance.

The big industries such as the timber, wood pulp and textile industries where trade union organization has been smashed, have an industrial police armed like private armies. Gunboats on the lakes and rivers, planes overhead, and tanks and armored cars on the roads and at the gates are part of their equipment. These, not collective agreements, are the determinants in Finland's "industrial peace."

On the Land

On the land the situation measures no better on any practical democratic gauges.

At the International Agrarian Congress that took place in Dresden in June, 1939, a report was made on Finnish agriculture by the Finnish agronomist, Kinnunen:

"The huge mass of Finnish small peasants possess such small plots of land that the income drawn from them is not enough to provide the peasants with the means of existence, if they do not find additional earnings in the countryside. The peasant families living in such conditions are compelled to sell their agricultural produce, and above all, milk. Therefore, the peasant family does not possess the necessary quantity of foodstuffs for daily nourishment, and this has a particularly grievous effect on the young generation of the peasantry."

Wood-flour with a small mixture of rye—makes up the "bread" consumed in the northern and eastern regions of Finland, which are populated mainly by small peasants. These regions show the results of under-nourishment. In 1934, no less than 40 per cent of the army recruits were rejected as unfit for military service by reason of their physical condition, while 60 per cent of young people awaiting recruitment to the army showed an average weight of less than 60 kilograms (122 pounds).

According to the data of the official "Statistical Annual of Finland," the distribution of land, according to the extent of land ownership is as follows:

	No. of Farms	Per Cent of Farms	Per Cent of Arable Land
Total for Finland	453,701	100	100
Parcelled farms of less than one-half acre (majority without ploughland)	166,500	37	} 4
½ acre to 5 acres	78,101	18	
5 to 30 acres	170,323	37	44.5
40 acres and over	38,777	8	51.5

Thus, over half of the cultivated land is in the hands of 8 per cent of the farmsteads—a landlord class, whereas the majority of the peasantry are either without their own ploughlands, or else possess a most insignificant part of it (4 per cent of the entire arable land of the country).

A considerable number of farmers, it should be added (37 per cent according to the Finnish census) own no land, tilling the soil as renters or as farm laborers.

This is the outcome of "agrarian reforms," initiated by the *Lex Kallio*, named after the President of Finland. According to this, expropriation could begin only on estates of more than 500 acres. The legal maximum of expropriations was 50 per cent of the *uncultivated* acreage, and this legal maximum was applicable only to estates of more than 1250 acres. Compensation to the landlords was in government bonds carrying 7 per cent interest; the costs to be borne by the new peasant proprietors. On these terms only half of the landless peasantry could afford to acquire land and the terms proved so onerous that in the five years between 1930 and 1935, 20,000 of these farms were put up at auction.

From this the character of the Finnish agricultural cooperatives becomes clear. The Finnish cooperatives are of two kinds, rural cooperatives which are organizations of producers and urban cooperatives which are organizations of consumers. Originally united, the two groups split over the question of union labor. The producers' cooperatives refused to employ union labor. Who are these producers? The figures show that only a small proportion of the farmsteads have enough land to produce a surplus for marketing. The rural cooperatives can therefore only be organizations of the well-to-do farmers. Their objection to the employment of union labor becomes clear.

Finland's Independence

As for Finland's independence, in common with the independence of other small European states, it has been, unhappily, a fiction. European states live under the pressure of power politics which have made an independent course impossible even for so strong a state as France—witness her increasing dependence in recent years upon the British Foreign Office. Under the same pressures Finland has increasingly become a "client state" of Great Britain.

This is the term used in Lawrence's Principles of International Law to designate those states "who are obliged to surrender habitually the conduct of their external affairs . . . to some state or authority external to themselves."

The London *Economist* of May 29, 1937, remarked:

"Not only do trade relations between England and both the Scandinavian States and the Baltic States date back to the very beginning of our history; not only is the whole of that region one of the best markets in the world for Britain and an essential source of supply; but from the political and cultural standpoints they are closer to us than almost any other nation. . . . Today their trade with

Russia is negligible, while England is their commercial—and in many ways their political—metropolis. That position affords this country unique chances and obvious responsibilities.”

Before the Bolshevik revolution Finland's economic hinterland, in accord with its geographical situation, and political ties, was Russia.

Following the revolution, in accord with the economic blockade carried on by the capitalist powers, and in accord with the new political ties the country was entering into, Finland pursued an economically unnatural orientation toward other countries. This led to the decay of some of its industries and to a wasteful overdevelopment of the timber resources, needed by England; and in agriculture to an overdevelopment of dairy production, which resulted in an insufficiency of grain, which had to be supplemented by imports.

Before the World War of 1914, the greatest share of Finnish exports fell to Russia. In 1937 import and export trade with the Soviet Union was virtually non-existent, whereas Finland sent 43 per cent of its exports to England and 13 per cent to Germany and took 19 per cent of its imports from England and 16.5 per cent from Germany.

Finland's principal industrial assets, including its timber, woodpulp, plywood, paper and cellulose industries, were controlled by joint stock companies in which British investments were heavy. The joint stock companies, according to the official Statistical Annual of Finland, of 1938, accounted for 95 per cent of the total 1937 output. Half of the timber and paper exports go to England.

Finland's nickel mines are controlled by the International Nickel Company of Canada (in which Morgan interests participate). Further, the Finnish currency is tied to the British pound. Finnish insurance is controlled by the Prudential Insurance Co., Ltd., of London.

American investments have also been heavy. The Finnish telephone system is controlled by the International T & T, a Morgan concern. The Ford Motor Co. has been established in Finland since 1926. Altogether, thirteen American corporations are installed in Finland. Swedish capital also has large investments in Finland.

Between 1920 and 1923 Finland borrowed \$204,000,000, chiefly from the United States and Great Britain. Between 1932 and 1937 Britain absorbed \$50,000,000, the United States \$32,000,000 of Finnish bond issues. Finland's 1939 borrowings, including \$40,000,000 from England, were again heavy. The British profits squeezed from Finland are indicated by the 18 per cent annual dividends declared by the London Hambro Bank, which specializes in placing loans abroad for Finnish banks.

The result of the economic tieup with Great Britain has been that Finland's industrial development has followed British needs. For example, a geological lode stretching across Scandinavia, Finland and the USSR has been exploited at both ends but remains untouched in its Finnish center because it is held as a "reserve" by British capitalists. Metals which Finland might have drawn from this source are imported, instead, from Eng-

land. Analysis of Finland's industrial structure as a whole shows this maldevelopment to be general. Her productive resources have never been developed in the interests of her own people.

Finland's military connections as shown in detail on the Calendar on page 93, have followed a related course. Veering between Germany and England, they have in recent years come more and more under British influence.

The extent of Finland's dependence on England was analyzed by Lenin in his speech on December 1, 1920, at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets:

“Churchill, who is pursuing a policy similar to that pursued by Nicholas Romanov, wants to fight and is fighting, and is completely ignoring Parliament; he boasted that he would mobilize fourteen states against Russia—this was in 1919—he would take Petrograd in September and Moscow in December. He was a little too loud in his boastings. He staked everything on the fact that everywhere in these small states there is a hatred for Russia, but he forgot that these small states clearly understand who Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin are. There was a time when they were a few weeks removed from complete victory. During Yudenich's advance, when he was not far from Petrograd, the *Times*, the richest English newspaper, published a leading article—I myself read this leading article—in which it begged, ordered and demanded of Finland: Help Yudenich, the eyes of the whole world are turned upon you, you will save liberty, civilization and culture throughout the world—march against the Bolsheviks! This was England speaking to Finland—England, who has the whole of Finland in its pocket, England speaking to Finland, who is up to her neck in debt, who does not even dare to squeak, because without England she has not enough bread to last her a week. . . .” (*Lenin on Britain*, page 186.)

Summing up Finland's status nineteen years later, before the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish peace, D. N. Pritt said:

“ . . . We see in Finland a country where internally, under a facade of parliamentary democracy, a reactionary and indeed fascist minority, with a long record of bitter hostility to the USSR, exercises the whole reality of power over a courageous and intelligent but oppressed majority; and in foreign relations, under a facade of independence, that same ruling minority accepts the position of a 'client state,' a colony, almost a military outpost, of Great Britain.” (*Must the War Spread?*, page 136.)

THE BALTIC MUTUAL AID PACTS

SIX months of close relations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic countries have conclusively demonstrated the scrupulousness with which the USSR observes its agreements and respects the independence of small neighbor nations wishing to maintain friendly relations and not permitting themselves to be used as tools for anti-Soviet adventures. In its mutual aid pacts* with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Soviet Union has not only secured itself against attack through their territories. It has also secured these countries against ever again being made objects of plunder by the great powers as they have been in the past, and against the ever-present threat of being laid waste by the armies of any nation that might decide to turn them into battlegrounds in an attempt to destroy the Soviet Union.

Relations With Estonia

The Government of Estonia was the first to grasp the implications of the new world situation with relation to its own security, and in concluding a mutual assistance pact with the USSR pointed the way to the other Baltic States.

The Baltic Sea reaches into Eastern Europe with two arms, the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga, and the tiny land they encircle, is Estonia, to which the strategically located Oesel and Dagö Islands guarding the entrance to these gulfs, belong. The leasing of these islands as air and naval bases enables the USSR to defend both the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga, and to operate freely in the Baltic against any aggressor or violator of peace. The use of the Estonian city Baltic Port as a naval base has the utmost importance to the USSR, since it is a warm water port, while Kronstadt and Leningrad are ice-locked a large part of the year.

Estonia, under the yoke of foreign capital, had become largely an agrarian country. The trade agreement with the USSR that accompanied the mutual aid agreement has already meant new industrial growth. Under its terms, trade turnover with the Soviet Union amounted to 39,000,000 kronen at the end of 1939, as against 9,600,000 in 1938.

In all their public declarations since the conclusion of the pacts, Baltic statesmen have given the lie to the slanders hurled at the USSR regarding her relations with these small nations.

Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter wired his thanks on October 2

*See document section for complete texts.

to Molotov on the conclusion of the Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance and trade pacts, in these words:

"Having returned to my country, I ask you to accept and convey to the leader of the peoples of the USSR, Stalin, and to People's Commissar of Trade, Mikoyan, the sincere gratitude of the Estonian Government for their wise conduct of political and economic negotiations in Moscow, for the successful conclusion of these negotiations in new agreements of friendship between our countries, designed to develop further their good-neighborly and peaceful collaboration."

In a broadcast to his country, after the pact was signed, President Konstantin Paets said:

"The new mutual aid pact with Russia has spared our nation a hopeless struggle and assured the maintenance of complete political independence."

The entrance of Red Army troops to occupy their new bases was carried out with great cordiality on both sides, and was made the occasion for a strong demonstration of friendship by the Estonians. In a dispatch from Moscow dated October 22, G. E. R. Gedye, *New York Times* correspondent, described how carefully the Red Army men were prepared and instructed before their entry into Estonia, so that their coming would in no way give offense to a friendly ally. He quoted a dispatch from a Soviet correspondent at Tallinn describing the arrival of the Soviet fleet at Baltic Port:

"When the torpedo boat Karl Marx arrived at Baltic Port as the forerunner of the new Soviet naval forces to establish a base there, it received a wonderful welcome, the populace applauding and throwing hats in the air. Baltic sailors have returned to the waters where the Russian fleet ruled for many decades, but with very different aims—not to enslave and conquer, but to consolidate the friendship of the peoples and establish a firm peace in the Baltic."

The visit to Moscow of General Laidoner, Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Army, was made the occasion for a whole flock of rumors about new demands alleged to have been made upon Estonia by the Soviet Union in connection with the war in Finland. In a radio address made on his return to Estonia on December 17, General Laidoner denied that any demands had been made and emphasized the friendliness of his meetings with Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and other Soviet leaders. In conclusion he said:

"My visit to Moscow has once more firmly convinced me that we took a wise course in concluding a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. We now have greater confidence in the possibility of remaining outside the present war upheaval in Europe. In the future we can live calmly and in peace with our great eastern neighbor. The mutual assistance pact is a guarantee that no one will dare touch us whenever they please."

On January 23 the Acting Consul General of Estonia in New York took occasion to deny the implications of an article referring to "Russian-dominated Estonia." In a letter to the *New York Times* he wrote:

"There is not any Russian-dominated Estonia. There is only one Estonia in the world, and that is the independent state of Estonia on the Baltic.

"Certain quarters have been trying, after Estonia signed the mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, to state that Estonia has lost her sovereignty and to represent Estonia as a Russian protectorate. That is not true. It is expressly said in the pact that 'carrying out the terms of the pact must in no way infringe the sovereign rights of the contracting parties; especially their economic systems and government structures.'

"Now the pact has been carried out and Estonia continues her independent existence as before. . . ."

On February 2, the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Tartu (formerly Dorpat) Peace Treaty between the Soviet Union and Estonia was celebrated in both countries. In Tallinn and in Moscow the Mutual Assistance Pact signed on September 28, 1939, was hailed as the logical consummation of twenty years of friendship. In a broadcast from Tallinn, Professor Piip, Estonian Foreign Minister, reviewed the circumstances under which Soviet-Estonian relations have developed, and emphasized that Estonia had not wished to be a barrier between Soviet Russia and the West, as was particularly desired by the participants of the Paris Peace Conference. He declared:

"It must not be forgotten that Estonia was the first country to sign a peace treaty with Soviet Russia, at a time, moreover, when the western countries were effecting intervention in Soviet Russia and blockading her borders. The European powers adopted a negative attitude to our negotiations with Soviet Russia.

"General Etievant, head of the French military mission, lodged a sharply-worded protest with the Estonian Government, but the latter, headed by J. Tonisson, vehemently defended her rights as a sovereign state and particularly her right to negotiate with her eastern neighbor for ending the war. Estonia acted properly. The Estonian Government was supported by the army, headed by General Laidoner, and by the entire population.

". . . We are convinced that the spirit of respect and mutual confidence that has characterized the relations between Estonia and the Soviet Union for twenty years will be preserved. In this way we can demonstrate to the whole world that close relations between great and small nations can be founded not on force and submission but on confidence and mutual support, in the interests of enhancing the well-being of the peoples and for the sake of securing peace."

While numerous statements of equal warmth have been made by Baltic statesmen, one must search the press diligently to find them. But even in the daily press the news of the good relations in the Baltic is breaking through. On April 3rd the *New York Herald Tribune* carried a dispatch from its *United Press* correspondent who admitted in a grudging sort of way that a survey of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia showed that "The Russians seem to have kept their pledge not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Baltic countries." He concluded:

"Certain effects of the relationship have been welcomed in Estonia. A large building program has been projected by the Soviet Union to house its garrisons. This is expected to give a lift to Estonian economy. Trade has been increased. Estonian manufactured goods are exchanged for Soviet raw materials under a program designed to double the formerly large Estonian-Soviet trade."

Effect of the Pact in Latvia

No less enthusiastic have been Latvian statesmen in hailing the effects of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact which strengthens the Soviet Union through providing defenses for the entrance to the Gulf of Riga and relieves Latvia of a defense task beyond her powers. On the conclusion of the negotiations, Latvian Foreign Minister Munters sent a telegram of thanks to Molotov in which he said:

"I particularly ask you to convey my sincere gratitude to Stalin, thanks to whose high authority we succeeded in rapidly reaching our decisions in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and in consolidating the friendship between Latvia and the Soviet Union."

Speaking to a joint session of Latvia's corporative chamber (which succeeded the Parliament in 1934) on October 22, Mr. Munters said that the Soviet-Latvian pact contained the political principle that the integrity of her Baltic neighbors was a necessity to the Soviet Union. Latvia, he said, "easily, even inevitably, could have been a theatre of war had Russia not felt it necessary to take steps to strengthen her security in the Baltic." (*New York Times*, October 23)

The Latvian press hailed the signing of the pact as an indication of the mutual respect and confidence of the two nations, and has contained numerous reports of its beneficial effect on Latvia's international position and economic life. The influential Riga paper *Rīts* wrote on October 19:

"Article 5 of the pact on inviolability of the sovereign rights and non-interference in the internal affairs of the two states is of great importance, as it indicates the independence and liberty of action of each party."

A trade agreement between Latvia and the USSR followed swiftly on the mutual assistance pact. It provided for a three-fold increase in trade between the two countries. Under its terms Soviet waterways to Murmansk, Soroka and Black Sea ports were made available for the commerce of Latvia, and Soviet freight transit in Latvia was greatly extended. These provisions were welcomed throughout Latvia as promising a revival of ports and railroads, which, a few months after the signing of the pact, is already in evidence.

The celebration of national independence day in Latvia on November 18 was made the occasion for special rejoicing over the mutual aid pact with the USSR. President Ulmanis said:

"Through this pact, we saved ourselves from involvement in the German-Polish war, we avoided being drawn into the war between Germany and the great Western powers, we avoided a war in which the blood of Latvian people would have been shed in a cause which does not concern our country. . . . This pact with a great nation, concluded in a spirit of mutual confidence and good will, is our guarantee against being drawn into the war. . . ."

On December 27 a letter appeared in the *New York Times* from Alfred Bilmanis, Latvian Minister in Washington, refuting the allegations that the foreign and domestic policies of the Baltic states are directed by

Moscow. Emphasizing that the treaty with the USSR is one of mutual guarantees and that Latvia continues to be independent and sovereign externally and internally, Mr. Bilmanis said:

"The treaty has been scrupulously adhered to by both sides, as has been the case with all previous treaties between the two nations."

In a speech at the University of Latvia, in Riga, on February 12, Latvian Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters commented scathingly on the false rumors spread in foreign circles to the effect that Latvia had become a Soviet protectorate, and asked:

"Where is that 'Sovietization' against which we have been warned? And where can a single citizen of Latvia be found with any grounds for saying that the Soviet Union has in any way interfered in our internal affairs?"

Reviewing the four-month period since the signing of the pact with the Soviet Union, he continued:

"This period has been quite long enough to enable us to draw certain conclusions on how the pact is working out. It should be stressed that both sides have approached the carrying out of the pact in a spirit of friendliness and mutual confidence. The garrisoning of Soviet troops on our territory took place according to plan, and without the slightest hitch. The arrival of Soviet garrisons in our country naturally gave rise to many problems, including their allocation, provisioning and transportation. Step by step each of these problems has been solved, without any difficulties whatever. . . ."

"With regard to the successful economic and other negotiations which have recently been carried on by both countries and which have already borne concrete results, there is every reason to characterize present relations with the Soviet Union as completely satisfactory.

"There are some people who assert that these favorable relations are only temporary, and that sooner or later we must expect pressure from the USSR both with regard to our internal political affairs and our foreign policy. On what grounds such prophecies are based remains the secret of their authors. They certainly are not justified by the experience of our government.

"Our government considers that the pact of October 5 is based on the interests of both countries, especially if the war situation is taken into consideration, and the fact that the pact was concluded under conditions of mutual confidence, and complete respect for the sovereignty of both countries."

The Situation in Lithuania

Relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union have in general been closer than in the case of the other Baltic States. By the treaty of 1920 Soviet Russia recognized Lithuanian sovereignty over its ancient capital Vilna, and continued to do so even after it was seized by the Poles a short time later. The Soviet Union has consistently given Lithuania its protection against the Poles, and warned Poland sharply against invading Lithuania at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis. The establishment of a joint frontier between the Soviet Union and Lithuania by the incorporation into the USSR of Western Byelo-Russia meant a further consolidation of their friendly relations. The mutual aid pact provides military and air bases for the Soviet Union in Lithuania, Soviet military aid for

the latter, and returns to Lithuania both Vilna and the Vilna region, which were taken under protection by the Red Army after the Polish debacle.

The gratitude of the Lithuanian people was expressed in a telegram sent to Molotov after the negotiations by Foreign Minister Urbsys:

"On my return home, I hasten to convey to you the gratitude of the Lithuanian delegation for the warm hospitality accorded us in Moscow and the friendly nature of the negotiations leading to conclusion of our treaty of October 10. I would ask you particularly to convey to Stalin our gratitude for his broad understanding of the aspirations of the Lithuanian people and for having by his active participation in the negotiations enhanced the mutual confidence and traditional friendship that have invariably existed between our states.

"The Lithuanian people profoundly rejoice on the return to Lithuania of her ancient capital, Vilna, and the Vilna region."

G. E. R. Gedye, *New York Times* correspondent, had cabled gloomily at the time of the signing of the Soviet-Estonian pact. "The Estonian Republic virtually ceased to exist in the early hours today." But by the time the pact with Lithuania was signed he began to change his tune. On October 10 he cabled from Moscow:

"In Baltic circles here there is a tendency to deprecate what is considered an exaggeration of the new situation. While appreciating foreign sympathy, it is said that Baltic statesmen feel they know the Russians better than the people of more distant countries and consider that the attacks on Russia over these new pacts, the suspicions entertained of her program and the gloomy views taken of the future of the Baltic states go rather too far. For one thing, it is said to be assured that none of these states have been in any way threatened by the Soviet Union in the course of the Moscow negotiations. . . ."

Of the departure of Germans for the Baltic states by arrangement with Germany, Gedye writes in the same dispatch:

"The departure of the Germans is in no way regretted in the Baltic states, it is said. To the general populace 'German' suggests a 'Baltic baron'—a member of an unloved class of feudal overlords who constantly sought the aid of Berlin in interfering for their own interests in the national affairs of the Baltic states and who are generally considered to have conducted themselves in an arrogant manner as members of a 'superior race.'"

After the formation of the new coalition government in Lithuania on November 21 the new Premier, Antanas Merkys, said that his government would continue to fulfill its treaty obligations with other countries in the interests of the Lithuanian people.

"The most important of these treaties," he said, "is the treaty concluded on October 10 with the Soviet Union. The Government will bend every effort to preserve good, friendly relations with all countries, and especially with its neighbors."

On January 5 Foreign Minister Urbsys declared that although his country was allied with the Soviet Union, this was in no sense to be interpreted as meaning that Lithuania had become a vassal of her larger neighbor. Soviet troops garrisoned on Lithuanian soil had conducted themselves admirably, he added.

On March 26, the Moscow *Pravda* published an article discussing Lithuania's improved economic position, which said in part:

"The naval war and the blockade have strongly affected the foreign trade of a number of neutral countries, particularly the Scandinavian countries. Matters are considerably more favorable in the Baltic States, particularly in Lithuania. Among the neutral countries they are the least affected by the war. Lithuania finished the 1939 fiscal year with an active trade balance of 33,800,000 litas and it is interesting to note that 13,000,000 litas of this sum comes in the period covering three months of the war. It would seem that Lithuania should have been in a worse position than the Scandinavian States, when taking into account the fact that Britain occupied first place in its trade during the last few years.

"As a result of the war, Lithuanian-British trade relations were practically brought to nought, which doesn't hold true of the Swedish-British or Norwegian-British relations.

"Nonetheless, in spite of this, Lithuania's foreign trade at the beginning of 1940 is indisputably in a better position—which fact in its turn eliminates the insurmountable economic difficulties in Lithuania.

"The explanation for this should be sought for in the fact that following the treaty of October 10, 1939, and on the basis of this treaty, Lithuania signed a new trade agreement with the Soviet Union which practically doubles the trade turnover between the two countries.

"... Supporting themselves on the increase in trade turnover with the Soviet Union, Lithuanian economic institutions are at the same time taking special measures to use their internal resources to the maximum. A number of new enterprises are being opened."

In conclusion it may be said that as a result of the mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania enjoy greater security and prosperity than any of the other small nations of Europe today. Their economic development, healthily rooted in its natural hinterland, the Soviet Union, is no longer subject to the imperialist control which kept them in a semi-colonial state, nor is their trade being withered by the Allied blockade or stalemated by the rivalries of the warring nations. With their independence guarded not only by their own small armies but by Soviet troops, they are safe from all attempts to draw them into the theatre of war.

REPORT ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BY V. M. MOLOTOV

Delivered at the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,

March 29, 1940.

COMRADES and Deputies, five months have elapsed since the last session of the Supreme Soviet. In this brief interval events have occurred of first rate importance in the development of international relations. It therefore behooves us at this session of the Supreme Soviet to examine those questions relating to our foreign policy.

Recent events in international life must be examined first of all in the light of the war that broke out in Central Europe last Autumn. So far there have been no big battles in the war between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany, matters being confined to isolated engagements chiefly on sea and in the air. It is known that the desire for peace expressed by Germany toward the end of last year was declined by the governments of Great Britain and France, and as a result, preparations for the expansion of the war were further intensified on both sides.

Germany, which has lately united about 80 million Germans, which has brought certain neighboring states under her sway and which has in many respects strengthened her military might, has evidently become a dangerous competitor for the principal imperialist powers of Europe—Great Britain and France. They therefore declared war on Germany under the pretext of fulfilling their obligations toward Poland.

It is now clearer than ever how far the real aims of the governments of these powers are removed from the purpose of defending disintegrated Poland or Czechoslovakia. This is shown if only by the fact that the governments of Great Britain and France have proclaimed that their aim in this war is to smash and dismember Germany, although this aim is still being concealed from the masses of the people under the cover of slogans of defense of "democratic" countries and the "rights" of small nations.

Inasmuch as the Soviet Union refused to become an abettor of England and France in this imperialist policy towards Germany, their hostility towards the Soviet Union became still more pronounced, vividly showing how profound are the class roots of the hostile policy of the imperialists towards the Socialist State.

And when war began in Finland, the British and French imperialists were prepared to make it the starting point of war against the USSR,

in which not only Finland herself but also the Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Norway, were to be used.

The attitude of the Soviet Union to the war developing in Europe is well known. Here too the peaceable policy of the USSR has been quite definitely displayed. The Soviet Union at once proclaimed that its position is one of neutrality and it has unswervingly adhered to that policy all through this period.

The radical change for the better in the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany found its expression in the Non-Aggression Pact signed last August. These new, good relations between the USSR and Germany have been tested in practice in connection with events in former Poland, and their strength has been sufficiently proved. The development of economic relations which was envisaged even then, last Autumn, found concrete expression as early as August 1939 in the trade agreement and then in the February, 1940 trade agreement. Trade between Germany and the USSR began to increase on the basis of mutual economic advantage, and there is ground for its further development.

Our relations with England and France have taken a somewhat different course. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union did not wish to become the tool of the British and French imperialists in their struggle for world hegemony against Germany, we have encountered at every step the profound hostility of their policy toward our country. This has gone farthest of all in connection with the Finnish question, on which I shall dwell later. But in the past few months there have been quite a number of other instances of hostility towards the USSR on the part of British and French policy.

Suffice it to mention that a couple of months ago the French authorities found nothing better to do than effect a police raid on our trade representation in Paris. In spite of their efforts to pick on every trifle, the search of the trade representation premises yielded no result. It only brought disgrace on the initiators of this preposterous affair and showed that there were no real grounds whatever for this hostile action towards our country.

As we see from the circumstances connected with the recall of Jacob Suritz, our Ambassador to France, the French Government is seeking for artificial pretexts to stress its unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union. In order to make it clear that the Soviet Union is no more interested in relations between these two countries than is France, we have recalled Mr. Suritz from the post of Ambassador to France.

Or take such instances of hostility towards the USSR as the seizure by British warships in the Far East of two of our steamers proceeding to Vladivostok with goods purchased by us in America and China. If to this we add such facts as the refusal to fulfill old orders for industrial machinery placed by us in England, the attachment of the funds of our trade representation in France and many others, the hostile nature of the

actions of the British and French authorities with regard to the Soviet Union becomes still more manifest.

Attempts have been made to justify these hostile acts toward our foreign trade on the grounds that by trading with Germany we are helping her in the war against England and France.

It does not take much to see that these arguments are not worth a brass farthing. One has only to compare the USSR, say with Rumania. It is known that Rumania's trade with Germany makes up half her total foreign trade and that, moreover, the percentage of national production in Rumania's exports to Germany, for example of such basic commodities as oil products and grain, far exceeds the percentage of national production in the Soviet Union's exports to Germany. Nevertheless, the governments of Great Britain and France do not resort to hostile acts towards Rumania and do not think it possible to demand that Rumania should cease trade with Germany.

Quite different is their attitude towards the Soviet Union. Hence the hostile acts of England and France towards the Soviet Union are to be explained not by the fact that the USSR is trading with Germany, but by the fact that the plans of the British and French ruling circles to utilize our country in the war against Germany have been frustrated and as a result they are pursuing a policy of revenge towards the Soviet Union.

It should be added that England and France have resorted to all these hostile actions even though the Soviet Union has so far not undertaken any unfriendly actions with regard to these countries.

As to the fantastic plans attributed to the Soviet Union of a Red Army "march on India," a "march on the East," and the like, they are such obvious absurdities that one must completely lose his senses to believe such absurd lies.

This is not the point, of course. The point evidently is that the Soviet Union's policy of neutrality is not to the liking of the British and French ruling circles. What is more, their nerves do not seem to be quite in order. They want to force us to adopt a different policy—a policy of enmity and war against Germany, a policy which would afford them the opportunity of utilizing the USSR for their imperialist aims.

It is time these gentry understood that the Soviet Union never has been and never will be a tool of the policy of others, that the USSR has always pursued its own policy and always will pursue it irrespective of whether these gentry in other countries like it or not.

I shall now pass to the Finnish question. What was the meaning of the war that took place in Finland during the last three-odd months? As you know, the meaning of these events lay in the necessity of safeguarding the security of the northwestern frontiers of the Soviet Union and above all of safeguarding the security of Leningrad.

All through October and November last year, the Soviet Government discussed with the Finnish Government proposals which, in view of the existing international situation, which was growing more and more in-

flammable, we considered absolutely essential and urgent for safeguarding the security of our country and especially of Leningrad.

Nothing came of these negotiations in view of the unfriendly attitude adopted by Finland's representatives. The decision of the issue was passed to the field of war. It may safely be said that if Finland had not been subject to foreign influences, and if Finland had been less incited by certain third states to adopt a hostile policy toward the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Finland would have arrived at a peaceful understanding last Autumn and matters would have been settled without war. But in spite of the fact that the Soviet Government reduced its requests to a minimum, settlement could not be reached by diplomatic means.

Now that hostilities in Finland have ceased and a peace treaty between the USSR and Finland has been signed, it is necessary and possible to judge the significance of the war in Finland in the light of incontrovertible facts. And these facts speak for themselves.

They show that in the neighborhood of Leningrad, all over the Karelian Isthmus to a depth of 50 to 60 kilometers, the Finnish authorities had erected numerous powerful ferro-concrete, granite and earth fortifications, armed with artillery and machine guns. The number of these fortifications ran into many hundreds. These fortifications, especially the ferro-concrete structures, attaining a high degree of military strength, connected by underground thoroughfares, surrounded by anti-tank trenches and granite anti-tank obstacles, and supported by countless mine fields, constituted what was known as the Mannerheim Line, which was built under the supervision of foreign experts on the model of the Maginot Line and the Siegfried Line.

It should be mentioned that until recently these fortifications were considered impregnable, that is, such as no army had ever broken through before. It should also be mentioned that the Finnish military authorities had endeavored beforehand to convert every little village in this area into a fortified position, supplied with arms, radio antennae, fuel stations, etc. In many parts of the south and east of Finland, strategic railways and highways of no economic importance whatever had been built, leading right up to our frontier.

In short, the hostilities in Finland have shown that as early as 1939, Finland and especially the Karelian Isthmus had been converted into a *place d'armes* ready for an attack by third powers on the Soviet Union, for an attack on Leningrad.

Incontrovertible facts show that the hostile policy which we encountered on the part of Finland last Autumn was no fortuitous thing. Forces hostile to the Soviet Union had prepared in Finland such a *place d'armes* against our country, and in the first place against Leningrad, which in the event of a certain foreign situation unfavorable to the USSR, was to play its part in the plans of the anti-Soviet forces of the imperialists and their allies in Finland.

Not only has the Red Army smashed the "Mannerheim Line" and

thereby covered itself with glory as the first army to force its way, under most difficult conditions through a deep, powerful zone of completely modern military fortifications; not only has the Red Army destroyed the Finnish *place d'armes* which had been made ready for an attack on Leningrad, but it also put an end to certain anti-Soviet plans that some third countries had been hatching during the past few years.

How far had gone the enmity towards our country on the part of the Finnish ruling and military circles who had prepared *places d'armes* against the Soviet Union, is also seen from the numerous cases of exceptionally barbarous atrocities perpetrated by the Finnish Whites on wounded Red Army men who had fallen into their hands. For example, when in one of the areas north of Lake Ladoga, the Finnish Whites surrounded our hospital dugouts, where 120 severely wounded men were lying, they killed them all to a man. Some were burned, others were found with shattered skulls, while the rest had been bayoneted or shot. In addition to mortal wounds, a large number of men who died there and in other places were found to have been shot in the head or finished off with rifle butts, while some of the men who had been shot were found to have knife stabs in the face. Some of the corpses had been beheaded and the heads could not be found. As to our medical nurses who fell into the hands of the Finnish Whites, they were subjected to special atrocities and incredible brutalities. In some cases corpses were found tied to trees head down. All these barbarities and countless atrocities were the fruit of the policy of the Finnish White Guards, endeavoring to fan hatred towards our country among their people. Such is the true face of these Finnish champions of "Western civilization."

It is not difficult to see that the war in Finland was not merely an encounter with Finnish troops. No, the matter was more complicated than that. It was not merely the Finnish troops that our troops encountered but also the combined forces of the imperialists of a number of countries, including the British, French and others who assisted the Finnish bourgeoisie with every form of weapon, especially artillery and aircraft, as well as with their men in the guise of "volunteers", with gold and every kind of supplies and with their frenzied propaganda all over the world, for the purpose of kindling war against the Soviet Union in every way.

To this should be added that amidst this furious howling of the enemies of the Soviet Union, always the loudest of all were the squealing voices of all those prostituted "Socialists" of the Second International, all those Attlees and Blums, Citrines and Jouhaux, Tranmells and Hoeglunds—all those lackeys of capital who have sold themselves body and soul to the warmongers.

Speaking in the House of Commons on March 19, Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, not only expressed his regret at having failed to prevent the termination of the war in Finland, thus turning his "peace-loving" imperialist soul inside out for all the world to see, but also gave something in the nature of an account of how and in what way the

British imperialists endeavored to help fan the war in Finland against the Soviet Union.

He made public a list of war materials that had been promised and dispatched to Finland: 152 airplanes were promised, 101 sent; 223 guns promised, 116 sent; 297,000 shells were promised, 185,000 sent; 100 Vickers guns were promised, 100 sent; 20,700 air bombs were promised, 15,700 sent; 20,000 anti-tank mines were promised, 10,000 were sent, and so on.

Without the least embarrassment Chamberlain stated that "preparations for an expedition were being carried on with all rapidity and at the beginning of March an expeditionary force of 100,000 men was ready to leave, two months before Mannerheim had asked for it to arrive. This was not necessarily the last force". Such on his own admission is true in the face of this "peace-loving" British imperialist.

As to France we learn from the French press that she dispatched to Finland 179 airplanes, 472 guns, 795,000 shells, 5,100 machine guns, 200,000 hand grenades, etc. On March 11, Edouard Daladier, then French Premier, declared in the Chamber of Deputies that "France has taken the lead of the countries that agreed to supply munitions to Finland and in particular at a request from Helsinki, she has just dispatched ultra-modern bombing planes to Finland." M. Daladier announced that "a French expeditionary corps had stood ready and equipped since February 26. A large number of vessels are ready to sail from two large ports on the Channel and the Atlantic Coast." He further declared that the Allies "would help Finland with all the forces promised." These hostile statements of M. Daladier toward the USSR speak for themselves. However, there is no need to dwell upon these hostile utterances, as it is apparent that they no longer reveal a fully sober mind.

Mention also should be made of Sweden's part in the Finnish war. From reports printed in all Swedish newspapers during the war against the Soviet Union, Sweden supplied Finland with "a certain quantity of aircraft roughly equal to one-fifth of Sweden's total air force at the time." The Swedish War Minister stated that the Finns had received from Sweden 84,000 rifles, 575 machine guns, over 300 artillery guns, 300,000 hand grenades and 50,000,000 cartridges. All this material, as the Minister declared, was of the very latest pattern.

Nor was Italy behindhand in the efforts to fan the war in Finland, to which, for example, she dispatched fifty military planes.

Finland also received military aid from such a devotee of "peace" as the United States of America.

According to incomplete information at our disposal the total munitions of all kinds sent to Finland by other countries during the war alone, amounted to not less than 350 airplanes, about 1,500 guns, over 6,000 machine guns, about 100,000 rifles, 650,000 hand grenades, 2,500,000 shells, 160,000,000 cartridges and much else.

There is no need to cite other facts to show that what was going on in Finland was not merely our collision with Finnish troops. It was a

collision with the combined forces of a number of imperialist States most hostile toward the Soviet Union. By smashing these combined forces of our enemies, the Red Army has added another glorious page to its history and has shown that the springs of valor, self-sacrifice and heroism among our people are inexhaustible.

The war in Finland has exacted heavy sacrifices both from us and from the Finns. According to estimates of our General Staff, on our side the number killed and those who died of wounds was 48,745, or somewhat less than 49,000 and the number of wounded was 158,863.

Attempts are being made on the part of the Finns to minimize their losses, but their casualties were considerably bigger than ours. Our General Staff places the number of Finnish killed at not less than 60,000 without counting those who died of wounds, and the number wounded not less than 250,000. Thus, considering that the strength of the Finnish Army was not less than 600,000 men, one must admit that the Finnish Army lost in killed and wounded over one-half its total strength.

Such are the facts.

The question remains, why did the ruling circles of England, France and of several other countries too, take such an active part in this war on the side of Finland against the Soviet Union?

It is well known that the British and French Governments made desperate efforts to prevent the termination of war and the restoration of peace in Finland, although they were not bound by any obligations towards Finland. It is also well known that some time ago, even though there existed a pact of mutual assistance between France and Czechoslovakia, France did not come to the aid of Czechoslovakia. Yet both France and England positively forced their military aid upon Finland, doing the best they could to prevent termination of the war and restoration of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union.

The hired-pen pirates, scribes who specialize in fraudulent news and hoaxes, are trying to attribute this conduct of Anglo-French circles to their particular solicitude for "small nations." But to attribute this policy of England and France to their particular solicitude for the interests of small countries is simply ridiculous. To attribute it to their obligations towards the League of Nations which, it is alleged, demanded protection for one of its members, is also quite absurd. In fact, it was hardly a year ago that Italy seized and destroyed independent Albania, which was a member of the League of Nations. Well, did England and France come to Albania's defense? Did they even raise a feeble voice in protest against Italy's predatory action in forcibly subjugating Albania without the least regard for its population of over a million people, and completely ignoring the fact that Albania was a member of the League of Nations?

No, neither the English nor the French governments, nor yet the United States of America nor the League of Nations, which had lost every vestige of prestige because it is dominated by these very Anglo-French imperialists, even raised a finger in this case.

For twelve whole months these "protectors" of small nations, these "champions" of the rights of members of the League of Nations, have not dared to raise the question in the League of Nations of Italy's seizure of Albania although this occurred last April. What is more, they have virtually sanctioned this seizure.

Consequently, it is not protection of small nations and not protection of the rights of members of the League of Nations that explains the support rendered Finland by the ruling circles of England and France against the Soviet Union. This assistance is to be explained by the fact that in Finland they had a *place d'armes* ready for attack upon the USSR, whereas Albania did not occupy such a place in their plans. As a matter of fact the rights and interests of small countries are just so much small change in hands of the imperialists.

The *Times* of London, leading newspaper of the British imperialists, and *Le Temps*, leading newspaper of the French imperialists, not to mention other English and French bourgeois newspapers, have during these past months been openly calling for intervention against the Soviet Union, without the least regard for the fact that so-called normal diplomatic relations exist between England and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other.

In step with these leading bourgeois newspapers and even a little ahead of them are the speeches from the "Servants Hall" that has now been instituted in every "respectable" bourgeois state for "Socialists" of the type of Clement Attlee in England and Leon Blum in France, who are doing their utmost to fan and spread the flames of war. In the utterances of the Anglo-French imperialist press and of its "Socialist" henchmen we hear the voice of infuriated imperialism which hates the Socialist State and with which we have been familiar from the earliest days of the Soviet Union.

As far back as April 17, 1919, the London *Times* wrote: "If we look at the map we shall find that the best approach to Petrograd is from the Baltic and that the shortest and easiest route is through Finland, whose frontiers are only about 30 miles distant from the Russian capital. Finland is the key to Petrograd and Petrograd is the key to Moscow."

If proof were needed that the British and French imperialists have not yet discarded these hare-brained plans, recent events in Finland have dispelled all doubts on this score. These plans have again been thwarted, not because of lack of zeal on the part of the anti-Soviet forces in England and France, and not merely because at the last moment the leading circles in Finland and also in Sweden and Norway showed at last some glimmerings of reason. These plans were thwarted by the brilliant successes of the Red Army, particularly on the Karelian Isthmus. Recent events have reminded us all of the necessity of continuing steadily to increase the might of our Red Army and of all defenses of our country.

In the beginning of February, the Finns made practical moves for termination of the war in Finland. We learned through the Swedish Gov-

ernment that the Finnish Government desired to ascertain our terms upon which the war could be brought to a close.

Before deciding this question we approached the People's Government of Finland for their opinion on this question. The People's Government expressed the view that in order to put an end to bloodshed and ameliorate the conditions of the Finnish people, the proposal to terminate the war should be welcomed. Thereupon we proposed our terms which soon after were accepted by the Finnish Government.

I must add that a week after negotiations with the Finns were opened, the British Government also expressed a desire to ascertain whether there was any possibility of mediation, ostensibly with the object of stopping the war in Finland. But when Ivan Maisky, our Ambassador in England, informed London of our proposals, which were subsequently adopted in their entirety by Finland, the British Government did not wish to cooperate in stopping the war and restoring peace between the USSR and Finland.

Nevertheless, an agreement was soon reached between the USSR and Finland. The results of the agreement to terminate hostilities and establish peace are contained in the peace treaty signed on March 12th. In this connection the question arose of the Peoples' Government dissolving itself, which it did.

You are familiar with the terms of the peace treaty. This treaty has changed the southern and in part the eastern frontiers of Finland. The whole Karelian Isthmus, together with Viborg and the Bay of Viborg, the whole western and northern shore of Lake Ladoga, together with Kexholm and Sortavala, have passed to the Soviet Union. In the region of Kandalaksha, where the Finnish frontier approached particularly close to the Murmansk railway, the frontier has been pushed farther back. Finland ceded to the Soviet Union small sections of the Sredni and Rybachi peninsulas which belonged to her in the north and a certain group of islands in the Gulf of Finland, together with the island of Hogland.

In addition, the Soviet Union has acquired on thirty years' lease, in return for an annual payment of 8,000,000 Finnish marks, the Hangö Peninsula and adjacent islands, where we shall build a naval base as protection against aggression at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland.

Furthermore the treaty facilitates transit of goods for Sweden, Norway, and the Soviet Union.

At the same time the peace treaty provides for mutual abstention from aggression and from participation in hostile coalitions.

Attempts have been made in the English and French press to depict the Soviet-Finnish treaty and particularly the transfer of the Karelian Isthmus to the Soviet Union as "destruction" of the independence of Finland. This, of course, is absurd and a downright falsehood. Finland still comprises a territory nearly four times as large as Hungary and over eight times as large as Switzerland. If no one has any doubt that Hun-

gary and Switzerland are independent states, how can there be any doubt that Finland is independent and sovereign?

The English and French press also wrote that the Soviet Union wants to convert Finland into a mere Baltic State. That too is absurd, of course. It is sufficient to point to the fact that after having occupied, during the war, the region of Petsamo on the Arctic coast, the USSR voluntarily restored this region to Finland, considering it necessary to let Finland have an ice-free ocean port. From this it follows that we regard Finland as a northern, and not merely a Baltic country.

The truth does not lie in these fabrications of the English and French newspapers which are old hands at the art of forgery in their anti-Soviet propaganda. The truth lies elsewhere: it is that the Soviet Union, having smashed the Finnish Army and having every opportunity of occupying the whole of Finland, did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for its expenditures in the war, as any other Power would have done, but confined its desires to a minimum and displayed magnanimity toward Finland.

What is the basic idea of the peace treaty? It is that it properly ensures the safety of Leningrad and of Murmansk and the Murmansk railway. This time we could not confine ourselves merely to the desires we expressed last Autumn, the acceptance of which by Finland would have averted war. After the blood of our men had been spilt through no fault of our own, and after we had become convinced that the hostile policy of the Finnish Government towards the Soviet Union had gone very far indeed, we were obliged to put the question of the security of Leningrad on a more reliable basis, and, moreover, to raise the question of the security of the Murmansk Railway and Murmansk, which is our only ice-free ocean port in the West, and is therefore of extreme importance for our foreign trade and for communication between the Soviet Union and other countries generally.

We pursued no other object in the peace treaty than that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, Murmansk and the Murmansk Railway. But we considered it necessary to settle this problem reliably and durably. The peace treaty is based on recognition of the principle that Finland is an independent state, recognition of the independence of her domestic and foreign policy, and at the same time, on the necessity of safeguarding the security of Leningrad and the northwestern frontiers of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the object we set out to achieve has been achieved and we may express our complete satisfaction with the treaty with Finland. Political and economic relations with Finland are now fully restored. The Government expresses the conviction that normal and good-neighborly relations will develop between the Soviet Union and Finland.

We must, however, utter a warning against attempts already being made by certain circles in Finland as well as in Sweden and Norway to

violate the peace treaty just concluded, under the pretext of forming a military defensive alliance of these countries.

In the light of the speech recently delivered by M. Hambro, President of the Norwegian Storting, in which, referring to historical examples, he called upon Finland "to reconquer the frontiers of her country" and declared that peace like the one Finland has concluded with the USSR "cannot last for long," in the light of this and similar utterances, it is easy to understand that attempts to form a so-called "defensive alliance" of Finland, Sweden and Norway are directed against the USSR and are unwisely fostered by the ideology of military *revanche*.

The formation of a military alliance of this kind in which Finland participated, would not only run counter to Article III of the peace treaty, which forbids either of the contracting parties to join any coalitions hostile to the other, but to the peace treaty as a whole, which firmly defines the Soviet-Finnish frontier.

Loyalty to this treaty is incompatible with Finland's participation in any alliance for military *revanche* against the USSR. As to the participation of Sweden and Norway in such an alliance, that would simply imply that these countries had abandoned their policy of neutrality and had adopted a new foreign policy, from which the Soviet Union could not but draw the proper conclusions.

Our Government, on its part, considers that the Soviet Union has no points of dispute with Sweden and Norway and that Soviet-Swedish and Soviet-Norwegian relations should develop on the basis of friendship.

As to rumors that the Soviet Union is demanding ports on the west coast of Scandinavia, claiming Narvik, etc., these rumors, spread for anti-Soviet purposes, are so wild that they need no refutation. Efforts of "Socialist" gentry like Hoeglund in Sweden and Tranmel in Norway, to spoil relations between these countries and the Soviet Union, should be branded as the efforts of sworn enemies of the working class, who have been bought by foreign capitalists and are betraying the interests of their own people.

The conclusion of the peace treaty with Finland consummates the task we set ourselves last year of safeguarding the security of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Baltic. This treaty is the necessary complement to the three pacts of mutual assistance concluded with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania respectively. Our experience during the six months that have elapsed since these pacts of mutual assistance were concluded enables us to draw very definite, positive conclusions concerning these treaties with the Baltic countries.

It must be admitted that the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have served to strengthen the international position both of the Soviet Union and of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In spite of the scare raised by imperialist circles hostile to the Soviet Union, the state and political independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has not suffered in any way, while economic intercourse be-

tween these countries and the Soviet Union has begun markedly to increase. The pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are being carried out in a satisfactory manner and this creates premises for further improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and these countries.

Recently the foreign press has been devoting extraordinary attention to relations between the USSR and the neighbors on its southern borders, particularly on the Transcaucasian border and that with Rumania. Needless to say, the Government sees no ground for any deterioration in our relations with our southern neighbors either.

True, in Syria and in the Near East generally, extensive and suspicious activity is afoot in the creation of Anglo-French, mainly colonial, armies, headed by General Weygand. We must exercise vigilance in regard to attempts to utilize these colonial and non-colonial troops for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union. Any such attempt would evoke on our part counter-measures against the aggressors, and the danger of playing with fire in this way must be perfectly obvious to the powers hostile to the USSR and to those of our neighbors who would become tools of this aggressive policy against the USSR.

As to our relations with Turkey and Iran, they are determined by our existing pacts of non-aggression and by the unswerving desire of the Soviet Union for observance of the mutual obligations arising out of them. Our relations with Iran in the economic sphere are regulated by the Soviet-Iran Trade Treaty just concluded.

Of the southern neighboring states I have mentioned, Rumania is the one with which we have no pact of non-aggression. This is due to the existence of the unsettled dispute, the question of Bessarabia, whose seizure by Rumania the Soviet Union has never recognized, although it has never raised the question of recovering Bessarabia by military means. Hence there are no grounds for any deterioration in Soviet-Rumanian relations.

It is true that it is now some time since we have had a Minister in Rumania, and his duties are being performed by a Chargé d'Affaires. But this has been due to specific circumstances of the recent past. If we are to deal with this question, we must recall the dubious role played by the Rumanian authorities in 1938, in relation to Butenko, who was then Soviet Acting-Minister in Rumania. It is well known that the latter, in some mysterious way, disappeared not only from the legation but from Rumania, and to this day the Soviet Government has been unable to obtain any authentic information about his disappearance, and what is more, we are expected to believe that the Rumanian authorities had nothing to do with this scandalous and criminal affair. Needless to say, things like this should not happen in a civilized state or in any well-ordered country for that matter. After this, the reason for delay in appointing a Soviet Minister to Rumania will be clear. It is to be assumed, however, that Rumania will understand that such things are not to be tolerated.

In our relations with Japan we have, not without some difficulty, settled several questions. This is evidenced by the conclusion on December

31 last of the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention for the current year, and also by Japan's consent to pay the last installment for the Chinese Eastern Railway which had long been overdue.

Nevertheless, we cannot express great satisfaction over our relations with Japan. To this day, for example, notwithstanding the prolonged negotiations between the Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese-Manchurian delegates, the important question of determining the frontier line on the territory in the area of the military conflict of last year has remained unsettled. Japanese authorities continue to raise obstacles to normal utilization of the last installment for the Chinese-Eastern Railway, which Japan has paid. In many cases the treatment of employees of Soviet organizations in Japan and Manchuria by the Japanese authorities is quite abnormal.

It is time it were realized in Japan that under no circumstances will the Soviet Union tolerate any infringement of its interests. Only if Soviet-Japanese relations are understood in this way can they develop satisfactorily. In connection with Japan, I will say a word or two on one, so to speak, unbusinesslike proposal.

The other day, a member of the Japanese Diet put the following question to his Government: "Ought we not consider how to put an end once and for all to conflicts between the USSR and Japan, as for example by purchasing the Maritime Region and other territories?"

The Japanese deputy who put this question and is interested in the purchase of Soviet territory, which is not for sale, must be a jovial fellow. But in my opinion, his stupid questions will not help to raise the prestige of his Parliament. If, however, the Japanese Parliament is so keen on trading, why should not its members raise the question of selling South Sakhalin? I have no doubt that purchasers would be found in the USSR.

As regards our relations with the United States of America, they have not grown any better lately, nor for that matter have they grown any worse, if we do not count the so-called moral embargo against the USSR, which is perfectly meaningless especially after the conclusion of peace between the USSR and Finland.

Our imports from the United States have increased as compared with last year, and they might increase still more if the American authorities did not put obstacles in the way.

Such, on the whole, is the international situation, as a consequence of the events of the past five months. From all that I have said, the main tasks of our foreign policy in the present international situation will be clear.

Stated briefly, the task of our foreign policy is to ensure peace between nations and the security of our country. The conclusion that must be drawn from this is that we must maintain a position of neutrality and refrain from participating in the war between the big European powers.

This position is based on treaties we have concluded and it fully corresponds to the interests of the Soviet Union. At the same time this position serves as a restraining influence in preventing the further extension

and instigation of war in Europe, and it is therefore in the interests of all nations that are anxious for peace and are already groaning under new and enormous burdens of privations caused by the war.

In summing up the events of this past period we see that as regards safeguarding the security of our country we have achieved no mean success. And it is this that makes our enemies furious. Confident, however, in our cause and in our strength, we will continue consistently and unswervingly to further our foreign policy.

THE KARELIAN-FINNISH REPUBLIC

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty, a new Union Republic, the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic, takes its place in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This new twelfth Republic of the Union is made up of the former Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the greater part of the territories ceded by Finland.

Their amalgamation in a new Union Republic by decision of the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet, held on April 1, 1940, is the Soviet solution of the national minority question. The Finnish people in the ceded territory find themselves, immediately, citizens of a sovereign republic, equal in status with the other eleven Union Republics.

The Finns and Karelians are related peoples, speaking similar languages. Their new Union Republic begins its career auspiciously on the foundations of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic which has had a notable record of progress since its establishment.

Known before the revolution as "the Siberia near the Capital," an undeveloped, roadless, forest country, Karelia now has a thriving timber and paper industry, fish canneries, quartz, feldspar, mica and titanium mines and marble quarries. New hydro-electric stations supply power to Karelia's expanding industries.

The population of Karelia has doubled, the country is traversed by railroads, the famous Stalin White Sea Canal and new highways. Karelia's principal city, Petrozavodsk, on the shores of Lake Onega, is a busy modern town with machine-building plants, sawmills and wood-working factories. Formerly considered unfit for agriculture its land now has a constantly expanding sown area, tilled with tractors and other modern agricultural machinery.

With this industrial and agricultural development has gone a similar cultural development. In the last few years 526 schools have been built. And the cultural facilities include two universities, twelve technical institutes, many theaters, twenty-four newspapers, 346 libraries. Illiteracy which was as high as 90 per cent before the revolution, has been completely eliminated.

With such a start, the prospects of the new Karelian-Finnish Republic are bright indeed.

FROM UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

IN examining the special rôle assigned to Finland in the successive invasions and intrigues to destroy the Soviet Union, the volumes issued by the State Department, *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, Vols. I, II and III, and *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, from which the quotations in the following pages are taken, are particularly illuminating.

These volumes reveal that while never assuming as aggressively hostile an attitude as the British, the United States acted in conjunction with the British throughout the whole intervention period, permitting the slaughter of hundreds of American and Russian soldiers in a lawless, undeclared war against the Soviet Government which had the support of the people, while supplying arms, food and materials to the counter-revolutionary forces, repudiated and defeated by the Russian people.

With regard to Finland, the volumes reveal that American representatives *opposed* its independence under the regime of the Provisional Government and *supported* its independence after the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia—and then only after the Finnish reactionaries were in the saddle.

Thus, on July 24, 1917, we find North Winship, American Consul at Petrograd, reporting to the State Department on the results of what he terms a "mutinous rising" of the Bolsheviks on July 16, 17, 18:

"A further evil result of the mutiny lies in the excuse it gave the Social-Democratic majority of the Finnish Seim to pass its law declaring Finland's independence of Russia in all respects except as to foreign affairs and the military necessities of war."

Two months later David R. Francis, last American Ambassador to Tsarist Russia, cabled to the Secretary of State that the situation in Finland was bad. The army and fleet were refusing to obey the orders of the Government to prevent sessions of the Diet.

On March 3, 1918, the Soviet Republic was forced to sign the robber peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany to save the Revolution. By its terms all Soviet troops were withdrawn from Finland. During the next few months reports by American representatives to the State Department contained repeated rumors of an impending German-Finnish advance into Murman Peninsula. This caused consternation among the Allies chiefly because their own troops had been stationed there, on the pretext of protecting the Murmansk Railroad. Reporting these rumors Ambassador

Francis added: "Finland is still covetously endeavoring to secure more Soviet territory."

American Armed Intervention

June of 1918 found the American Ambassador prophesying the quick collapse of the Soviet Government, supporting anti-Soviet movements and violently agitating against American recognition of the Soviets.

In July, DeWitt C. Poole, United States Consul in Moscow, telegraphed to the Secretary of State in Washington urging "immediate intervention in Siberia for the purpose of supporting the Czechoslovaks and the new Siberian Government." The sequel was the dispatch in August of the American military expedition of 7,000 men to Siberia. The story of Siberian intervention has been told fully by General William S. Graves, its commander, in his *America's Siberian Adventure*. General Graves himself sought valiantly to carry out the ostensible purposes of the expedition, which were to help bring the Czechoslovak deserters from the Austrian army to the western front, and to protect Allied supplies. Actually he found himself expected to intervene in Soviet internal affairs and to help bolster up by its military forces the counter-revolutionary regime of Admiral Kolchak.

The occupation of Archangel by the Allied forces took place on August 2. The local Soviet was deposed and the counter-revolutionary "Supreme Government of the Northern Region" headed by Tchaikowsky was set up. Ambassador Francis had already moved his embassy to Archangel in defiance of Soviet requests to establish quarters in Moscow.

Later Francis reported that the Tchaikowsky Government "would not have succeeded if the Allied forces had not landed, neither would it survive if Allied troops were taken away."

On September 4, 4,800 American troops arrived at Archangel to help this counter-revolutionary government of the North in its attempts to overthrow the Soviets.

Thereafter American troops under the British General Ironside took part in shooting and imprisoning loyal Soviet workers. The interventionists supported a local White army under command of General Miller, which was supposed to join forces with Kolchak. By October 10 Ambassador Francis was urging that the Allies take Petrograd and Moscow.

Enter Mannerheim—and the Germans

In considering the role of Finland during this period, it must be remembered that after Soviet recognition of the independence of Finland in December 1917, the Finnish bourgeoisie sought help both from the Allies and Germans in fighting its own revolutionary workers, offering Finland as a base for anti-Soviet attacks. At the end of January the Finnish Bolsheviks were in control in the south, and the White Guards, under command of General Mannerheim, fled to the north. Shortly after, Ira Nelson Morris, American Minister to Sweden, advocated withholding

recognition of Finnish independence since the Reds were in Helsingfors and urged sending food to the northern section where the Whites were in control.

On February 18, Thornwall Haynes, United States Consul at Helsingfors, cabled the State Department:

"Usurping Socialist Government asks to discuss food. Replying unofficially America has no food to be wasted in civil war."

On February 19, Ambassador Francis cabled approvingly of Mannerheim:

"The White Guards, comprising an army of patriots totalling about 50,000 well-drilled and disciplined men and under command of Mannerheim, a Russian-Finnish general distinguished in the present and in the Russo-Japanese war, who is virtually dictator, is in absolute control of all Finland north of line Bjorneborg-Tammerfors-Viborg. . . ."

But these "well drilled and disciplined men" could accomplish nothing without foreign help. On March 11, Haynes cabled:

"According to arrangement with White Guards, Germans are landing at Hangö to take Helsingfors and drive Reds from Finland in order to restore order. German airplanes over Helsingfors."

The Germans captured Helsingfors for the Whites. Six days later the British recognized the Finnish Government, put into power with the bayonets of Britain's enemy. Mannerheim, to hold German support, made this extraordinary statement:

"The Germans' victorious and mighty army landed in Finland to help against the infamous Bolsheviks, and to help the friendship the Finnish people have always had for the noble Kaiser and mighty German people. . . . I greet the brave German troops and hope that every Finn will realize the great sacrifice of the noble German people who are helping them in an hour when every man is needed on the Western front."

But now the Germans had no further use for Mannerheim, who went to Stockholm to seek Allied support. Minister Morris cabled from Sweden to Assistant Secretary of State Polk, on June 14:

"General Mannerheim has severed his connections with the Finnish Government. . . . He states that with the German situation in Finland what it is he does not desire personally to live there. In future it may be well to bear this in mind should some opportune time come in which General Mannerheim could be of service to us."

A few weeks later, Morris telegraphed again:

"I have had several conferences with General Mannerheim. . . . Regarding intervention in Russia he felt that this was the correct thing to do. . . ."

Mannerheim and the Allies

But the path of intervention was not entirely smooth. Haynes noted in alarm the pro-Bolshevik sentiment among the Finns, and reported that the withdrawal from production of 75,000 Red prisoners (the work of

that great patriot Mannerheim) accentuated famine conditions. In November he was advocating recognition of Mannerheim as Regent of a new government. On November 12 he wrote:

"Notwithstanding the increasing peril of Bolshevism, Finland under the new regime hopes to be able to defend itself on the eastern frontier if the United States will help it. . . . It seems advisable that naval and military forces be ready to come at the earliest opportunity."

The war between the Allies and Germany came to an end. The undeclared war on the Soviets went on. On November 16 Haynes reported:

"According to a decision reached yesterday, the Senate and the Diet have agreed to entrust General Mannerheim with the forming of a new government. . . . New general elections are fixed by February or March, by which time it is hoped that the Entente will be able to cope with the Bolshevik danger, which has been hitherto the principal objection to leaving existing mooted questions to the decision of the people. . . ."

On November 22, Mr. Polk notified Haynes that although the Department was not yet ready to recognize Finland's independence, 5,000 tons of food were on their way to Mannerheim. At that very time Mannerheim was involved with a certain Trepov in a plot to make Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich Tsar of Russia. Morris, Minister to Sweden, reported on December 16 to the Secretary of State:

"... Through Mannerheim's mediation Trepov received 500,000 marks in advance from the Finnish treasury and it was planned he would follow Mannerheim's troops on entering Petrograd. In compensation Finland was to receive Karelia and would be guaranteed that Aland would not be ceded to Sweden. . . ."

On October 12, a month before the armistice, Whitehouse, the American Chargé in Stockholm, indicated how much greater was Allied hostility to the Bolsheviks than to their enemy Germany:

"It is the opinion of those American, English and French officials with whom I have talked that the departure of the German and Austrian troops from the Baltic provinces and Ukraine would lead immediately to disturbances and shortly thereafter to Bolshevik intervention. In the event of an armistice with the Central Powers it would seem, therefore, advisable not to insist on the immediate evacuation of these territories until we are in a position to send Allied troops. There can be no doubt that the Bolshevik cause would be greatly strengthened by the evacuation of these territories and the task of restoring Russia correspondingly more difficult. . . ."

Mannerheim was consolidating his rule by a terror that was arousing indignant protest throughout the world. But this did not deter the Allies from continuing to support him. On February 20, 1919, Grant Smith, the American Chargé in Copenhagen, reported:

"In interview with naval attaché yesterday General Mannerheim stated that his army was willing and capable of defeating the Bolsheviks in Northern Russia.

Mannerheim stated his willingness to commence hostilities immediately if encouraged to do so by the Allies and assured that the United States would hasten sending food supplies to Finland."

Robert W. Imbrie, American Vice Consul at Viborg, also urged haste. On March 2 he wrote:

"Have had several conferences with heads of Russian Whites. They have, with the knowledge and consent of the Finnish Government, perfected a military organization numbering 10,000 volunteers. The object of this organization is the capture of Petrograd, and afterward Moscow and the overthrow of the Bolsheviks. . . . If the United States Government thinks favorably of sending food in support of the Whites, I cannot too strongly urge necessity of immediate action. . . . Even a month's delay may be fatal to the project."

In due time Herbert Hoover came to the aid of Mannerheim and of the counter-revolutionary General Yudenich. Foodstuffs stored at Reval and Viborg, sent for the relief of starving Russian children, went to the army of intervention.

The Lansing Documents recently published by the U. S. State Department reveal that the real aim of the Hoover relief mission was intervention in another guise, and show how deeply President Wilson's Secretary of State, Lansing, was involved in secret financial support of Kornilov, Kaledin and other counter-revolutionaries.

"The Way Lies Through the Finnish Army"

On July 11 Imbrie reported to the State Department:

"... From the Finnish-Russian border Petrograd was menaced with an advance and in the opening days of the month a volunteer Finnish army advancing into Karelia took Olonetz and threatened Petrograd from the north. . . . Early in May the Russian White detachment which had originated in Pskov . . . advanced in the direction of Petrograd, finally stopping at Gatchina, 45 versts southwest of the city. . . . They were, however, without sufficient food . . . the force therefore ceased its advance, merely taking steps to protect its flanks. In this latter operation Krasnaya Gorka, on the Finnish Gulf, was, with the assistance of the British fleet, captured. . . . There remains, however, one way, aside from a campaign by an international expeditionary force, in which the capture of Petrograd and the consequent overthrow of the Bolsheviks may be accomplished. This way lies through the Finnish army."

Imbrie outlined the plan:

"... The Finnish Government is aware that its political salvation is dependent upon the overthrow of the Bolsheviks before its own country becomes impregnated with the leprosy of Bolshevism. . . . From sources so high that they may almost be considered official, I have been informed that the Finnish Government only awaits the sanction of the Allied Governments to launch its attack.

"An agreement has been reached between the Russian Whites, under which General Yudenich, representing the Kolchak Government, and the Finns, are willing to attack. What these terms are I have been unable to ascertain, but in all probability they embrace the granting of an open, ice-free port to Finland in the White Sea and possibly the cession of the west shore of Lake Onega.

"The Finnish army is quite capable of taking Petrograd and no time seems as propitious as the present. If the Bolsheviks are not crushed this summer their strength and prestige will be increased not only in Russia but in contiguous countries. Certainly it may be expected that Finland may very well fall under the disease. . . .

"I trust the Department may not consider it presumptuous on my part to point out, but I feel it my duty to do so, that the consummation of this condition may be effected, as I have indicated, without the loss of a single American life or the expenditure of a single American dollar, by giving sanction to the advance of the Finnish forces, and that I may be permitted to urge that such sanction and approval be communicated by our Government to the Finnish Government."

Permission to launch the attack here outlined came from the American Peace Mission at Versailles. On July 16 a cable from the Mission requested the Allied representative at Helsingfors:

"To inform the Government of General Mannerheim that in case he thought he ought to follow up the request for action of Admiral Kolchak, the Allied Governments, without bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have no objection to raise against this operation. . . ."

On August 16 Imbrie reported that the British had loaned £6,000,000 to the Finnish Government on condition that the Finns should mobilize for an offensive on Petrograd. From the United States Finland received over \$8,000,000. (It was Finland's repayment of the installments of this loan and not of a World War loan, as generally supposed, that was used so brazenly to whip up pro-Finnish sentiment in the United States.)

Secretary of State Lansing gave his blessing to the whole affair in a message to the Chargé in Russia, on September 4:

"Regard with deep and sympathetic interest efforts now being made by . . . elements associated with Admiral Kolchak, and hopeful that means will develop by which Russia may be assisted toward a happy outcome of the efforts of her people to regain control of their own affairs."

Armed Intervention Fails

Intervention failed in its counter-revolutionary designs. Mutinies were spreading among Allied troops. White Generals were everywhere meeting defeat. The bulk of the American forces were withdrawn from Archangel in July, 1919, and the British forces withdrew during August and September. But the anti-Soviet intrigues went on.

No longer able to rely upon their own war-weary soldiers the imperialist powers now had to be content with building up bases in the Baltic states against the time when a more active intervention could be resumed, with backing the Polish attack and supporting the counter-revolutionary remnants still to be found within Russia. On January 2, 1920, a conference was held in Helsingfors of representatives of the Finnish, Polish, Lithuanian and Estonian Governments to consider "their mutual interests." When the Finnish Minister in Washington inquired

of Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, what support could be expected from America, Long reported his reply:

"I told him . . . that he might feel that the Government of the United States viewed sympathetically any action which the Government of Finland might take which would react to strengthening that government, and which might also act as a barrier against the spread of Bolshevism."

The manner in which Finland continued to serve as a base for all kinds of anti-Soviet intrigues after armed intervention failed, may be seen from the following calendar.

FINLAND AS AN ANTI-SOVIET BASE 1917-1940

1896

One of the two officers chosen to escort Tsar Nicholas II to the altar at his coronation is the young Swedo-Finnish nobleman, Carl Gustav von Mannerheim.

1905

Duchy of Finland swept by strikes and wholesale boycott of the Tsar's government apparatus which had brutally suppressed Finnish people's national identity. Baron Mannerheim supports the Tsar.

1917

February (old style)—Tsar overthrown. Bourgeois Provisional Government comes to power. Within a week partial autonomy granted but full independence refused to Finland, whose right to self-determination is defended by the Bolsheviks only.

July—Finnish Diet (with Social-Democratic majority) passes Independence Bill appropriating to itself all powers except control of foreign affairs and defense. Too much for Kerensky, who orders Diet dissolved.

October—Russia's October Socialist Revolution finally brings Finland hope of full freedom. Request that Finland's independence be recognized sent to Lenin.

December 31—Lenin hands Finland's representative copy of decree of Council of People's Commissars recognizing full independence of Republic of Finland.

January 4—Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies ratifies full independence for Finland, Stalin defending it against objections of bourgeois, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik circles.

January 11—It is revealed that reactionaries in Finnish Government have placed orders with Germany for large quantities of arms and invoked foreign aid against Finnish revolutionary movement. White Guard detachments attack socialist and trade union headquarters.

January 12—Diet invests Mannerheim with Dictatorial powers.

January 29—Finland proclaimed a Socialist Workers' Republic, following victorious uprising led by Social-Democrats. A Parliamentary Government headed by S. D. Manner is established. Otto Kuusinen, member of Finnish Social-Democratic Party and Deputy in Finnish Diet since 1908, is Minister of Education.

February—White Guard government flees to North of Finland, Pehr Eviind Svinhufud, reactionary pro-German, becomes head of rump State and Mannerheim Commander-in-Chief of White Guard. In his staff are German-trained General Wallenius (a leader of the Finnish army 1939-1940); and Hugo Ostermann, an officer of the German army until 1918, (and in 1940 Chief of Finnish General Staff). From Vaasa they negotiate with Sweden and Germany for military support against their own people, while White Guard bands officered by German-trained "Jägers", massacre workers and poor peasants, threatening to annihilate whole working population of Finland.

Saario, Svinhufud's Foreign Minister, of whom London *Times* writes "his extreme German sympathies appear to be untempered by any consideration even for the interests of his own country", negotiates for direct German intervention against Helsinki government. Holsti (Finnish delegate to League of Nations today) tours European capitals to "explain" the plan to call in the German army to "establish Finland's independence."

March 1—Treaty of Amity concluded between RSFSR and Finnish Workers' Republic; Soviet Russia cedes District of Petsamo, not a part of the Grand Duchy, providing Finnish State with ice-free port.

March 3—At Brest-Litovsk Germans insist Soviet Russia withdraw her entire garrison from Finland. Removal of troops started immediately, completed by second week in March.

March 7—Vaasa White government signs peace treaty and trade pact with Germany which, according to the Finnish historian Schibergson, "makes Finland politically and economically dependent on Germany."

On same day first German expeditionary forces after occupying Aland Islands, land at Hangö on Finnish mainland to attack Socialist Government.

Thus Mannerheim's first act as Commander-in-Chief is to call in his enemies of the day before to suppress people of his own country.

Workers' Government at Helsinki ready to cooperate with the Allies against Germany; had they received help, the Germans and General Mannerheim could have been defeated.

Third Week in March—Offensive against Helsinki Socialist Government begins. Main military actions carried out not by Mannerheim's forces, but by Germans assisted by "Black Brigade" from Sweden. *Soviet troops have been completely withdrawn.*

During March armed Finnish band of 1,000, headed by Tsarist officer Malm, invading Soviet territory with aim of joining Allied interventionist forces, is thrown back.

April—New German force of 12,000 under General von der Goltz arrives to assist Mannerheim, a German fleet under Admiral Meurer participating.

April 9—London *Times* editorial says "Finland can no longer claim to be neutral; it has become a German province."

April 28—Helsinki taken by Germans. Mannerheim's White Guard victories due solely to German aid. Germany aims to detach all the border provinces including the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia from Soviets.

May 15—Baron Mannerheim enters Finnish capital at side of General von der Goltz; is decorated with German Iron Cross.

Whites recall Diet, but bar Social-Democratic members. Rump Parliament elects Svinhufud Regent. Svinhufud asks Kaiser Wilhelm to make one of his sons King of Finland. Diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia are broken.

This Civil War carried on by Mannerheim and Svinhufud with indescribable butchery and won by the Germans, is officially and falsely referred to as Finland's "War of Independence." It was actually a bitter fight waged by the Finnish people against an oppressive ruling class, the Swedo-Finns, aided by Tsarist White Guards and foreign invaders. The Finnish people received some arms and supplies from the Soviet Republic, but not much aid could then be spared.

End of May—Mannerheim, now seeking Allied rather than German protection, resigns, and seeks support in Stockholm, for plan to occupy Eastern Karelia and march on Petrograd with British Murmansk expedition.

In months following, as during Civil War itself, ferocious atrocities are carried on against Finland's working class. In addition to thousands executed during the Civil War, Finnish White Guards takes toll of from 30,000 to 40,000 people; 90,000, more than half of Finland's working class, thrown into prisons and concentration camps.

August—Finnish and Soviet delegates discuss peace terms in Berlin. Finns demand entire Murmansk Peninsula, Petrograd, Petrozavodsk in Karelia as well as Petsamo. Soviet delegates find no basis for negotiations.

Hjalmar Procope, one of the secretaries of the Finnish delegation (today Finnish Minister to Washington) writes article in German weekly *Deutsche Politik*, August 2nd, urging necessity of uniting to Finland all Eastern Karelia and whole of Kola Peninsula, more than 200,000 square kilometers. Among reasons advanced: safeguarding German interests in Far North against England.

October 9—Diet elects Kaiser's brother-in-law, Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse, King of Finland; Svinhufud Regent, Paasikivi (negotiator of 1939) first Prime Minister.

During October—White Guard Finnish bands invade Soviet Karelia.

November 9-11—Collapse of German Empire; Armistice saves Finland from a German king. Svinhufud falls.

December—Under Mannerheim, now Regent, ruling Finnish circles become active partners Allied Intervention against Soviet Russia. Finnish port, Koivisto, put at disposal of interventionist naval forces as a base to shell Kronstadt.

Inter-Allied Trade Commission now controls Finland's commerce, replacing Germany. Finland's best customer, Russia, is lost.

British Military Mission established at Helsinki under General Gough (1940—Gough demands intervention against USSR).

1919

With Mannerheim first President, Finnish Republic is democratic in form but openly based on the *Schutzcorps* (White Guard reorganized into government-subsidized Civil Guard). Terror at home and campaign against Soviet Russia, with Allied help, continues.

February 20—American Chargé in Denmark telegraphs to Acting Secretary of State in Washington:

"In interview with naval attaché yesterday morning General Mannerheim stated that his army willing to and capable of defeating the Bolsheviks in Northern Russia. . . . Willing to commence hostilities immediately if encouraged to do so by the Allies and assured that the United States would hasten sending food supplies to Finland."

(*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919. Russia. Department of State, Washington. P. 669*)

American encouragement soon forthcoming in \$8,300,000 loan (same heard of in 1939-40). British Government loans £6,000,000 on condition attack be launched on Petrograd.

During February—Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin protests to Finnish Foreign Minister invasion by regular Finnish troops, Petrograd Region, and concentration of armed forces on Finnish side of border.

March 2—American Vice Consul Imbrie at Viborg cables State Department urging immediate action to aid Finnish Whites in "the capture of Petrograd and afterward Moscow and the overthrow of the Bolsheviks."
(*Ibid. pp. 670-671*)

April—"Olonets Volunteer Army", formed and armed by Finnish bourgeoisie and acting on instructions of Great Britain and France, raids Soviet territory, seizes whole stretch of land between Lakes Ladoga and Onega and threatens Leningrad.

April 2—Rosta dispatch, Helsingfors, reports English army at Murmansk mobilized whole male population, but Finnish workers sent to Archangel front refused to fight against Bolsheviks, many being shot.

April 17—Apropos of sending British Expeditionary Force to Murmansk, London *Times* writes:

"So far as stamping out the Bolshevik menace is concerned, we

might as well send expeditions to Honolulu as to the White Sea. If we look on the map, we shall find the best approach to Petrograd is from the Baltic, and the shortest and easiest route is through Finland. . . . Finland is the key to Petrograd and Petrograd the key to Moscow."

May—British under General Maynard reach Lake Onega; Finnish Government offers cooperation if given Petrozavodsk in Soviet Karelia. Offer declined, but Finnish volunteer force assaults town independently, without success.

May 3—Telegram sent to Peace Commission in Paris by American Minister Morris in Sweden:

"Finnish Chargé d'Affaires called at the Legation this afternoon . . . to inform us that the Finnish Government hoped that the United States and Associated Governments would not at present juncture send food to the portions of Russia controlled by Bolshevik authorities. The Finnish Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that it would seem particularly undesirable that food should be supplied just at the present moment when the Bolsheviks are being so vigorously pressed by their enemies on every side. . . ."
(*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia. Page 109*)

May 17 and 18—Finnish batteries fire on Soviet territory and on Soviet ships outside of Finnish territorial waters.

June 13—Winston Churchill (telegram in Kolchak's secret archives) undertakes to persuade Finland to join the proposed Yudenich offensive.
(See Fischer's "*The Soviets in World Affairs*", Vol. 1, page 200)

In June—"Olonets Volunteer Army" hurled back by Soviet troops, who stop at Finnish border.

July 16—Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris (Woodrow Wilson attending) telegraphs Secretary of State in Washington:

"The Supreme Council has decided that a joint telegram should be addressed to the British, American, Italian and French Chargé d'Affaires at Helsingfors to ask them to inform the Government of General Mannerheim that in case he thought he ought to follow up the request for action from Admiral Kolchak, the Allied Governments, without bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have no objection to raise against this operation."
(*Foreign Relations of the United States. Russia, 1919, page 691*)

During July—Yudenich arrives in Helsingfors which he hopes to make starting point of advance on Petrograd; refuses to negotiate with representatives of Finnish Government who want assurances of independence of Finland; Kolchak intervenes on his behalf; Mannerheim, accepting vague promises that interests of Finland "will be taken into consideration," replies to Kolchak:

"The capture of Petrograd would be of the utmost importance in view of the significance of that city as the base of military operations of the Soviet Government in Northern Russia. . . . The Government of Finland is therefore not at all averse to regular Finnish troops taking part in the liberation of Petrograd."

And so, though not "officially", General Mannerheim's bands march with Yudenich on Petrograd.

July 30—Finnish aviators fly over Kronstadt, bombing city and harbor.

October 14—Vanguard of Yudenich counter-revolutionary army approaches Petrograd. One of its Finnish contingents reaches Gatchina, and is put to rout with rest of Yudenich army.

Autumn—Invading Finnish forces are driven back from Ingermanlandia.

October—Mannerheim, at one time refused admission to England because of his butcheries, campaigns in London and Paris for increased British, French intervention. In interview, London *Times* declares "The historic mission of Finland is to drive Bolshevism from Leningrad."

As the year ends, moderate candidate Stahlberg wins in Presidential elections over Mannerheim, discredited because of his close association with Yudenich and other Whites opposing Finnish independence.

1920

April 29—Soviet-Finnish armistice negotiations broken off under Entente pressure. Poland insists on unreasonable conditions in order to postpone agreement and support Polish advance into Soviet Russia. Holsti as special envoy in London and Paris, raises impossible demands.

May 11—Chicherin proposes resumption Soviet-Finnish peace parleys.

May 20—*Izvestia* describes further fruitless attempts to conclude an armistice, while Soviets demand not an inch of Finnish territory, the Finns insist on occupying part of Archangel Province and Karelia and on quartering Mannerheim troops in Petrograd suburbs.

June 15—Paasikivi raises new complex questions on behalf of Finns, further prolonging negotiations.

September—Soviet offer for renewed peace negotiations rejected.

October—Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Peace signed at Dorpat (now Estonian city Tartu). Finland recognizes Karelia part of Soviet Russia, Soviet Russia cedes Petsamo and corridor to Arctic Ocean.

1921

Despite peace treaty, Mannerheim's White Guards continue private war against Soviet Karelia, making repeated border raids.

Finnish economic life completely re-oriented on unnatural plan whereby instead of maintaining ties with Russian market, Finnish trade is diverted to Great Britain and the United States.

October 27—Baron Mannerheim leads direct invasion of Karelia by armed Schutzcorps troops, known as "The Karelian Adventure," with open support of Finnish Government (Cajander Prime Minister, Holsti Foreign Minister), permitting organization on its territory of so-called Finnish Government of Karelia. Finnish White Guards burn villages, pillage, torture population. Invasion British-financed, French-officered.

1922

Finnish statesmen (prominent among them recent Prime Minister Erkkö) work in cooperation with Polish Foreign Minister Beck, acting as chief agent for Allies in mustering anti-Soviet forces, in Baltic pact directed against Soviet Union. Finland signs Baltic Accord with Poland, Estonia and Latvia, but does not ratify, because of vigorous protests from Moscow.

March—Decisive victory of working people of Karelia with the help of the Red Army over Finnish invaders.

July—On demand of Soviet Government that Finland guarantee inviolability of border, special agreement is signed.

However, ruling clique of Finland, on instructions of its foreign patrons, continues provocations against Workers' Republic.

Using League of Nations as a medium for developing anti-Soviet sentiment, Finnish delegation introduce series of resolutions falsely charging the Soviet Republic with violations of Treaty of Dorpat; back separatist Karelian movement engineered from Finland and demand League's intervention. Introduce resolutions for financing anti-Soviet war and for "moral condemnation of the Soviet Union as an aggressor". Consistently slander and misrepresent Soviet peace policy, opposing all Soviet peace proposals, and helping to disrupt disarmament conference convened on Soviet initiative in Moscow.

1923

Finland is assigned prominent part in all anti-Soviet plans hatched at this period. Foreign capital, primarily British and American, pours into Finland, England acquiring a dominant position in Finnish market. Economic "assimilation" is accompanied by "cultural conquest." Finland refuses Soviet proposal to conclude non-aggression pact.

September 24—Three Soviet officials returning from inspection trip to Finland border zone, are shot, two mortally, assassins receiving asylum on Finnish territory. Chicherin protests this as one of long series of acts in which Finnish border authorities are implicated, charging Finnish border authorities with sending armed bandits into Karelia; and that a White counter-revolutionary organization is harbored by Finns in border zone.

1924

October 30—People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs reports Finnish attempt during League of Nations' session to intervene in USSR internal affairs by encouraging counter-revolutionary separatist movement in Georgian Republic. On protest of Soviet Government, Mr. Procope, Finnish Foreign Minister, makes explanation accepted as satisfactory by USSR.

November 2—Stockholm Finnish Legation declares, in direct contradiction of above explanation, that Finnish Government rejected Soviet protest as "altogether unfounded."

November 5—Soviet Government protests this step as infraction of generally accepted rules of international intercourse.

1924-1925

British military mission, headed by General Sir Walter Kirke, visits Finland at invitation of Cajander and Kallio, to reorganize Finland's army, navy and air force. Under its directions Mannerheim-Kirke Line is begun on Isthmus of Karelia, intended to serve as a base for attack on Leningrad. Kirke decorated with highest Finnish order, the White Rose. Regular inspection trips follow.

Intensive British espionage activities in Soviet Russia develop with aid of Finland. In 1925 British spy, Capt. Sidney Riley of Air Force, crosses from Finland into Soviet territory, using passport of Steinberg, a merchant.

1926

April—Litvinov announces that in effort to maintain and strengthen friendly relations with Finland, thirty conventions regarding all aspects of neighborly relations have been concluded.

Social-Democratic Government headed by Vainö Tanner comes to power, but continues regime of unbridled reaction and curtailment of the democratic liberties formally listed in the Constitution. Tanner not only countenances Schutzcorps, but reviews its parade celebrating defeat of Socialist Government in 1918. Diet rejects a bill to curtail state subsidy to Schutzcorps.

November 26—Finland breaks off negotiations initiated by the Soviet Government for conclusion of non-aggression pact.

1927

Trial of Anglo-Finnish spies reveals existence of network of British spies operating through Finnish White Guard diplomats in Moscow. Outstanding among 26 tried is international spy Hoyer, who first went to Finland for British Intelligence Service in 1918. Having conducted espionage against Finland, in 1925 his main efforts were turned against USSR. Supplied through Capt. Boyce of British navy with necessary documents. Reports forwarded through the Finnish mission in Moscow or Finnish Consulate in Moscow. All correspondence inserted in two envelopes, top bearing address "Dr. Holsti, Finnish Minister, Reval" (Finnish representative in League today), inside to Boyce. *Thus Holsti was an active confederate of the spy ring conducting subversive activities against the USSR.* British imperialist plans to convert Finland into base of intrigues against USSR is made very clear. Testifies Hoyer:

"Instructions were received from Downing Street prior to my departure for the USSR. The British Intelligence Service wanted to disrupt the good neighborly relations between the USSR and Germany at all costs. Boyce was instructed to produce 'documentary proof' that Germany supplied the USSR with submarines, that the German and Soviet navies conducted joint maneuvers in 1924, etc. My instructions were to transmit all information through the Finnish diplomatic representatives in the USSR."

Existence of British secret service center at Terioki revealed. Under direction of Captain Ross, agents are instructed in organization of terrorist activities in USSR and terrorists armed with bombs and hand grenades

are smuggled across the Soviet-Finnish border with connivance of Finns.

Russian White Guard emigrés use Finland as base for plots and terrorist acts against USSR, such as explosion in Leningrad Engineers' Club at end of 1927, perpetrated by terrorists from Finland.

1928

Great Britain is instrumental in bringing about amalgamation of largest ship-building plants in Finland, thus providing for effective repair of British ships in event of war against the USSR.

September 3—Finnish newspaper *Huvundtadsbladet* writes:

"Well-equipped wharves and machine-building plants are a particularly important condition for *outside help*. That is why from the viewpoint of defense, we must regard them as just as important as the forts and mine fields which protect our coasts."

On British initiative, chemical plants and munition plants are built in Finland, and islands in Gulf of Finland are fortified to serve as bases for foreign naval squadrons.

British General Burt, chief of Allied Baltic military mission in 1919, tours Baltic countries.

British navy makes one of its annual visits to Baltic to study future possible theatre of anti-Soviet war, and to draw up plans for simultaneous action of British fleet and land forces, primarily, of Finland.

1929

February—Finland refuses to sign Litvinov Protocol putting into effect Kellogg Pact (which the Soviet Union was the first country to ratify) between the USSR and neighboring states.

November—Lapua (fascist) movement launched with fierce attack on young workers' club in Lapua, Northeast Finland. Government and courts connive at Lapuan attacks all over Finland on working class organizations, printing plants, clubs; hundreds of Communists and Social-Democrats kidnapped and driven across border to Soviet territory; other working class leaders beaten or murdered.

Lapua movement unleashes furious anti-Soviet campaign throughout Finland, including boycott of Soviet goods, demonstrations before Soviet organizations, etc.

Lapua organization attempts complete destruction of labor movement to strengthen rear in general preparation for anti-Soviet war conceived as only way out of economic crisis gripping Finland.

International situation becomes more tense, danger of war more imminent. Every imperialistic power that threatens the Soviet Union counts on active support and assistance of Finland, always at the disposal of state most bitter against the Soviet Union. Britain acquires ever greater control over Finland's economy.

1930

Orgy of violence and terror with renewed suppression of left wing parties, dissolution of trade unions, suppression of press, workers being deprived of last vestiges of civil rights. Foreign policy now one of close

alliance both with England and Germany. Svinhufud dominates period, first as Prime Minister, then as President. Mannerheim returns to power as President of the Defense Council and Commander-in-Chief elect.

New elections held under Lapua terror. Lapua gangs start furious drive against Stahlberg, candidate of moderates, preparing his assassination if elected. General Wallenius, Chief of Staff and group of staff officers, kidnap Stahlberg, attempt to smuggle him across the border to Soviet territory intending to murder him and place blame on USSR, as step to war. Plot discovered; Wallenius given short prison term but soon released.

July—Special session of Diet meets to pass so-called anti-Communist laws—Svinhufud forms new government—Army, Schutzcorps and most reactionary elements prepare to proclaim open terrorist dictatorship—Government stages “March on Helsingfors”—12,000 Lapua gangsters pass in review before Svinhufud and Mannerheim.

Present at review is British Minister, Sir Rowland Stirling, arousing protest of British labor press.

Next to Svinhufud, most important member of new government is Hjalmar Procope, Foreign Minister.

Numerous Lapuan acts of violence perpetrated under anti-Soviet slogans. Keres, Lapuan leader, announces in presence of Svinhufud and Mannerheim:

“Our task is to capture Leningrad province. We must expand our territory to the extreme North and up to the Urals. An end must be put to the power of Moscow. We must strive for the organization of an international crusade against the Bolsheviks. This crusade must lead to the partition of that barbarous country.”

Propaganda for “Greater Finland” carried on rabidly by such organizations as “Academic Karelian Society”, “League for the Independence of Finland”, “Ingermanland League”, “League of Karelian Fugitives”, “Veteran’s League”, and finally, the “Castle of Finland”, ideological center of the Lapua movement.

July 17—Soviet note to Finland protests systematic illegal deportation of Finnish citizens across Soviet-Finnish border with connivance of Finnish Government authorities. Seventeen cases mentioned of trade union leaders, workers, farmers and deputies of Finnish Diet thus violently expelled, which do not exhaust the list. Expulsions in some cases carried on by armed Finnish troops crossing Soviet territory in violation of international law.

August 6—Five more Finnish citizens, including municipal officials, violently expelled across border.

September 28—Soviet Government declares Finnish answer to protest unsatisfactory since it gives no assurance of desire on part of Finnish government to guarantee normal conditions on border, where violations continue.

Autumn—British aviation mission visits Finland. October issue British *Contemporary Review* publishes article asserting that political importance of Finland is determined primarily by proximity to Leningrad and Kronstadt. Article says:

“It would suit the wisdom of those who framed the post-war peace treaties to organize a bulwark in the shape of a bloc of states having common frontiers with Russia, stretching from the Arctic to the Black Sea, in order to prevent the influence of the Bolshevik regime from spreading to Western Europe. We can rest assured that Finland will not be the weakest link in this line of defense.”

November 25—“Industrial Party” trial reveals role planned for Finland in Franco-British plans for armed attack on Moscow and Leningrad. Finland, called “Classic country” for provocation of anti-Soviet incidents, slated to take active part in advance on Leningrad.

November 28—Vainö Tanner, head of Social-Democratic group in Diet (which voted laws against working class organizations) interviewed by Paris *Populaire*, justifies Lapuan movement as “rather the expression of a national protest against Russia than political action against the Finnish Communists.”

1931

May 12—Hostile demonstration of Fascist students before Soviet Legation. Despite Soviet protest, Finnish authorities give no guarantee against repetition.

May 17—Soviet protest warns that anti-Soviet atmosphere cultivated in Finland is direct threat to peaceful relations. Note charges that propaganda carried on with official support “has developed into systematic campaign aiming at the alienation of the Karelian Autonomous Republic and certain districts of the Leningrad Region from the Soviet Union, and in certain circles has even gone so far as to advocate the annexation by Finland of the entire Northern section of the Soviet Union as far as the Ural Mountains.”

May 24—Soviet Government protests Finnish interference in Soviet internal affairs by their agitation on behalf of Ingermanlanders of Leningrad province, spreading slanderous information regarding their alleged “persecution,” raising funds for their defense, etc.

June 24—The Moscow *Izvestia* reports Soviet Government has informed Finland it construes Finnish answer to Soviet protests as meaning that the Finnish Government “will as before permit the continuance of the campaign of enmity and hatred which has been carried on for a long time in Finland against the Soviet Union, and which is a threat to the existing relations of the two governments.”

During the year Svinhufud is elected President as official candidate of Lapuan movement of which General Wallenius is open leader. Mannerheim becomes President of the Defense Council.

1932

January 21—Finnish Government at last reluctantly signs non-aggression pact after repeated Soviet proposals to do so since 1922. Nevertheless continues to encourage propaganda of “Greater Finland up to the Urals.” Lapuans in armed revolt; arrested, pardoned.

Vicar Elias Simoiski, founder of “Academic Karelia Society,” rabid anti-Soviet organization in Finland declares:

"The fall of Russia is drawing nigh with rapid strides, and we hear as it were the rumble of the imminent war. That is why the Finnish people must keep awake. . . . The cause of Karelia was once drowned in an ocean of paper in the League of Nations. This question will have to be settled by a show of arms. This is the stark truth, and we must face it, even if, forsooth, our bones may one day bleach on the shores of the White Sea."

1933

The advent of the Nazis to power renews Finnish imperialist dreams of conquering Soviet Karelia "as far as the Urals."

September—As step toward recovery, "British Week" celebrated in Helsinki. Trade pact makes England master even of Finland's domestic markets.

1934

At Soviet Government proposal Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact extended ten years.

Concession for mining nickel granted to Mond-Nickel, affiliated with International Nickel Co. of Canada, an affiliate of British Chemical Trusts and American trusts controlled by Morgan. Not only nickel attracts British interests to Petsamo, but latter's proximity to Soviet port of Murmansk.

1935

Control by foreign capital grows. United States bankers hold \$32,000,000 worth of Finnish bonds. National City Company floats \$10,000,000 loan for Finland. National City Bank grants large credits to Finnish timber barons. International Telephone and Telegraph Co., (Morgan) controls telephone system of Finland in partnership with Swedish firm "Erikson."

Extreme Right press in Finland revives demand for fortification of Aland Islands and mounting of heavy guns on Finnish coast, specifically forbidden in 1920 Russo-Finnish peace treaty, since Finns could close ice-free channel to Murmansk by fortification of this region.

October 14—Goering representing Germany, Mannerheim representing Finland, Radziwill representing Poland and Gombos representing Hungary meet at Rominter, East Prussia, to consider plans for an attack on the USSR. *London Times*, October 14, reports naval, military and air armament ideas discussed: "Finland (whose strategical position for naval operations is talked of) and even Rumania have been drawn in. Even Japan is suspected of figuring in these dreams of the future."

During this period Germany participates in fortifying Finland for eventual anti-Soviet action.

1936

January—At session of the Central Executive Committee, Molotov states:

" . . . Plans for intervention are not unknown to certain elements

of neighboring Finland who are orientating themselves more and more on the most aggressive imperialist states."

March—Finnish people call a halt to the warmongers. Mounting discontent with government's anti-Soviet policy forces the Svinhufud-Kivimäki government out of office, despite terror and outrages of Schutzcorps. Kallio, leader of Agrarian Alliance, becomes President; forms cabinet headed by leader of "progressive" party, Cajander. Sympathy of Finnish people with Soviet people forces government to adopt "formally correct" relations with USSR, while continuing hostile preparations.

Spring—German military mission arrives in Finland to develop air bases.

May—Retrial of Antikainen forced by widespread protest. (Antikainen, a Finnish-speaking Soviet citizen of Karelia who took prominent part in repelling Finnish attacks in the war of 1921-22 was arrested on trumped up charges of "murder" of Finnish White Guard and convicted in 1935 without being permitted witnesses). Antikainen again given life-term, on evidence of witness who changes testimony, on Finnish police threat of death.

August 13—Stockholm paper *Tydyningen* cites London rumors regarding secret parley between Germany, Finland and Poland for simultaneous attacks on USSR from the Baltic.

September—Mannerheim, head of Finnish Defense Council, as guest of the British Government, reviews British tank maneuvers, visits Woolwich Arsenal, Vickers-Armstrong works, Bristol Aircraft Company's factory, etc. Entertained officially by British Government, fellow guests include Chief of Imperial General Staff, Director General of the Territorial Army, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Permanent Secretary of the Air Ministry, big munitions makers, Mr. Duff Cooper, Lord Plymouth, General Burt who had acted against the Soviet Union in Latvia and Lithuania in 1918-1919, etc., etc. Mannerheim is made a Knight Grand Cross of the British Empire.

September 29—*Izvestia* publishes article describing anti-Soviet plans of German and Finnish fascists, quotes Social-Democratic paper *Kassan Tine* published in Viborg: "Hitlerian Germany is offering Ingermanland, Olonetz and Karelia to Finland." German press reported supporting Finnish plans to fortify Aland Islands.

October—Spirin, commander of Soviet border guard unit, shot at his post from Finnish side. Eight more shootings follow of Soviet border guards and citizens of Soviet frontier settlements from the Finnish side.

1937

Reports of Finnish-German collaboration against Russia appear throughout world press. Rudolf Holsti, again Finnish Foreign Minister, forced to make public statement (having no foundation in truth) calling them "mere inventions of hostile newspapermen."

With Svinhufud as President, Finnish Government actually signs over port of Petsamo to a German company as fishery (submarine?) concession. Popular protest prevents ratification.

September 16—*New York Herald Tribune* dispatch from Moscow

correspondent Joseph Barnes quotes article in *Leningradskaya Pravda* by NKVD official in charge of Leningrad district describing far-flung campaign by Gestapo to transform Finland into base of operations for war against USSR. Finnish fugitives admitted into Red Army brigades discovered to be Finnish spies acting under Gestapo orders to "cut off the Kola peninsula and Karelia from the Soviet Union in case of war and to paralyze the Murmansk Railroad." The article says:

"It is no secret that Finland does not need the airfields recently built there, because the country never will have enough airplanes to warrant them. Finland also does not need the enormous number of new strategic roads now under construction. This is all being done under the direction of the German General Staff."

1938

Moscow Treason Trial of 1938, (as those of 1936 and 1937) brings revelations of well-coordinated plan to murder Soviet leaders, open border to fascist troops, dismember USSR and restore capitalism, Finland being cast as "key to Leningrad."

Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis intensifies its aggression, with direct connivance of British Tories, who look forward to day when Hitler will march into the Ukraine, and Soviet Union and Germany will weaken each other in war.

Britain tightens hold on Finland, to be sure that she will do her bidding when time comes.

February—Immediately after seizure of Austria, General Osterman and others of Finnish army high command visit Nazi Germany; received by Hitler, Goering and Ribbentrop. Finnish papers praise Hitler's action in Austria.

April 11—Delegation of 40 German Nazis headed by General von der Goltz and other important diplomats and military men arrive in Finland to celebrate 20th Anniversary of "freeing of Helsinki from the Bolsheviks," and, it is reported, to inspect fortifications. In welcoming speech Chief of City Council says: "At the present time German aid is no less valuable than it was twenty years ago."

July 9—*Pravda* charges Kallio and Cajander with continued orientation on Nazi Germany, citing campaign for fortification of Aland Islands carried on with German assistance. Swedish paper *Dagens Newheter* quoted on arrival of large numbers of Germans in Finland and Aland Islands; preparations to make them a German naval and air base. Finland's recent big appropriation designed to enlarge naval port at Abö so that navy can serve for attack as well as defense is discussed. Article asserts Nazi Germany makes no secret of choice of Finland as *place d'armes* for attack on USSR, and that Finnish fascists express complete sympathy with axis powers.

1939

Cases tried by Leningrad Tribunal show that activities of the Finnish Whites and military clique against the Soviet Union have never ceased, subversive work being carried on under direct orders from Cajander and Erko. The spy Pyakonen was smuggled over the border on instructions of Finnish police. The spy Ahonen was revealed as active agent of the

Finnish Secret Service, under cover of employment in Finnish Consulate in Leningrad, 1930-1938.

May 23—USSR blocks Finland's request before League Council to fortify Aland Islands to which Sweden, Britain, Germany and Italy had agreed. Finland refused Moscow information on nature and extent of fortification plans made in collaboration with German military experts. (It later appeared that the Aland Islands, which Finland had pledged herself not to fortify, in accordance with a League decision, were already being fortified.) Finland's insistence on fortifications is ominous sign since heavy guns on the Alands could control Gulf of Finland thus menacing vital Kronstadt naval base and Leningrad.

June—General Mannerheim visits London; shortly after is host to British General Kirke who inspects Mannerheim-Kirke Line.

July—British Navy List names two officers lent to foreign governments. The senior, Capt. N. C. Moore, M.V.O., who served from 1919-22 in anti-Soviet intervention in the Black Sea, is lent to Finland. Despite small Finnish air force, Finland is one of the fourteen foreign capitals in which Great Britain maintains a permanent Air Force attaché.

General Halder, Chief of German General Staff, inspects airdromes in Finland and on the Islands in the Gulf (with capacity ten times as great as required for Finland's air force).

Finnish soldiers who fought with Loyalists in Spain are arrested and imprisoned on their return home.

August—Finnish fortifications are inspected by Swedish War Minister Skjold.

During Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, Finland willingly accepts role of being that particular Baltic State which, as Chamberlain declared: "Refused any guarantees on part of USSR."

In other words, control of strategic islands and bases commanding the Gulf of Finland, without which any Anglo-Franco-Soviet Pact would have been meaningless, was denied USSR with British connivance.

August 23—Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact signed.

September 3—Balked in their plans to instigate war between Germany and the USSR, Great Britain and France declare war on Germany.

When the Soviet Union, guided by a desire to localize as far as possible the European War, directly proposes to Baltic States pacts of mutual assistance, Finland alone flatly refuses. Pacts are soon concluded with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

October 5—The USSR invites Finland to send delegates to Moscow for discussion of mutual problems.

October 11—After preliminary exchanges, Finnish delegation arrives in Moscow, but first Finnish army is put on war footing, population of districts bordering on USSR is evacuated, anti-Soviet hysteria is whipped up, General Mannerheim, now Marshal of Finland, takes command.

The Soviet Union negotiates patiently for two months, offering every concession possible without jeopardizing its security. During negotiations chaos ensues in Finland, and wave of terror and persecution of anyone suspected of Soviet sympathies. Newspapers calling for a reasonable attitude are shut down.

November 26—Finnish military clique engineers armed provocations on Soviet borders, shelling of Red Army troops in which Red Army men are killed and wounded. Soviet Government protests concentration of troops near Leningrad and border attack, requests Finland to withdraw troops from frontier.

November 28—In view of refusal of Finland to withdraw troops, their unacceptable counter-proposal that Soviet troops be withdrawn to suburbs of Leningrad, and continued threats by Finland against Leningrad in contravention of terms of Soviet-Finish Non-Aggression Pact, USSR denounces pact.

November 29—Molotov broadcasts announcement that diplomatic relations with Finland have been broken, the Red Army is held in readiness to check fresh sallies of the Finnish military clique.

November 30—In answer to new provocations the troops of the Leningrad Military District cross the border into Finland. President Kallio proclaims state of war with USSR. Finland mobilizes 600,000 men, including the Schutzcorps, nearly one to every six inhabitants.

On March 12, 1940, after 105 days of fighting, accompanied by attempts by the Allies to use Finland as an excuse for creating a Northern war front and to redirect their war against the Soviet Union, a Peace Treaty is signed between the Helsinki Government and the Soviet Union, thus bringing to an end the possibility of realizing the plan of using Finland as a base for intervention against the USSR.

While the above record cannot be considered exhaustive, it is as complete as possible within the limits of space and the sources at our disposal. The sources from which the material has been gathered and checked, in addition to those mentioned in the text are: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia", Department of State, Washington, D. C.; "Finland" by J. Hampden Jackson (MacMillan Co., New York, 1940); "Must the War Spread?" by D. N. Pritt, K. C., M. P. (Penguin Books, New York, 1940); The Encyclopedia Britannica; *Soviet Russia*, Vols. 1919 through 1921 (Russian Soviet Government Bureau, New York); *Russian Review*, Vols. 1923 through 1926, (Russian Information Bureau, Washington, D. C.); *Soviet Union Review*, Vols. 1927 through 1932 (Soviet Union Information Bureau, Washington, D. C.); Anglo-Russian News Bulletin (London, December 18, 1939); The Labour Monthly (London, January 1940). *New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *Izvestia*, *Pravda*, *London Times*, etc.

DOCUMENTS

THE SOVIET-ESTONIAN PACT

The text of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Aid and Trade Agreement signed on September 29, 1939, follows:

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on one side and the President of the Estonian Republic on the other side:

For the purpose of the development of friendly relations established by the Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, and based on recognition of the independent state of existence and on non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other party;

Recognizing that the Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, and the Pact on Non-Aggression and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of May 4, 1932, still form the firm basis of their relations and undertakings;

Convinced that the definition of the exact conditions of insuring mutual security corresponds to the interests of both contracting parties;

Found it necessary to conclude the following pact of mutual assistance and appointed for this purpose as their authorized representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; the President of the Estonian Republic: Karl Selter, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and these authorized representatives agreed upon the following:

Article I

The two contracting parties undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of direct aggression or menace of aggression arising on the part of any great European power against the sea frontiers of the contracting parties in the Baltic Sea or their land frontiers across the territory of the Latvian Republic, as well as against bases indicated in Article III.

Article II

The USSR undertakes to render the Estonian Army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

Article III

The Estonian Republic assures the Soviet Union the right to maintain naval bases and several airdromes for aviation on lease terms at a reasonable price on the Estonian islands of Saaremaa (Oesel), Hiiumaa (Dagö) and in the town of Paldiski (Baltic Port).

The exact sites for bases and airdromes shall be allotted and their boundaries defined by mutual agreement. For the protection of the naval bases and airdromes the USSR has the right to maintain at its own expense on the sites allotted for bases and airdromes Soviet land and air armed forces of strictly limited strength, their maximum numbers to be determined by special agreement.

Article IV

The two contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances nor participate in any coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

Article V

Realization of this pact should not affect in any extent the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their economic systems and State organizations. The sites allotted for bases and airdromes (Article III) remain the territory of the Estonian Republic.

Article VI

This pact comes into force on the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of these instruments shall take place in Tallinn within six days from the signature of this pact. The term of validity of this pact is ten years and if one of the contracting parties does not find it necessary to denounce this pact one year prior to expiration of its term, the pact shall automatically continue valid for the next five years.

Article VII

This pact is made in two originals, in the Russian and Estonian languages, in Moscow the 28th of September, 1939.

VIACHESLAV MOLOTOV,
KARL SELTER.

THE SOVIET-LATVIAN PACT

The full text of the Mutual Aid Pact between the USSR and the Latvian Republic signed in Moscow, October 5, 1939, follows:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on one side and the President of the Latvian Republic on the other side;

For the purpose of the development of friendly relations established by the Peace Treaty of August 11, 1920, and based on recognition of independent State existence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other party;

Recognizing that the Peace Treaty of August 11, 1920, and the Pact on Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of February 5, 1932, continue to form the basis of their mutual relations and undertakings;

Convinced that a definition of the exact conditions of insuring mutual security meets the interests of both contracting parties, found it necessary to conclude the following pact on mutual assistance and appointed for this purpose as their authorities and representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Viacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; the President of the Latvian Republic, Vilhelms Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs [of Latvia], and these authorized representatives on mutual presentation of their credentials, found in good form and due order, agreed on the following:

Article I

The two contracting parties undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of direct aggression or the menace of aggression arising on the part of any great European power against the sea frontiers of the contracting parties in the Baltic sea or their land frontiers across the territories of the Esthonian or Lithuanian Republics, as well as against the bases indicated in Article III.

Article II

The Soviet Union undertakes to render the Latvian Army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

Article III

For the purpose of guaranteeing the security of the USSR and consolidating her own independence, the Latvian Republic grants the Soviet Union the right to maintain naval bases at the towns of Liepaja (Libau) and Ventspils (Windau) and several airdromes for aviation on lease terms at a reasonable price. The exact sites for the bases and airdromes shall be allotted and their boundaries defined by mutual agreement. For the protection of the Irben Straits the Soviet Union is granted the right to establish on the same conditions a coastal artillery base on the coast between Ventspils and Pitraga. For the protection of the naval bases, airdromes and the coastal artillery base the Soviet Union has the right to maintain at its own expense on the sites allotted for bases and airdromes, Soviet land and sea armed forces of strictly limited strength, their maximum numbers to be determined by special agreement.

Article IV

The two contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliance nor to participate in any coalitions directed against either of the contracting parties.

Article V

The realization of this pact should not affect in any way the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their State organization, economic and social systems and military measures.

The sites allotted for bases and airdromes (Article III) remain territory of the Latvian Republic.

Article VI

This pact comes into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of these instruments shall take place in Riga within six days from the day of this pact. The term of the validity of this pact is ten years and unless one of the contracting parties finds it necessary to denounce this pact one year prior to the expiration of its term, the pact shall automatically continue valid for the next ten years.

In confirmation whereof the aforementioned authorized representatives signed this pact and affixed their seals thereto.

This pact is made in two originals in the Russian and Lettish languages in Moscow, October 5, 1939.

VIACHESLAV MOLOTOV,
VILHELMS MUNTERS.

THE SOVIET-LITHUANIAN PACT

Following is the text of the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Aid Treaty signed in Moscow on October 10, 1939:

A TREATY ON THE TRANSFER OF THE CITY OF VILNA AND THE VILNA REGION TO THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC AND ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE USSR AND LITHUANIA:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the one side and the President of the Lithuanian Republic on the other side;

For the purpose of developing the friendly relations established by the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, and based on the recognition of an independent State existence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other party;

Recognizing that the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, and the Pact on Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of September 28, 1926, continue to form a firm basis of their mutual relations and undertakings;

Convinced that a definition of the exact conditions of insuring mutual security and a just settlement of the questions of State appurtenance of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region, unlawfully wrested from Lithuania by Poland, meets the interests of both contracting parties;

Found it necessary to conclude the following treaty on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Lithuanian Republic and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and appointed for this purpose their authorized representatives;

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Viacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; for the President of the Lithuanian Republic, Jozas Urbsys, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and these authorized representatives, on mutual presentation of their credentials, found in due form and good order, agreed on the following:

Article I

For the purpose of consolidation of friendly relations between the USSR and Lithuania, the city of Vilna and the Vilna region are transferred by the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian Republic and included in the territory of the Lithuanian State, the boundary between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic being established in accordance with a map appended hereto, which boundary shall be specified in more detail in a supplementary protocol.

Article II

The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of aggression or menace of aggression against Lithuania as well as in the event of aggression or the menace of aggression against the Soviet Union over Lithuanian territory on the part of any European power.

Article III

The Soviet Union undertakes to render the Lithuanian Army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

Article IV

The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic undertake jointly to effect protection of the State boundaries of Lithuania, for which purpose the Soviet Union receives the right to maintain at its own expense, at points in the Lithuanian Repub-

lic established by mutual agreement, Soviet land and air armed forces of strictly limited strength. The exact locations of these troops and the boundaries within which they may be quartered, their strength at each particular point and also all other questions, economic, administrative, questions of jurisdiction, and others, arising in connection with the presence of Soviet armed forces on Lithuanian territory under the present treaty, shall be regulated by special agreements. The sites and buildings necessary for this purpose shall be allotted by the Lithuanian Government on lease terms at a reasonable price.

Article V

In the event of the menace of aggression against Lithuania or against the USSR over Lithuanian territory, the two contracting parties shall immediately discuss the resulting situation and take all measures found necessary by mutual agreement to secure the inviolability of the territories of the contracting parties.

Article VI

The two contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances nor participate in any coalitions directed against either of the contracting parties.

Article VII

Realization of this treaty should not affect in any way the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their State organization, economic and social system, military measures and generally the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. The locations of the Soviet land and air armed forces (in Article IV of this treaty) under all circumstances remain a component part of the territory of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article VIII

The term of validity of this treaty in regard to the undertakings for mutual assistance between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic, (Articles II and III) is for fifteen years and unless one of the contracting parties finds it necessary to denounce the provisions of this treaty established for a specified term of one year prior to expiration of that term, these provisions shall automatically continue to be valid for the next ten years.

Article IX

This treaty comes into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. Exchange of these instruments shall take place in Kaunas within six days from the day of signature of this treaty. This treaty is made in two originals, in the Russian and Lithuanian languages, at Moscow, October 10, 1939.

VIACHESLAV MOLOTOV,
JOZAS URBSYS.

MOLOTOV'S REPORT TO SUPREME SOVIET

Following are the sections dealing with the Baltic States and the negotiations with Finland from the report on the international situation delivered on October 31, 1939, to the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by Viacheslav Molotov:

Relations with the Baltic Countries

THE relations of the Soviet Union with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are based on peace treaties concluded with the respective countries in 1920. By these treaties Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent States, and ever since then the Soviet Union has invariably pursued a friendly policy toward these newly created small States.

This was the reflection of a radical difference between the policy of the Soviet Government and the policy of Tsarist Russia, which brutally oppressed the small nations, denied them every opportunity of independent national and political development and left them with the most painful memories of it.

It must be admitted that the experience of the past two decades of the development of Soviet-Estonian, Soviet-Latvian and Soviet-Lithuanian friendly relations created favorable conditions for the further consolidation of political and all other relations between the USSR and its Baltic neighbors. This has been revealed, too, in the recent diplomatic negotiations with representatives of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania and in treaties that were signed in Moscow as a result of these negotiations.

As you know, the Soviet Union has concluded pacts of mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that are of major political significance. The principles underlying all these pacts are identical. They are based on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the other, and they include military assistance in case any of these countries are attacked.

In view of the special geographic position of these countries, which are, in a way, approaches to the USSR, particularly from the Baltic, these pacts allow the Soviet Union to maintain naval bases and airfields in specified parts of Estonia and Latvia and, in the case of Lithuania, the pact provides for defense of Lithuanian borders jointly with the Soviet Union.

The creation of these Soviet naval bases and airfields on territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the stationing of a certain number of Red Army units to protect these bases and airfields, insure reliable defense bases not only for the Soviet Union but also for the Baltic States themselves and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace, which is to the interest of our peoples.

Our recent diplomatic negotiations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have shown that we have sufficient confidence in each other and the proper understanding of the necessity of adopting these measures of military defense in the interests both of the Soviet Union and of these States themselves. The negotiations have fully revealed the anxiety of the parties concerned to preserve peace and safeguard the security of our peoples who are engaged in peaceful labor.

It was all this that insured a successful completion of the negotiations and the conclusion of the pacts of mutual assistance which are of great historical importance.

The special character of these mutual assistance pacts in no way implies any interference by the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. On the contrary, all these pacts of mutual assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of the sig-

natory States, as well as the principle of non-interference in each other's affairs.

These pacts are based on mutual respect for the political, social and economic structure of the contracting parties, and are designed to strengthen the basis for peaceful, neighborly cooperation between our peoples. We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of pacts on a basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all nonsense about sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs. In view of the improvement in our political relations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Soviet Union has gone a long way to meet the economic needs of these States and has accordingly concluded trade agreements with them.

Thanks to these economic agreements, trade with the Baltic countries will increase several fold, and there are favorable prospects for its further growth. At a time when all European countries, including neutral States, are experiencing tremendous trade difficulties, these economic agreements between the USSR and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are of great and positive importance to them.

Thus the rapprochement between the USSR, on the one hand, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the other, will contribute to more rapid progress of agriculture, industry and transport and in general to the national well-being of our Baltic neighbors.

The principles of Soviet policy toward small countries have been demonstrated with particular force by the treaty providing for the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Lithuanian Republic. Thereby the Lithuanian State, with its population of 2,500,000, considerably extends its territory, increases its population by 550,000 and receives the city of Vilna, whose population is almost double that of the present Lithuanian capital.

The Soviet Union agreed to transfer the city of Vilna to the Lithuanian Republic not because Vilna has a predominantly Lithuanian population. No, the majority of the inhabitants of Vilna are non-Lithuanian. But the Soviet Government took into consideration the fact that the city of Vilna, which was forcibly wrested from Lithuania by Poland, ought to belong to Lithuania as a city with which are associated on the one hand the historical past of the Lithuanian State and on the other hand the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people.

It has been pointed out in the foreign press that there has never been a case in world history of a big country's handing over such a big city to a small State of its own free will. All the more strikingly, therefore, does this act of the Soviet State demonstrate its good-will.

The Negotiations with Finland

Our relations with Finland are of a special character. This is to be explained chiefly by the fact that in Finland there is a greater amount of outside influence on the part of third powers. An impartial person must admit, however, that the same problems concerning the security of the Soviet Union and particularly of Leningrad, which figured in the negotiations with Estonia, also figure in the negotiations with Finland. In a certain sense it may be said that in this case the problem of the Soviet Union's security is even more acute inasmuch as Leningrad, which after Moscow is the most important city of the Soviet State, is situated at a distance of only thirty-two kilometers (about twenty miles) from the Finnish border. This means that the distance of Leningrad from the border of a foreign State is less than that required for modern long-range guns to shell it. On the other hand, the approaches to Leningrad from the sea also depend to a large extent on whether Finland, which owns the entire northern shore of the Gulf of Finland and all the islands along the central part of the Gulf of Finland, is hostile or friendly toward the Soviet Union. In view of this, as well as in view of the present situation in Europe, it may be expected that Finland will display the necessary understanding.

What has been the basis of the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland during all these years? As you know, the basis of these relations has been the peace treaty of 1920, which was on the pattern of our treaties with our other Baltic neighbors. Of its own free will the Soviet Union insured the separate and independent existence of Finland.

There can be no doubt that only the Soviet Government, which recognizes the principle of the free development of nationalities, could take such a step. It must be said that none but the Soviet Government in Russia could tolerate the existence of an independent Finland at the very gates of Leningrad.

This is eloquently testified by Finland's experience with the "democratic" government of Kerensky and Tsereteli, not to mention the government of Prince Lvov and Miliukov, let alone the Tsarist government. Doubtlessly this important circumstance might serve as a sound premise for the improvement in Soviet-Finnish relations in which, as may be seen, Finland is no less interested than the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Finnish negotiations were begun recently on our initiative. What is the subject of these negotiations? It is not difficult to see that in the present state of international affairs, when in the center of Europe war is developing between some of the biggest States, a war fraught with great surprises and dangers for all European States, the Soviet Union is not only entitled but obliged to adopt serious measures to increase its security.

It is natural for the Soviet Government to display particular concern with regard to the Gulf of Finland, which is the approach to Leningrad from the sea, and also with regard to the land border which hangs over Leningrad some thirty kilometers away.

I must remind you that the population of Leningrad has grown to 3,500,000, which almost equals the entire population of Finland, amounting to 3,650,000.

There is scarcely any need to dwell on the tales spread by the foreign press about the Soviet Union's proposals in the negotiations with Finland. Some assert the USSR "demands" the city of Viborg and the northern part of Lake Ladoga. Let us say for our part that this is a sheer fabrication and lie.

Others assert that the USSR demands the cession of the Aland Islands. This is also a fabrication and lie.

There is also nonsensical talk about some allegedly existing claims of the Soviet Union against Sweden and Norway. But these irresponsible lies are not even worth refuting.

Actually our proposals in the negotiations with Finland are extremely modest and are confined to that minimum without which it is impossible to safeguard the security of the USSR and to put on a firm footing the friendly relations with Finland.

We have begun negotiations with Finnish representatives. [Juho] Paasikivi and [V. A.] Tanner were sent for this purpose by the Finnish Government to Moscow, proposing the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish pact of mutual assistance approximately on the lines of our pacts of mutual assistance with other Baltic States, but inasmuch as the Finnish Government declared that the conclusion of such a pact would contradict its position of absolute neutrality we did not insist on our proposal.

We then proposed that we proceed to discuss concrete questions in which we are interested from the standpoint of safeguarding the security of the USSR and especially of Leningrad, both from the sea—in the Gulf of Finland—and from the land, in view of the extreme proximity of the border to Leningrad.

We have proposed that an agreement be reached to shift the Soviet-Finnish border on the Isthmus of Karelia several dozen kilometers further to the north of Leningrad. In exchange for this we have proposed to transfer to Finland part of Soviet Karelia, double the size of the territory which Finland is to transfer to the Soviet Union.

We have further proposed that an agreement be reached for Finland to lease

to us for a definite term a small section of her territory near the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, where we might establish a naval base. With a Soviet naval base at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Finland, namely at Baltic Port, as provided for by the Soviet-Estonian pact of mutual assistance, the establishment of a naval base at the northern entrance to the Gulf of Finland would fully safeguard the Gulf of Finland against hostile attempts on the part of other states.

We have no doubt that the establishment of such a base would not only be in the interests of the Soviet Union but also of the security of Finland herself.

Our other proposals, in particular our proposal as regards the exchange of certain islands in the Gulf of Finland as well as parts of the Rybachi and Sredni peninsulas for territory twice as large in Soviet Karelia, evidently do not meet with any objections on the part of the Finnish Government. Differences with regard to certain of our proposals have not yet been overcome, and concessions made by Finland in this respect, as for instance the cession of part of the territory of the Isthmus of Karelia, obviously do not meet the purpose.

We have further made a number of new steps to meet Finland half way. We declared that if our main proposals are accepted we shall be prepared to drop our objections to the fortification of the Aland Islands, on which the Finnish Government has been insisting for a long time. We only made one stipulation. We said that we would drop our objection to fortification of the Aland Islands on condition that the fortification is done by Finland's own national forces without the participation of any third country, inasmuch as the USSR will take no part in it.

We have also proposed to Finland to disarm the fortified zones along the entire Soviet-Finnish border on the Isthmus of Karelia, which should fully accord with the interests of Finland. We have further expressed our desire to reinforce the Soviet-Finnish pact of non-aggression with additional mutual guarantees.

Lastly, consolidation of Soviet-Finnish political relations would undoubtedly form a splendid basis for the rapid development of economic relations between the two countries. Thus we are ready to meet Finland in matters in which she is particularly interested.

In view of all this we do not think that Finland will seek a pretext to frustrate the proposed agreement. This would not be in line with the policy of friendly Soviet-Finnish relations and would, of course, work to the serious detriment of Finland. We are certain that Finnish leading circles will properly understand the importance of consolidating friendly Soviet-Finnish relations and that Finnish public men will not yield to anti-Soviet influence or instigation from any quarter.

I must, however, inform you that even the President of the United States of America considered it proper to intervene in these matters, which one finds it hard to reconcile with the American policy of neutrality. In a message to Comrade Kalinin, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, dated October 12, Mr. Roosevelt expressed the hope that the friendly and peaceful relations between the USSR and Finland would be preserved and developed.

One might think that matters are in better shape between the United States and, let us say, the Philippines or Cuba, who have long been demanding freedom and independence from the United States and cannot get them, than between the Soviet Union and Finland, which has long ago obtained both freedom and political independence from the Soviet Union.

Comrade Kalinin replied to Mr. Roosevelt's message as follows:

"I consider it proper to remind you, Mr. President, that the political independence of the Republic of Finland was recognized by free will of the Soviet Government, on December 31, 1917, and that the sovereignty of Finland was secured to her by the treaty of peace between the RSFSR and Finland of October 14, 1920. These acts of the Soviet Government defined the fundamental principles governing the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. It is in conformity with these principles that the present negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Government of Finland are being

conducted. Contrary to the tendentious version, spread by circles who are evidently not interested in European peace, the sole object of these negotiations is to consolidate relations between the Soviet Union and Finland and to strengthen the peaceful cooperation of the two countries in the matter of safeguarding the security of the Soviet Union and Finland."

After this plain reply by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it should be quite clear that, granted good will, the Finnish Government will meet our proposals, which are minimal ones and which—far from militating against the national and State interests of Finland—will enhance her security and form a broad basis for further extensive development of the political and economic relations between our countries. . . .

SOVIET PROPOSAL TO FINLAND, DATED OCTOBER 14, 1939

IN the negotiations with Finland, the Soviet Union is mainly concerned with the settling of two questions:

- (a) Securing the safety of Leningrad;
- (b) Becoming satisfied that Finland will have firm, friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Both points are essential for the purpose of preserving against external hostile aggression the integrity of the Soviet Union coast of the Gulf of Finland and also of the coast of Estonia, whose independence the Soviet Union had undertaken to defend.

In order to fulfil this duty, it is necessary:

(1) To make it possible to block the opening of the Gulf of Finland by means of artillery fire from both coasts of the Gulf of Finland, in order to prevent warships and transport ships of the enemy from penetrating the waters of the Gulf of Finland;

(2) To make it possible to prevent the access of the enemy to those islands in the Gulf of Finland which are situated west and north-west of the entrance to Leningrad;

(3) To have the Finnish frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia, which frontier is now at a distance of 32 kilometers from Leningrad—i.e., within the range of shots from a long-distance gun—moved somewhat further northwards and north-westwards.

A separate question arises with regard to the Kalastajasaarento in Petsamo, where the frontier is unskillfully and artificially drawn and has to be adjusted in accordance with the annexed map.

With the preceding as a basis, it is necessary to settle the following questions by having in view a mutual arrangement and common interests:

(1) Leasing to the Soviet Union for a period of thirty years the port of Hangö and a territory adjoining thereto situated within a radius of 5-6 nautical miles southwards and eastwards and within a radius of 3 nautical miles westwards and northwards, for the purpose of creating a naval base with coastal artillery, capable of blocking by artillery fire, together with the naval base Paldiski (in Estonia) on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, the access to the Gulf of Finland. For the protection of the naval base, the Finnish Government should permit the Gov-

ernment of the Soviet Union to keep in the port of Hangö the following garrison:

- One infantry regiment;
- Two anti-aircraft batteries;
- Two air-force regiments;
- One battalion of armored cars, altogether not more than 5,000 men.

(2) Granting to the naval forces of the Soviet Union the right of using the bay of Lappohja as anchoring berth.

(3) Ceding to the Soviet Union, in exchange for other territories, the following:

The islands Suursaari, Seiskari, Lavansaari, Tytärsaari and Koivisto, part of the Isthmus of Karelia, from the village of Lippola to the southern border of the town of Koivisto, and the western parts of the Kalastajasaarento—in total, 2,761 square kilometers, in accordance with the annexed map.

(4) In exchange for the territories mentioned in paragraph 3, the Soviet Union cedes to the Republic of Finland, Soviet Union territory of the districts of Repola and Porajärvi to the extent of 5,529 square kilometers, in accordance with the annexed map.

(5) Strengthening the Non-Aggression Treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland by including therein a paragraph according to which the Contracting Parties undertake not to join any groups or alliances directly or indirectly hostile to either of the Contracting Parties.

(6) Suppression of the fortified zones situated on both sides of the frontier between Finland and the Soviet Union and leaving frontier-guard troops only at the frontier.

(7) The Soviet Union does not object to the fortifying of the Aland Islands by Finland's own work, provided that no foreign Power, Sweden included, has anything to do with the question of fortifying the Aland Islands.

In her counter-proposal to the Soviet Union of October 23, Finland refused the request regarding leasing to the USSR the port of Hangö and adjoining territory as a naval base. A slight adjustment of the frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia was offered, still leaving it much closer to Leningrad than the USSR considered compatible with her security. The Finnish Government stated that in regard to Article 2, Paragraph 1, of the Non-Aggression Treaty, in which the Contracting Parties undertake to observe neutrality in cases where either Party becomes the victim of aggression by a third state, the Finnish Government would be prepared to have this paragraph redrafted in clearer and more definite terms. The other proposals made in the Soviet note of October 14 were unanswered.

PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION TRANSMITTED ON OCTOBER 23, 1939

With reference to the Finnish Government's memorandum of October 23 the Government of the Soviet Union beg to state that, in accordance with the views defined in the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of October 14, the proposals advanced by them represent their minimum terms, the attitude having been dictated by the fundamental security requirements of the Soviet Union and particularly of the city of Leningrad with its 3½ million inhabitants. These proposals were expressly put forward as minimum terms and, further to this, the Soviet Union withdrew their proposal for the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland, in order to enable Finland to maintain her strict neutrality. At the same time, the Government of the Soviet Union abandoned their proposal concerning the non-fortification of the Aland

Islands or their fortification in cooperation with the Soviet Union, substituting for these proposals their assent to the fortification of the Aland Islands by Finland herself. The Soviet Union made these important concessions, as she relied upon Finland's friendly attitude and was also confident that Finland could agree to the minimum proposals made in the Union's memorandum of October 14.

The exchange of views between the representatives of the Soviet Union (Molotov, Stalin) and those of Finland (Tanner, Paasikivi) on October 23 enabled both parties to understand each other's views better, but at the same time revealed a divergence between them. Taking into account the results of this conversation and in order to pay due regard to the Finnish Government's wishes, the Government of the Soviet Union wish to make the following statement:

(1) The Government of the Soviet Union are unable to withdraw their proposal that a naval base be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union in Hangö since they regard this proposal as an absolutely essential minimum condition for the safeguarding of the defence of Leningrad. In this connection the Government of the Soviet Union, amending their memorandum of October 14, would find it possible to limit to 4,000 men the land force for the protection of the naval base, and to maintain this force on the territory of Hangö only up to the end of the war between England, France and Germany, in Europe.

(2) The Government of the Soviet Union find it impossible to agree to the proposal that a strip of 10 versts of Finnish territory on the Isthmus of Karelia should—as proposed in the Finnish Government's memorandum of October 23—be ceded in return for the territory to be ceded by the Soviet Union. The Government of the Soviet Union find such a step quite inadequate as a means of providing a minimum of security for Leningrad at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland. Being desirous, however, of meeting Finland in an accommodating spirit, the Government of the Soviet Union would find it possible, as an extreme concession, to amend their original proposal in some measure by reducing, in the manner shown in the annexed map the area of the Isthmus of Karelia to be ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union against territorial compensation; in this connection, the original proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union regarding the Island of Koivisto remains unaltered.

(3) The Soviet Government find it necessary to maintain the other proposals contained in the Soviet Government's memorandum of October 14.

(4) The Soviet Government accept the Finnish Government's proposal regarding the amendment of Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Non-Aggression Treaty.

In a further memorandum, Finland reiterated the counter-proposals previously offered; continued her refusal to lease Hangö for a naval base; agreed to cede the previously listed outer islands in the Gulf of Finland; rejected the line of demarcation in the Isthmus of Karelia proposed by the USSR; offered somewhat more extensive territory on the northern coast at the end of the Gulf of Finland than originally proposed; agreed to cession of the western part of Rybachi Peninsula; made certain conditions regarding the territorial compensation offered Finland by the USSR; rejected the proposal of replacing the fortified zone between Finland and the USSR by an ordinary frontier guard.

In a supplementary memorandum on November 9 Finland rejected the Soviet proposal that in the event of Finland not being able to grant the USSR a military base at Hangö, such a base should be granted instead on the island situated in the vicinity of Hangö—namely, Hermansö, Koö and Hästöbusö—together with an anchorage in the port of Lappohja.

MEMORANDUM PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER 9, 1939, BY M. MOLOTOV TO M. PAASIKIVI AND M. TANNER

Having taken note of the memorandum of the Finnish Government which you handed to me today (November 9), I find that in this memorandum the declaration of the Government of the USSR, dated November 3, has been incorrectly set forth.

In point of fact, on the 3rd instant, the Government of the USSR made the following proposals:

(1) The Government of the USSR, taking into consideration the declaration of the Finnish Government that it cannot consent to a garrison or naval base of another Power being situated "on the territory of Finland," proposed to the Finnish Government that a corresponding piece of territory situated in the vicinity of the port of Hangö should be sold to the USSR. This solution would mean that the objection that such a piece of land formed part of the territory of Finland would cease to apply, since, after having been sold to the USSR, it would ipso facto, become Soviet territory.

(2) Furthermore, the Government of the USSR stated that it would propose to the Finnish Government that if, for any reason, a piece of land situated in the vicinity of Hangö, could not be sold or exchanged, the islands of Hermansö, Koö, Hästöbusö, Långskär, Furuskar, Ekö, and certain other islands situated near them should be sold or exchanged, as the Finnish Government agreed to do on a previous occasion, when it ceded to the USSR certain islands in the Gulf of Finland and some territory on the Karelian Isthmus.

By reason of the foregoing, I consider that the objection contained in the memorandum of M. Paasikivi and M. Tanner, dated the 9th instant, that "Finland cannot grant to a foreign Power military bases on its territory and within the confines of its frontiers" is unfounded and indicates a misinterpretation of the attitude of the Government of the USSR.

It is obvious that if either the region of Hangö or the islands situated to the east of Hangö were sold or exchanged for a corresponding piece of territory in the USSR, they could no longer form part of the territory of Finland or be situated within the confines of the Finnish frontiers.

Accordingly, I return your memorandum of November 9.

(Signed) V. MOLOTOV.

(The foregoing translations of Soviet notes of October 14, 23 and November 9, were published by the League of Nations on the basis of documentation supplied by Finland. We publish them in the absence of official Soviet texts.)

SOVIET NOTES TO FINLAND

The text of the November 26, 1939, note of V. M. Molotov to the Finnish Government, protesting border provocations, is as follows:

MR. MINISTER, according to a report of the General Staff of the Red Army today, November 26, at 3.45 P.M., our troops, stationed on the Isthmus of Karelia at the Finnish border near the village of Manila, were suddenly subjected to artillery fire from Finnish territory.

Altogether seven shots were fired as a result of which three Red Army men and one junior commander were killed and seven Red Army men and two commanders wounded. Soviet troops, having received strict orders not to give way to provocation, refrained from opening fire in reply.

In informing you of this, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to emphasize that already during recent negotiations with Messrs. Tanner and Paasikivi, the Soviet Government pointed out the danger created by the concentration of large numbers of Finnish regular troops at the very frontier near Leningrad.

At present, in connection with provocative artillery fire from Finnish territory on Soviet troops, the Soviet Government is constrained to place on record that concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad not only creates a menace for Leningrad, but, in actual fact, represents a hostile act against the USSR and has already led to attack on Soviet troops and to loss of life.

The Soviet Government does not intend to place undue emphasis upon this provocative act of attack by Finnish army units, who are perhaps not under proper discipline. But it would not wish similar provocative acts to occur in the future.

In view of this, the Soviet Government, in registering its determined protest in connection with this occurrence, proposes to the Finnish Government that it immediately withdraw its troops further from the frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia, for a distance of 25 kilometers and thus avert the possibility of a repetition of these provocations.

The text of the November 28, 1939, note of V. M. Molotov, sent to the Finnish Government denouncing the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact is as follows:

Mr. Minister, the reply of the Government of Finland to the note of the Soviet Government is a document reflecting the profound hostility of the Government of Finland toward the Soviet Union, and is calculated to carry to extremes the crisis in the relations between the two countries.

1. The denial by the Government of Finland of the outrageous shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops which resulted in victims cannot be explained except by a desire to lead astray public opinion, and cast derision upon the victims of the firing. Only the absence of a sense of responsibility and a contemptuous attitude toward public opinion could explain this shocking incident as artillery salvos fired in the course of "training drills" of Soviet troops very near the frontier line, before the eyes of Finnish troops.

2. The refusal of the Government of Finland to withdraw the troops responsible for the villainous shelling of Soviet troops, together with the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops, formally proceeding from the principle of equality on both sides, betray the hostile desire of the Government of Finland to keep Leningrad under threat. In reality we do not here have equality in positions of Finnish troops and Soviet troops, but, on the contrary, an advantageous position for the Finnish troops. Soviet troops menace no vital centers of Finland, being removed from these centers for hundreds of kilometers; while Finnish troops, stationed 32 kilometers [about 20 miles] from Leningrad—a vital center of the USSR with a population of 3,500,000—constitute an immediate threat to it. Properly speaking, there is no room for withdrawal of Soviet troops since their with-

drawal would mean stationing them in the Leningrad suburbs which is obviously absurd from the viewpoint of the security of Leningrad. The proposal of the Soviet Government regarding the withdrawal of the Finnish troops twenty to twenty-five kilometers constitutes a minimum; since its purpose is not to eliminate this inequality in the positions of the Finnish and Soviet troops but only to reduce it to some extent. If the Government of Finland declines even this minimum proposal that means that it intends to keep Leningrad directly menaced by its troops.

3. By concentrating large forces of its regular troops and thus placing under immediate threat a most important vital center of the USSR the Government of Finland has committed a hostile act against the USSR incompatible with the non-aggression pact concluded between the two countries. Moreover, by refusing to withdraw its troops at least twenty to twenty-five kilometers, following the villainous shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops, the Government of Finland has shown that it continues to maintain a hostile attitude toward the USSR and does not intend to pay regard to the provisions of the non-aggression pact and has decided to keep Leningrad under threat in the future as well. However the Government of the USSR cannot reconcile itself to a situation where only one side would undertake to carry out this pact. In view of this the Soviet Government deems itself compelled to state that from this date it considers itself free from obligations undertaken under the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland. Accept, Mr. Minister, assurance of my complete respect.

MOLOTOV'S BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE

On November 29, 1939, Viacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, broadcast the following speech:

Men and women, citizens of the Soviet Union, the hostile policy pursued by the present Government of Finland towards our country compels us to take immediate measures to insure the external security of our State.

You know that in the course of the past two months, the Soviet Government has patiently conducted negotiations with the Government of Finland concerning proposals which, in the present alarming international situation, it regarded as the minimum essential for insuring the security of our country and especially for the security of Leningrad.

In these negotiations the Government of Finland adopted an attitude of irreconcilable hostility towards our country. Instead of finding ground for agreement in a friendly manner, the present rulers of Finland, to please the foreign imperialists who instigate hostility towards the Soviet Union, took a different course.

Despite all the concessions we made, the negotiations ended without yielding any result. The consequences of this are now known. In recent days abominable provocations have been initiated by the Finnish militarists on the frontier between the Soviet Union and Finland, including even artillery firing on our troops near Leningrad, which caused grave losses in the Red Army units.

Attempts of our Government to forestall repetition of these provocations by means of practical proposals addressed to the Government of Finland, far from finding any support, again met with the hostile policy of the ruling circles of Finland. As you know from yesterday's note of the Soviet Government, they replied to our proposals by a hostile refusal and a brazen denial of the facts, by a derisive attitude toward the victims we have lost and by undisguised striving to continue to keep Leningrad under the immediate area of their troops in the future.

All this has definitely shown that the present Government of Finland, which

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became entangled in its anti-Soviet ties with the imperialists, does not wish to maintain normal relations with the Soviet Union. It continues in its hostile attitude towards our country and has no wish to pay due regard to the provisions of the non-aggression pact concluded between our countries. It desires to keep our glorious Leningrad under military threat. From such a Government and from its thoughtless military clique, we can now expect only fresh, insolent provocations.

The Soviet Government was therefore compelled yesterday to declare that henceforth it considered itself free from the obligations undertaken under the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland, and violated in an irresponsible manner by the Government of Finland. In view of the fresh attacks of the Finnish military units on Soviet troops at the Soviet-Finnish frontier, the Government has now been compelled to adopt new decisions. The Government can no longer tolerate the present situation, responsibility for which fully rests with the Government of Finland. The Government of the USSR has arrived at the conclusion that it can no longer maintain normal relations with the Government of Finland and has therefore found it necessary immediately to recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. Along with this, the Government has given orders to the Chief of Command of Red Army and Navy to be ready for any surprise and immediately to check possible fresh sallies on the part of the Finnish military clique.

The hostile foreign press asserts that the measures being taken by us are aimed at the seizure of Finnish territory or its annexation to the USSR. This is malicious slander. The Soviet Government has had no such intentions. More than that, if Finland herself pursued a friendly policy towards the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, which always strove for friendly relations with Finland, would be ready to meet her half-way in regard to territorial concessions on the part of the USSR. Under this condition the Soviet Government would be ready to consider favorably even such a question as the question of re-uniting the Karelian people inhabiting the main districts of present Soviet Karelia with kindred Finnish people in a single and independent Finnish State. For this, however, it is necessary that the Government of Finland should maintain not a hostile but a friendly attitude toward the USSR, which would correspond to the vital interests of both states.

Others assert that measures carried out by us are aimed against Finland's independence, or at interference in her internal and external affairs. This is equally malicious slander. Irrespective of the regime existing in Finland, we consider her an independent and sovereign state in her external and internal policies. We firmly hold that the Finnish people should itself decide its internal and external affairs in the manner it deems necessary.

At the proper time the peoples of the Soviet Union did what was necessary for the creation of an independent Finland. The peoples of our country are ready also in the future to render the Finnish people assistance in assuring its free and independent development.

The Soviet Union has equally no intention of prejudicing to any extent the interests of other states in Finland. Questions of the relations between Finland and other states are the exclusive concern of Finland herself, and the Soviet Union does not consider itself entitled to interfere in this matter. The only purpose of our measures is to insure the security of the Soviet Union and especially of Leningrad with its population of 3,500,000. In the present international atmosphere, heated by war, we cannot make the solution of this vital and urgent state problem dependent on the ill-will of the present Finnish rulers.

This problem will have to be solved by the efforts of the Soviet Union itself in friendly cooperation with the Finnish people. We have no doubt that a favorable solution of the problem of insuring the security of Leningrad will provide the foundation for an indestructible friendship between the USSR and Finland.

MOLOTOV'S DENIAL OF CIVILIAN BOMBINGS

In response to representations made on December 1, by Mr. Laurence B. Steinhardt, Ambassador of the United States to the USSR, on behalf of President Roosevelt, protesting the alleged bombardment of civilians in Finland by Soviet airmen, Mr. Molotov made the following reply:

"Mr. Roosevelt's suggestion that air bombardment of the population of Finland's towns should not be permitted, insofar as it is addressed to the Soviet Government, is caused by a misunderstanding. Soviet airplanes have bombed airdromes, but they have not bombed towns and do not intend doing so, because our Government values the interest of the Finnish population no less than any other Government does. Certainly one may fail to see this from America, which is over 8,000 kilometers away from Finland. Nevertheless, facts are facts. In view of this, Mr. Roosevelt's statement is, as can be seen, pointless."

Moscow Daily News, December 4, 1939.

SOVIET APOLOGIES TO NORWAY AND SWEDEN FOR AIRPLANE INCIDENTS

On January 19 the Tass News Agency published the following statement regarding notes sent to Sweden and Norway regretting the accidental violation of their borders by Soviet planes:

"On January 17 Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Solomon Lozovsky, handed to the Chargé d'Affaires of Sweden, von Euler, the reply of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the note of the Swedish Government dated January 16, 1940, in which the Swedish Government lodged a protest at the fact that Soviet planes flew over the Swedish island of Kalaks near the city of Lulea on January 14 and allegedly dropped bombs. In this note the Swedish Government also asked the Government of USSR to take measures to avoid repetition of such cases in the future.

"In reply to this note the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in its note declared that according to information received, two Soviet planes actually did fly across the Soviet frontier, owing to difficulty in finding exact bearings due to a severe snowstorm. The Soviet Government expressed its regret at what had occurred.

"On January 17 the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs also handed a note to the Norwegian Mission in Moscow in reply to its notes of January 15 and 16 in which protest was lodged against Soviet planes flying across the Norwegian frontier on January 12 and 14 in the region of Svanik-Vaggetem.

"In his note the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs declared that according to information received three cases actually did take place in which Soviet planes accidentally crossed the Norwegian frontier on January 12 and 14, which fact was solely due to unfavorable weather conditions which made it difficult for the aviators to find their bearings. The Soviet Government expressed its regret at what had occurred."

THE SOVIET-FINNISH PEACE TREATY
MARCH 12, 1940

THE Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the one side and the President of the Republic of Finland on the other side, guided by the desire to put an end to the hostilities between the two countries and create stable, mutually peaceful relations, convinced that a definition of exact conditions ensuring mutual security, including the security of the cities of Leningrad and Murmansk, as well as of the Murmansk railway, corresponds to the interests of both contracting parties, found it necessary to conclude a peace treaty for these purposes and appointed as their authorized representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Andrey Alexandrovich Zhdanov, Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; Alexander Mikhailovich Vassilevsky, Brigade Commander;

President of the Republic of Finland: Risto Ryti, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Finland; Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Minister; Karl Rudolph Walden, General; and Vainö Voionmaa, Professor.

The above authorized representatives, upon mutual presentation of their credentials, found in due form and good order, agreed upon the following:

Article I

Hostilities between the USSR and Finland shall cease immediately in accordance with the procedure provided for in the protocol appended to this treaty.

Article II

The State frontier between the USSR and the Republic of Finland shall be established along a new line in accordance with which the territory of the USSR will include the entire Karelian Isthmus with the town of Viborg (Viipuri) and Viborg Bay with its islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, with the towns of Kexholm, Sortavala, Suojärvi, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the territory east of Merikijärvi with the town of Kuolajärvi, part of the peninsulas of Rybachi and Sredni in accordance with the map appended to this treaty.

A more detailed description of the frontier line will be determined by a mixed commission of representatives of the contracting parties, which commission must be formed within ten days from the date of the signing of this treaty.

Article III

Both contracting parties mutually undertake to refrain from any attack upon each other, not to conclude any alliances, and not to participate in any coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

Article IV

The Republic of Finland consents to lease to the Soviet Union for thirty years, with an annual payment by the Soviet Union of 8,000,000 Finnish marks, Hangö Peninsula and the waters surrounding it in a radius of five miles to the south and east and three miles to the west and north of the peninsula, and a number of islands adjoining it in accordance with the appended map, for the purpose of creating there a naval base capable of defending the entrance of the Gulf of Finland against aggres-

sion; for the purpose of protection of its naval base, the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain there at its own expense, land and air forces of the necessary strength.

Within ten days from the date when this treaty becomes effective, the Government of Finland shall withdraw all its troops from Hangö Peninsula, and Hangö Peninsula together with the adjoining islands, shall pass under the administration of the USSR in accordance with this article of the treaty.

Article V

The USSR undertakes to withdraw its troops from the Petsamo region voluntarily ceded to Finland by the Soviet State in accordance with the Peace Treaty of 1920. Finland undertakes, as provided by the Peace Treaty of 1920, to refrain from maintaining in the waters along her coast of the Arctic Ocean, naval and other armed ships excepting armed ships of less than 100 tons displacement which Finland has the right to maintain without restriction, also not more than fifteen naval and other armed ships with a tonnage of not more than 400 tons each. Finland undertakes, as was provided by the same treaty, not to maintain in said waters any submarines and armed aircraft. Finland similarly undertakes, as was provided by the same treaty, not to establish on that coast military ports, naval bases and naval repair shops of greater capacity than necessary for the above-mentioned ships and their armaments.

Article VI

As provided by the Treaty of 1920, the Soviet Union and its citizens are granted the right of free transit across the Petsamo region to Norway and back. The Soviet Union is granted the right to institute a Consulate in the Petsamo region. Freight in transit across the Petsamo region from the USSR to Norway, as likewise freight in transit across the same region from Norway to the USSR is to be exempted from inspection and control excepting only such control as is necessary for the regulation of transit communications. The said freight is also exempted from the payment of customs duties, transit and other duties. The above-mentioned control of transit freight is permitted only in the form observed in similar cases in accordance with established usages in international communications. Citizens of the USSR travelling across the Petsamo region to Norway and back from Norway to the USSR have the right of free transit passage on the basis of passports issued by the Soviet organs concerned.

Soviet unarmed aircraft shall have the right to maintain air service between the USSR and Norway across the Petsamo region with the observance of general operating rules.

Article VII

The Government of Finland shall grant the Soviet Union the right of transit of goods between the USSR and Sweden, and with the aim of developing this transit along the shortest railroad route, the USSR and Finland find it necessary to build, if possible in the course of the year 1940, each party on its own territory, a railway line connecting the town of Kandalaksha with the town of Kemijärvi.

Article VIII

When this treaty comes into force, economic relations between the contracting parties will be restored and with this end in view, the contracting parties will enter negotiations for the conclusion of a trade treaty.

Article IX

The present peace treaty comes into force immediately upon being signed and is subject to subsequent ratification. The exchange of ratification instruments shall

take place within ten days in Moscow. The present treaty is made in two originals, in the Russian, Finnish and Swedish languages each, in Moscow March 12, 1940.

Signed: MOLOTOV, ZHDANOV, VASSILEVSKY, RYTI, PAASIKIVI, WALDEN, VOIONMAA.


Protocol

The contracting parties fix the following procedure for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops beyond the state frontier established by the treaty:

1. Both sides are to cease hostilities at noon, March 13, 1940, Leningrad time.
2. A neutral zone is to be established one kilometer (about six-tenths of a mile) wide between the lines of the advance units, as from the hour fixed for the cessation of hostilities; and in the course of the first day the troops and units, which in accordance with the new state frontier find themselves on territory of the other side, shall be withdrawn for one kilometer.
3. The withdrawal of troops beyond the new State frontier and the advance of troops to the other side towards the frontier shall be commenced at ten o'clock on March 15, 1940 along the whole frontier from the Gulf of Finland to Lieksa and ten o'clock March 16 north of Lieksa. The withdrawal shall be effected by daily marches of not less than seven kilometers in twenty-four hours while the advance of troops on the other side must be effected in such a way that the rear units of the troops being withdrawn and the advanced units of the troops of the other side marching toward the new frontier shall be separated by a distance of not less than seven kilometers.
4. The following time limits are fixed for withdrawal on the various sections of the state frontier:
 - A.) In the section from the sources of the river Tunttajoki, Kuolajärvi, Takaka, on the Eastern shore of Lake Joukamjärvi, the withdrawal of troops of both sides must be completed by eight P.M., March 20, 1940;
 - B.) In the section south of Kuhmonjemi in the area of Latva the withdrawal of troops is to be completed by 8 P.M., March 22, 1940;
 - C.) In the section of Longavara, Vartaila, Station Matkaselka, the withdrawal of troops of both sides must be completed by eight P.M., March 26, 1940;
 - D.) In the section of Station Matkaselka, Kojtsanlahti, withdrawal of troops is to be completed by 8 P.M., March 22, 1940;
 - E.) In the section Kojtsanlahti, Station Enso the withdrawal of troops is to be completed by 8 P.M., March 25, 1940;
 - F.) In the section station Enso, Island Bate, the withdrawal of troops is to be completed by 8 P.M., March 19, 1940.
5. The evacuation of the Red Army troops from the Petsamo area must be completed by April 10, 1940;
6. The Command of both sides undertakes in the course of the withdrawal of troops beyond the State frontier, to take necessary measures for the preservation of the towns and localities which pass to the other side and to take suitable measures to safeguard against damage and destruction of cities, small towns, and structures of defensive and economic significance (bridges, dams, airdromes, barracks, storehouses, railway junctions, industrial enterprises, telegraph communications, power stations).
7. All questions which may arise in the course of transfer of areas, localities, towns and other objectives mentioned in Paragraph 6 of this protocol by one side to the other, shall be settled by representatives of both sides on the spot, for which purpose special delegates shall be appointed by the command for each main road of movement of both armies.
8. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be effected in the shortest possible time after the cessation of hostilities on the basis of a special agreement.

Signed: MOLOTOV, ZHDANOV, VASSILEVSKY, RYTI, PAASIKIVI, WALDEN, VOIONMAA.

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